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INTRODUCTION
"What chance has labor, the laborers, for fair play when the whole history of
jurisprudence has been against the laborer?" 1
Seventy years ago, Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene expressed the widely

held view that federal courts were far from neutral in their approach to labormanagement disputes.2 Although Congress enacted two major labor protection
statutes in the 1930s, 3 federal appellate judges in the ensuing decades have been
accused of undermining statutory protections for various forms of concerted
activity. Such critiques rest on the claim-at times openly stated by legal scholarsthat federal courts are systematically opposed to workers' interests in unionization
and collective action.4 There is some empirical evidence to support the assertion
that, in the aggregate, federal courts of appeals have been unusually chary of the
statutory rights asserted by workers and their unions.5 Yet this assertion of persistent

ISamuel Gompers, Debate (1903), quoted in I THE GREEN BAG 306,314 (2d ser. 1998).
2See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200-05 (1930).
Labor leaders viewed courts as the enemy of workers well before 1930. See Bernard D. Meltzer,
The Brandeis-GompersDebate on "Incorporation"ofLabor Unions, 1 THE GREEN BAG 299,
313-15 (2d ser. 1998) (reporting text of 1903 debate between Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Gompers on the legal accountability of labor unions, in which Gompers intoned that courts had
consistently "transgress[ed] upon the ights of wage earners"). More recently, legal scholars other
than Frankfurter and Greene have reached the same conclusion. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 33, 52-53, 151-52, 199-201 (1991)
(describing federal judges' opposition to worker interests in late 19th century); see generally
WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUrED FURY: PoPuLIsTs, PROGREssIvEs, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994).
3Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65,47 Stat. 70 (1932); National Labor Relations Act,
Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935).
4 See, e.g., CHRIsTOPHER L. TOMLINs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONs: LABOR RELATIONs,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABORMOVEMENT INAMERICA, 1880-1960,239-41,319-21(1985);
Julius Getman, OfLaborLaw and Birdsong,30 CONN. L. REv. 1345, 1349-50 (1998); Karl E.
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal
Consciousness,1937-1941,62 MINN. L. REV. 265,293-336 (1978); George Schazki, It'sSimple:
Judges Don'tLike Labor Unions, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1365, 1366-70 (1998).
5See RONDAL GENE DOWNING, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
1936-1954: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 137-38 (1956) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois) (reporting that National Labor Relations Board orders were fully enforced
in 63.3% of all unfair labor practice cases between 1936 and 1954, compared with full judicial
enforcement for 80% of orders issued by Securities and Exchange Commission, 70% of orders
issued by Federal Trade Commission, and 66% of orders issued by Federal Power Commission);
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy ofFederal
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result-oriented jurisprudence conflicts with the traditional legal process belief that
judicial decisions are shaped by more or less objectively discernible factors such as
the plain meaning of statutory text, the intent of the legislature, and the controlling
6
weight of agency or court precedent.

Disagreement about how judicial attitudes affect labor law decisionmaking by
federal appellate courts is at the core of a broader debate that tends to pit the legal
profession against political scientists. Judges and many legal scholars recognize that
appellate courts have considerable discretion in deciding particular cases, but they
emphasize the importance of language, precedent, and logical reasoning in cabining
the exercise of such discretion. 7 By contrast, many political scientists accept the
formal limits imposed by law and judicial custom, but they emphasize the role of
judges' policy preferences within these relatively soft constraints. 8 In recent years,
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.L 984, 1013-22 (reporting that in 1984-1985, the National
Labor Relations Board had a lower affirmance rate in the courts of appeals (75%) than other
agencies that also act almost exclusively through adjudication and have a similarly high volume
of cases, i.e. the Immigration and Naturalization Service (83% of orders fully affirmed) and the
Merit Systems Protection Board (90% of orders fully affirmed)).
6 See Alex Kozinski, What I Atefor Breakfast and Other Mysteries ofJudicialDecision
Making, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 993, 996-97 (1993); Patricia M. Wald, Thoughts on
Decisionmaking,87 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1984); see generally HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERTM. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS INTHEMAKING AND APPLICAnION OF
LAW 403-576 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
7See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judgingin the Quiet ofthe Storm, 24 ST. MARY's LJ.965,
982-88 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on
CurrentPracticein FederalAppellateAdjudication,32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 388-95 (1983);
Frederick Schauer, GivingReasons,47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634-35 (1995); David L. Shapiro, In
Defense ofJudicialCandor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736 (1987). While legal realists, public
choice theorists, and proponents of critical legal theory qualify as a diverse chorus of dissenters
within the legal community, the legal process perspective-based on reasoned elaboration of
objective doctrine and rules--remains the dominent lawyerly explanation for judicial
decisionmaking. See generallyNEIL DuxBuRY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
8
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL& HAROLDJ. SPAmH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrruDINAL
MODEL 64-65 (1993); Gregory A. Caldeira, Book Review, 88 AM. POL. SC. REv. 485, 485
(1994) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAEMH, supra)("I can think ofno political scientists who would take
plain meaning, intent of the firers, and precedent as good explanations of what the justices do
in making decisions'); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28,42 (1997); John M. Scheb II et al., Ideology,
Role Orientations,andBehavior in State Courts ofLastResort, 19 AM. POL. Q. 324, 324 (1991)
(stating that "[t]here is little doubt among students ofthejudicial process that ideology, in the sense
of liberalism versus conservativism, is a significant predictor ofjudicial behavior"). Law professors
as well as political scientists have expressed similar views with specific reference to intermediate
appellate courts. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICALBEHAVIOR 57-65 (1997); Tracey
E. George, Developinga PositiveTheory ofDecisionmakingon U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 58 OHIO
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scholars using complex quantitative techniques have sought to identify connections
between biographical background factors that allegedly shape judges' policy
preferences and the decisions reached by those judges.9 While the studies have
produced nothing approaching consensus, scholars have often identified the political
party of the appointing President as important in helping to predict judicial
decisions. 10 The evidence regarding the explanatory value of other social
background factors has been at best mixed or inconclusive. 1
Relying on a database ofunprecedented richness, our study offers new insights
into both of these debates. We have identified every appellate court decision that
reviewed an adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)
involving liability or relief during a recent seven year period. We coded all
individual issues within the cases that reflect court determinations on liability or
relief. We also identified the federal judges who participated on the court of appeals
panels and how they voted with respect to each issue. The result is over 2,000
substantive labor law issues on which appellate courts either affirmed or reversed
the Board, giving rise to more than 6,000 judicial votes. Further, for each of the 223
participating appellate court judges, we coded a broad range of biographical factors
that reflect personal attributes, educational preparation, and pre-judicial political and
professional experience. Using logistic regression and related statistical analyses,
we are able to focus on which social background factors are significantly more
likely to predict judicial votes supporting, or rejecting, the union's legal position in
the courts of appeals.
Our study of judicial behavior includes numerous distinctive strengths. The
database of all 1,224 decisions issued during a seven year period allows us to
analyze a full universe of cases including unanimous unpublished affirmances, as
well as an intermediate subset of decisions that were published in the Federal
Reporter and a smaller grouping of divisive cases that present close, controversial
issues-reversals and nonunanimous affirmances. Most prior studies of judicial
behavior have focused on published decisions or divisive cases, 12 in part because
ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology and the D.C.
Circuit,83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact ofParty
and Region on VotingDecisionsin the United States Courts ofAppeals 1955-1986,43 W. POL.

Q.317,320 (1990).
9 See infra Part I.
1
0 See infraPart I.A.3.

I1See infra Part I.A.2.
12
See, e.g., Kevin L. Lyles, PresidentialExpectationsandJudicialPerformanceRevisited:
Law and Politicsin the FederalDistrict Courts, 1960-1992,26 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 447
(1996) (examining cases that receive a full written opinion and have precedential value); Songer
& Davis, supranote 8 (examining published opinions); C. Neal Tate, PersonalAttributeModels
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3
it is extremely difficult to track down nondivisive cases that are unpublished.'
Further, a database that codes for issue outcomes can account for important
complexities within cases. Issue-specific analysis allows for distinctions between
single-issue and multi-issue cases; it reflects the presence of mixed results within
a single case; 14 and it facilitates recognition of substantive areas of law that generate
unusual levels of conflict between the Board and the appellate courts.15 Once again,
most prior studies have focused on case outcomes while omitting issue-specific
discussion.
In addition, we build on this database through the use of logistic regression
equations incorporating a broad range of social background factors as independent
variables. This statistical analysis enables us to isolate the significance of each
particular background factor while controlling for other effects and then to assess
the magnitude of those factors that are statistically significant. Many earlier studies
either utilized bivariate comparisons that did not control for other variables or else
employed a less reliable type of regression analysis. 16 Finally, in assessing which
social background variables are significantly related to judges' positions for or
against the union, we specifically control for the outcome before the NLRB and for
the effects of being in a particular court of appeals. To the extent that prior studies
have failed to address the effects ofjudicial deference to agency determinations, or
of sharp variations in circuit court cultures, they have overlooked important
constraints on the behavior of individual appellate judges.
The results we report are surprising in some respects. We found that college

of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 356 (1981) (examining

nonunanimous decisions); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals 1961-64,60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 374 (1966) [hereinafter VotingBehavior] (examining

unanimous reversals and nonunanimous decisions).
13
See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the DisposableOpinion: UnpublishedOpinions and
Government Litigantsin the United States Courts ofAppeals, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 940, 944 (1989)
(discussing widespread circuit court practices that limit distribution and avoid indexing of
unpublished opinions); Kirt Shuldberg, DigitalInfluence: Technology and UnpublishedOpinions

in the FederalCourtsofAppeals, 85 CAL. L. REv. 541,547-48 (1997) (observing that restricted
publication lowers the cost of legal research precisely because unpublished opinions are

inaccessible).
14 A case is classified as a reversal if the outcome below was not fully affirmed or enforced.
In a case involving six issues, the party prevailing below may win four issues while losing two.
Issue-specific analysis reflects the affirmed outcomes as well as the reversed ones.
15
See, e.g., infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing disproportionately high
reversal rate where Board held that employer violated section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA).
16
See infra note 25 (discussing studies based on bivariate analysis and studies based on
stepwise regression).
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background and prior experience representing management in NLRA matters were
significantly associated with a judge's stance toward unions' claims. Judges who
graduated from elite colleges were significantly more likely to reject the union's
position in the courts of appeals than judges who graduated from less prestigious
schools. Conversely, judges who had represented management in NLRA matters
before joining the bench were significantly more likely to support union claims than
judges who lacked that professional experience. We also found that elected office
experience, law school background, age, religion, and race reliably predicted votes
under some circumstances.
We identified important effects as well that are related to political party, gender,
and year of appointment. Democratic men, Democratic women, and Republican
women all were significantly more likely than Republican men to support the
union's position in most analyses. At the same time, more recent appointees from
both parties were significantly less likely to support the union's position, a finding
that may carry special weight when contemplating the future direction of NLRA
law.
The persistent impact of various social background factors indicates the
inadequacy of a purely doctrinal explanation for appellate court decisions, at least
in the labor relations area. Although our findings are subject to some qualifications,
they strongly suggest that specific attributes and experiences do influence judicial
approaches to substantive law issues. Insofar as such factors are affecting either
judicial attitudes or judicial reliance on reasoned analysis, this raises important
questions regarding the training and education ofjudges, the self-awareness of these
judicial actors, and the appropriate response from scholars who subscribe to the
traditional doctrinal approach.
Part I of the Article briefly describes current scholarly debates over the value
ofjudicial attributes in helping to explain court decisions. Part I also identifies some
key hypotheses we set out to explore with respect to judicial decisions in the labor
relations area. Part II sets forth the methods used in our study, including how we
coded issues and judges, and the different ways in which we assess the importance
of our findings. Part III presents our findings, while Part IV discusses them and
places them in the context of other studies. Part IV also considers some of the
limitations on our results and identifies possible areas for further analysis.
I. CASELAW OUTCOMES AND JuDIcIAL ATTRIBUTES

This study analyzes appellate judges' voting patterns in a particular substantive
law area over a recent seven year period. A proper understanding of the results
requires a brief overview of the judicial behavior model we apply. While
recognizing that the model has limitations, we believe that as used here it can shed
light on the decisionmaking process of federal judges.
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A. The SocialBackgroundApproach
Empirical research into judicial behavior acknowledges the relevance of casespecific facts and legal precedent but posits that judges' personal traits, their
educational training, and their pre-judicial activities can help explain court
decisions. 17 In particular, a number of social scientists contend that pre-court life
experiences play a prominent role in shaping the personal values and policy
preferences ofjudges, and that such biographical factors can be useful in predicting
judicial decisions. 18 Among the potentially relevant biographical factors, personal
traits include a judge's race, gender, religion, and age. Educational preparation
includes the prestige or rank of the college and law school from which a judge
graduated, the educational institution's geographic region, and whether the
institution was public or private. Pre-judicial professional experience covers factors
such as whether an individual held elected office or a state court judgeship prior to
becoming a federal judge, the nature of the judge's previous law practice, and the
political party of the appointing President which is used as a proxy for the judge's
own ideological orientation.
1. GeneralConcerns
The social background model has drawn criticism from a number of quarters.
It is accused of undervaluing legal doctrine, in particular of failing to appreciate how
judges develop that doctrine primarily through reasoned elaboration of language and
precedent in written decisions, not through subconscious infiltration of life
experiences. 19 In addition, the model is said to overlook an important life experience
for all judges-their adaptation to the role of ajudge. A central aspect ofthe judicial
role involves earning respect from attorneys, fellow judges, and one's own law
clerks through impartial analysis that eschews personal value choices.20 A further
17 See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, CombiningJudges'Attributesand Case Characteristics:An

AlternativeApproach to ExplainingSupreme CourtDecisionmaking,71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988);
C. Neal Tate &Roger Handberg, Tme Bindingand Theory Buildingin PersonalAttribute Models
ofSupreme Court VotingBehavior, 1916-1988, 35 AM. J. POL. Scl. 460 (1991); see generallyS.
Sidney Ulmer, Are SocialBackgroundModels Time-Bound?, 80 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 957 (1986).
18 See Aliotta, supranote 17; HENRYR. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS AND JUSTICE 313 (3d ed.
1993); see generally BAUM, supranote 8, at 63 (discussing relationship between judges' career
experiences and their orientation toward legal versus policy perspectives).
19
See Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 987-88; Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the
Methodology ofLaw, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 521,545-46 (1997); Shapiro, supranote 7, at 737; see
generally BAUM, supranote 8, at 17-19 (discussing a typology ofpossible goals forjudges).
20 See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS INTHE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

xxiii, 184-85 (1981); Kozinski, supra note 6, at 994; James L. Oakes, On the Craft and
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aspect of that role at the appellate court level involves the influence of fellow panel
members. An appellate court judge may be inclined to defer to a colleague with
recognized expertise in the subject matter area;2 1 she may feel constrained to follow
precedent by the prospect of whistleblowing from a politically opposed member of
the panel; 22 she may forego voting for her own policy preferences in order to be on
the winning side of a decision;23 or she may moderate her initial views as part of a
collegial process that yields a mutually acceptable judgment. 24
Apart from slighting the importance of legal doctrine and the judicial role, the
social background model suffers from internal difficulties. Some statistical
techniques used to quantify the importance of personal, educational, and
professional experiences have been criticized as incomplete or distortive.25 Certain
PhilosophyofJudging,80 MICH. L. REV. 579,588 (1982).
21
See Jonathan R. Macey, The InternalandExternalCosts andBenefits ofStareDecisis,65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 93, 103 (1989) (contending that appellate court judges use stare decisis as a
form of "expertise-trading," in which they defer to colleagues with specialized knowledge); see
also Terry Bowen, ConsensualNorms and the FreshmanEffect on the United States Supreme
Court, 76 Soc. SCI. Q. 222, 229 (1995) (contending that newly appointed Justices experience
difficulty adjusting to their new duties and responsibilities, and they write significantly fewer
opinions than their senior colleagues during this freshman period); Eloise C. Snyder, The Supreme
Court as a Small Group, 36 Soc. FORCES 232, 237 (1958) (arguing that the "freshman effect'
includes tendency of new Justices to vote with a centrist bloc, and to join liberal or conservative
blocs only later in their judicial careers). A number of scholars have questioned or doubted the
existence of such a freshman effect on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Edward V. Heck & Melinda
Gann Hall, Bloc Voting and the FreshmanJustice Revisited,43 J. PoL. 854 (1981); Albert P.
Melone, Revisiting the FreshmanEffect Hypothesis: The First Two Terms of JusticeAnthony
Kennedy, 74 JUDICATURE 6 (1990); John M. Scheb II & Lee W. Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connorand the "FreshmanEffect," 69 JUDICATURE 9 (1985).
22
See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowingon the FederalCourts ofAppeal, 107 YALE LJ.2155, 2173-75 (1998).
23 See George, supra note 8, at 1686-88; see also Revesz, supranote 8, at 1732-34, 1751-56
(finding some support for the hypothesis that an appellate court judge adjusts her views to avoid
writing a dissent).
24
See HarryT. Edwards, CollegialityandDecisionMaking on the D.C. Circuit,84 VA. L.
REv. 1335, 1358-61 (1998).
25 See JAROL B. MANHEIM & RICHARD C. RICH, EMPMICAL POLmCALANALYSIS: RESEARCH

METHODS INPOLITCAL SCIENCE 280-81 (1991) (describing bivariate comparisons as useful but

unsophisticated in not controlling for other variables that might affect the relationship); WILLIAM
H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 401 (3d ed. 1997) (criticizing stepwise regression for failing

to recognize that the order in which independent variables are inserted will affect findings of
significance); PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMMMCS 52 (3d ed. 1992) (same); Michael S.
Lewis-Beck, Stepwise Regression: A Caution, 5 POL. METHODOLOGY 213, 234-235 (1978)

(same).
For examples ofjudicial behavior studies that relied on bivariate comparisons, see Robert A.
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social background variables also may differ substantially in importance depending
on the distinct era or time frame of a court's operation.26 Further, at least one ofteninvoked variable-the political affiliation of the judge or the appointing Presidentmay have limited explanatory value to the extent it is less a cause of judicial
27
attitudes than a reflection of policy preferences already formed.
More generally, social background factors can be both causes and indicators of
judicial voting patterns, with some factors more causally linked than others.
Scholars relying on the social background approach have struggled with this issue
and have yet to formulate a consistent theory that identifies when background
factors are influential causes-as opposed to reflective indicators-of judicial
behavior.2 8 At a minirnm , judges' social background variables do not mechanically
translate into judicial policy preferences when considering their potential impact or
influence on the decisionmaking process; the relationship seems too complex and
Carp et al., The Voting Behavior ofJudges Appointed by PresidentBush, 76 JUDICATURE 298
(1993); Lyles, supranote 12. For examples ofjudicial behavior studies that relied on stepwise
regression, see Tate, supranote 12; S. Sidney Ulmer, SocialBackgroundas an Indicatorto the
Votes ofSupreme CourtJustices in CriminalCases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. J. POL. SCi. 622
(1973).
26
See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS INTHE FEDERAL
DISTRICr COURTS 34-36 (1983) (finding that Democratic district court judges decided issues very
similarly to Republican appointees between 1953 and 1969, but then became markedly more
liberal in their decisions between 1969 and 1977); Ulmer, supra note 17, at 961-64 (finding that
father's govemment service has no effect on judge's attitude towards government as litigant from
1903-1935 but significant positive effect from 1936-1968).
27
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supranote 8, at 232 (discussing reciprocal linkages between party
affiliation and judicial attitudes); Malcolm M. Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in
JudicialDecision-Making:An Analysis of the MichiganSupreme Court,4 POLITY 91, 101-03
(1971) (contending that party affiliation maybe simply an organizing or summarizing variable in
accounting for voting differences among judges). Presidential selection of appellate court judges
has been overwhelmingly partisan for more than halfa century. Such consistency reflects, at least
in part, an effort by each President to assure a relatively homogeneous public policy cohort. See
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGHREAGAN 355 (1997) (reporting that, except for Truman and Carter appointees, over 90%
of court of appeals judges came from President's own party); see also Patricia M. Wald, A
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999) (suggesting that convergence
of judicial votes and partisan policy views is likely a result of the fact that "the same life
experiences that channel a judge's choice of political parties also guide her judicial
decisionmaking").
28
See BAUM, supra note 8, at 131-43 (discussing tensions between economically and
psychologically grounded approaches to judicial behavior, and suggesting that economic
perspective tends to focus on coherence-as exemplified by successful prediction-while
psychological perspective tends to address comprehensiveness by probing more deeply into
sources of behavior).
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indirect to be identified as simply causal.
Given the range of concerns raised, it is understandable that empirical analyses
based on the social background approach have yielded mixed results. A thorough
examination of empirical studies applying the social background model is beyond
the scope of this Article. We will, however, review social science results directed
at the possible influence on judicial decisionmaking of one personal attribute,
gender, and one pre-judicial experience, political party affiliation. Prior studies
addressing these two variables are reasonably representative of the larger literature.
Moreover, because the two variables figure prominently in our own study, these
prior results help set the stage for the findings and discussion that follow.

2. Gender and JudicialOutcomes
Numerous studies have found no significant relationship between a judge's
gender and his or her voting behavior.29 There are, however, several studies that
support a connection between gender and judicial voting behavior. 30 Inasmuch as
29

See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial

Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 257,276-77 (1995) (finding that the gender
of ajudge does not influence outcomes regarding federal civil rights and prisoner rights issues filed
in three federal district courts); John Gruhl et al., Women as Policy Makers: The Case of Trial
Judges,25 AM. J. POL Sci. 308 (1981) (finding that, except for the treatment of female offenders,
gender of municipal trial courtjudge had no significant influence on rate of criminal convictions
or length of sentences); Gerard S. Gryski & Eleanor C. Main, SocialBackgrounds as Predictors
of Votes on State Courts ofLast Resort: The Case ofSex Discrimination,39 W. POL. Q. 528, 53132, 536 (1986) (finding that gender of state supreme courtjudges did not significantly influence
outcome in sex discrimination cases); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhoodin the
Courtroom: Sex ofJudge and Defendant in Criminal CaseDisposition, 14 Soc. Sci. J. 77, 86
(1977) (finding that gender ofjudge had no effect on judge's approach to sentencing); Gregory C.
Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An EmpiricalStudy of Judicial
Reasoning,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1453-54 (1998) (finding no significant difference between
rates at which male and female federal district judges declared the federal sentencing guidelines
unconstitutional).
30
See David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court
Justices:Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 232 (1987) (finding that female state
supreme court judges were significantly more likely to exhibit extreme voting pattems-i.e. voting
more liberally or more conservatively than the majority-than to conform to majority pattern of
voting); Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDIcATURE 129, 131-32 (1993) (finding that female appellate court judges were significantly
more supportive of employment discrimination claimants than their male counterparts, although
there were no significant gender-related differences in obscenity or criminal procedure (search &
seizure) cases); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversficationof the Federal
Bench: PolicyandProcessRamfications,47 J. PoL. 596,608 (1985) (finding that female district
court judges were significantly more likely to defer to govemment agency decisions than male
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studies vary in terms of the types ofjudges being investigated (trial versus appellate,
state versus federal), the types of issues being analyzed (civil versus criminal,
economic rights versus personal rights), the types of outcomes being measured
(liberal versus conservative, voting with majority versus voting as outsider), and the
percentage of women on the bench (de minimis numbers versus a more sizeable
group of colleagues), it is difficult to speak with confidence of general patterns in
these results.
Still, it is noteworthy that many of the studies finding no gender-related effects
involved trial court judges and were completed by the mid-1980s. 31 Two studies
addressing federal appellate court judges, and based on more recent periods of
decisionmaking, found that gender did correlate with judicial voting behavior in the
employment discrimination area though not in others. 32 Moreover, the studies
conducted and reported to date have involved relatively low numbers of female
judges.33 This is to be expected inasmuch as many of the studies were completed
at a time when few women had been appointed to the bench.34 As the number of
judges); Nancy Crowe, Gender and the Courts: A Look at the Diversification of the Federal Bench,
(Nov. 14-15, 1997) (unpublished paper delivered at Conference on the Scientific Study of Judicial
Politics, on file with authors) (finding that female appellate court judges were significantly more
likely to vote for plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases than male judges, and that the effect of
gender was larger for Republican judges than Democrats).
31
See, eg., Ashenfelter et al., supranote 29; Gruhl et al., supra note 29; Kritzer & Uhlman,
supranote 29. But see Sisk et al., supranote 29 (studying trial court judges but conducted over
a more recent period).
32
See Davis et al., supra note 30; Crowe, supra note 30, at 13 (observing that further
research is needed on whether female appellate court judges are more likely to support plaintiffs
in other kinds of civil cases).
33
See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supranote 29, at 275-76 (including 47 total judges, very few
female); Gruhl et al., supra note 29, at 314 (including seven female judges); Walker & Barrow,
supranote 30, at 602 (including 12 female judges). But cf Sisk et al., supranote 29, at 1403, 1453
(including 28 female judges out of 294 total); Davis et al., supranote 30, at 131 (including 16
female judges out of 204 total in employment discrimination cases).
34
Prior to 1977, U.S. Presidents had appointed a total of eight female Article III judges.
President Carter appointed 40 women to the federal district court and appellate court bench
between 1977 and 1980; President Reagan added 31 between 1981 and 1988; and President Bush
appointed 36 between 1989 and 1992. See Amy Singer, Numbers Too Big to Ignore, TIE
AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 1999, at 5, 6. Women were similarly underrepresented on state courts
during this period. See Beverly Blair Cook, Women Judges: A Preface to Their History, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 573 (1984), reprintedas Women Judges in the OpportunityStructure,
in WOMEN, THE COURTS AND EQUALriY 143,143 (Laura L. Crites & Winifred L. Hepperle eds.,
1987) (reporting that in 1985 women held only 7% of the attorney judgeships in state and federal
courts, despite being 16% of the attorneys in practice and 40% of all law students); Beverly Blair
Cook, The Path to the Bench: Ambitions andAttitudes ofWomen in theLaw, TRIAL, Aug. 1983,
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female judges increases, larger sample sizes may yield more reliable results. 35
When considering why ajudge's gender might influence decisional outcomes,
two distinct explanatory approaches have emerged. One approach draws on the
"different voice" theory of psychologist Carol Gilligan. 36 Relying on a range of
behavioral studies and literary insights, Gilligan posits that men and women make
decisions differently because they differ in their basic self-definition and in the way
they view the world.3 7 She maintains that women tend to concentrate on social
relationships and on taking responsibility; by defining themselves in terms of a
larger community, women are more likely to be community-oriented when reaching
moral decisions. 38 By contrast, men tend to define themselves as autonomous
individual achievers, and to focus more on individual rights and the application of
rules when they make moral decisions. 39 Some legal scholars have built on this
"different voice" theory to suggest that female judges may depart more frequently
from the traditional legal approach that emphasizes individual rights, procedural
fairness, and the application of appropriate legal rules.4° Whether directly or
obliquely expressed, 4 1 this feminine approach to judging would modify the
traditional orientation by infusing more reliance on community values, substantive
fairness, and social context into decisional outcomes. 42
at 49, 50 (reporting that in 1982, women held 5.3% of state court trial judgeships and 5.5% of state
court appellate judgeships, though 12% of practicing attorneys were female).
35
It may also be the case that the small number of women appointed to the federal bench did
not vote differently than male judges, or did not begin to do so until joined by a "critical mass" of
female colleagues. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (discussing voting behavior by
female legislators).
36

See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
37

See id. at 5-23.
38See id. at 17-23, 32, 173-74.
39
See id,at 32, 173-74; see also Suzanna Sherry, The GenderofJudges, 4 LAw & INEQ. J.
159, 163 (1986).
40
See Sherry, supra note 39; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 578-91 (1986); see also Lucinda Finley,
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the GenderedNatureofLegalReasoning,64

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893 (1989) (discussing differences between male and female legal
reasoning); see generally Davis et al., supranote 30, at 129-30.
41 CompareSherry, supranote 40, at 543-44 (expressed directly), with DANIEL A. FARBER
& SUzANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL AssAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN

LAW 30 (1997) (expressed more obliquely).
42
See Davis et al., supranote 30, at 130. But cf Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley,
Rethinking Feminist Judging,70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995) (rejecting on empirical and normative
grounds the proposition that female judges can or should decide cases in a distinctly feminine
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In contrast to the psychological approach, an alternative explanation for genderbased influence on judicial decisions invokes the distinctive social and professional
experiences of the current generation of female judges. Some recent studies
examining gender differences in the context of legislative behavior have found that
female legislators take more liberal positions than males, at least on certain issues. 43
One hypothesis is that because women do not have the same political career
opportunities as men, they may feel freer to vote in ways that are not conventional
or popular. 44 Other scholars have suggested that female legislators behave
differently than males once they reach a critical mass within their legislature 4 5 and
that such differences may persist until legislatures as institutions are able to
assimilate the newly elected cohort of female members.46
Like their counterparts in the legislative arena, women ascending to the federal
appellate bench between 1977 and 1992 have followed atypical career paths and
faced unusual challenges. 47 It may be that their experiences as relative outsiders in

fashion).
43
See, e.g., SuE THOMAS, HOW WOMEN LEGiSLATE 63 (1994) (reporting a gender gap in
voting by legislators on a range of substantive issues during late 1980s); Susan Welch,Are Women
More Liberal Than Men in the US. Congress?, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 125,126 (1985); Sue Thomas,
Voting Patternsin the CaliforniaAssembly: The Role of Gender, 9(4) WOMEN & POL. 43, 51
(1989) (finding that female legislators are more supportive of women's issues than male
legislators).
44 See Welch, supranote 43, at 127-28; see generallyRosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects
ofProportionson GroupLife: Skewed Sex Ratios andReponses to Token Women, 82 AMER. J.
Soc. 965 (1977) (discussing how group structures shape particular patterns of male-female
interaction when females are "tokens" in a male-dominated group).
45 See, eg., THOMAS, supra note 43, at 94 (finding that in states with higher percentages
(over 20%) of female legislators, women gave higher priority to women's and family issues than
men did; in states with less than 10% female legislators, women were as uninterested as men in
these kinds of issues); Michelle A. Saint-Germain, Does Their ifference Make a Difference? The
Impact of Women on PublicPolicy in the Arizona Legislature,70 Soc. Sci. Q. 956, 961-63 (1989)
(finding that female legislators' support for legislation addressing areas of traditional concern to
women increased as their proportional presence in the legislature increased).
46 Cf Welch, supra note 43, at 131 (finding that while female legislators in U.S. House of
Representatives take more liberal voting positions than males, this difference is decreasing over
time); see generally Beth Reingold, Conflict and Cooperation: Legislative Strategies and
Concepts of Power Among Female and Male Legislators, 58 J. POL. 464 (1996) (examining
gender-based techniques to accomplish legislative goals among female legislators in Arizona and
California).
47
See Elliot E. Slotnick, The Paths to the FederalBench: Gender, Race and Judicial
Recruitment Variation,67 JUDICATURE 371,375-83 (1984) (finding that female judges appointed

by Carter and confirmed in 1979-1980 were in aggregate less wealthy, less likely to be born
within circuit, younger, less likely to come from private practice, more likely to have attended and
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the legal profession have helped shape independent or distinctively empathetic
perspectives with regard to one or more doctrinal areas of federal law.48 Perhaps
women also vote in distinctive ways as their proportional presence on the courts of
appeals increases. Such explanations, while not as comprehensive as the "different
voice" theory, may be more relevant when examining judicial behavior in particular
subject matter areas and within particular time frames.

3. PoliticalPartyAffiliation andJudicialOutcomes
Since the early 1960s, political party affiliation has emerged as the background
factor most often found to be a significant predictor ofjudicial voting. Two early
studies of federal courts of appeals decisions concluded that a judge's party
affiliation was the background characteristic with the strongest direct link to voting
behavior. 4 9 In both the 1960s and the early 1970s, political party was a significant
50
predictor in various doctrinal fields including labor-management relations.
excelled at an elite law school, more likely to have had prior judicial experience, and less likely
to have been politically active than their male counterparts); Elaine Martin, GenderandJudicial
Selection:A Comparisonofthe Reaganand CarterAdministrations,71 JUDICATURE 136,139-40
(1987) (finding that Reagan-appointed female judges were younger, less likely to come from
private practice, less likely to have been politically active, and more likely to have had judicial
experience and experience as a government attorney than male appointees of President Reagan);
Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench: A Different Voice?, 77 JUDICATURE 126, 128 (1993)
(suggesting that the first generation of female judges, by virtue of their drive to succeed in an area
of profession previously closed to women, may possess more independence and unconventionality
than women in legal profession as a whole); Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench, Vive
la Difference, 73 JUDICATURE 204,208 (1990) (concluding that Carter-appointed female judges
experience more conflict between parental and career roles than their male colleagues, and that
most of these women had to overcome sex discrimination as well as sex-role conflict in order to
pursue their legal careers).
48
See, e.g., Crowe, supra note 30 (reporting that female appellate court judges demonstrated
distinctive sympathy for employment discrimination claimants); Davis et al., supranote 30 (same);
Walker & Barrow, supranote 30 (reporting that female district court judges displayed distinctive
sympathy for government position).
49
See Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavioron the UnitedStates CourtsofAppeals Revisited,
69 AM. POL Sci. REv. 491,496 (1975) [hereinafter Voting BehaviorRevisited];Goldman, Voting
Behavior, supra note 12, at 380-81; see also Stuart S. Nagel, PoliticalParty Affiliation and
Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 845-48 (1961) (finding party affiliation an
important explanatory factor in study of state and federal judges who sit on courts of last resort).
50
See Goldman, Voting BehaviorRevisited, supranote 49, at 496-97 (finding significant
party-related voting differences in areas of labor relations, injured persons, criminal procedure, and
civil liberties); Goldman, Voting Behavior,supranote 12, at 379-81 (finding significant partyrelated voting differences in labor cases and private economic cases though not for criminal law
or civil liberties cases); Nagel, supranote 49, at 844-46 (finding significant party-related voting
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Democratic judges were significantly more likely to vote with the union or
employees than their Republican counterparts. 51 More recent studies tend to
confirm that the political party of the judge or the appointing President makes a
difference in a number of discrete subject matter areas. 52 While one can identify
notable exceptions to this trend,53 the bulk of the studies have concluded that judges
affiliated with the Democratic party or appointed by a Democratic President are

more likely to adopt liberal patterns of voting. 54
There are, however, some intriguing complexities to the empirical findings in
this area. Given that over 90% of the federal appellate judges appointed are
members of the same party as the President who appointed them,55 one might
differences in cases involving employee injury, business regulation, and unemployment
compensation).
51 See Goldman, Voting Behavior,supra note 12, at 380-81; Goldman, Voting Behavior
Revisited, supranote 49, at 496-97; Nagel, supranote 49, at 845.
52
See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior ofJudges Appointed by President
Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298,300 (1993) (finding significant party-related voting differences in areas
of criminal justice, civil rights and liberties, and labor and economic relations); Gryski & Main,
supranote 29, at 534 (finding significant party-related voting differences on sex discrimination
cases); Crowe, supranote 30 (same); George, supra note 8, at 1678-86 (finding significant partyrelated voting differences on wide range of issues); Jon Gottschall, Reagan'sAppointments to the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals: The Continuation ofa JudicialRevolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51-54
(1986) [hereinafter Reagan Appointments] (finding significant party-related voting differences in
civil rights and civil liberties cases); Jon Gottschall, Carter'sJudicialAppointments:The Influence
ofAffirmativeAction andMerit Selection on Voting on the U.S. CourtsofAppeals, 67 JUDICATURE
164, 169-71 (1983) [hereinafter CarterAppointments] (finding significant party-related voting
differences in criminal cases and sex or race discrimination cases); Songer & Davis, supranote
8, at 317 (finding significant party-related voting differences on cases involving labor relations,
criminal law, First Amendment, and civil rights issues).
53
See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 20, at 182-83, 186 (finding that the predictive power of
party indicators across multiple fields was negligible and indirect); Sisk et al., supranote 29, at
1466 (finding no significant variance between district judges appointed by Republican and
Democratic Presidents regarding decisions on constitutional validity of federal sentencing
guidelines); Ashenfelter et al., supranote 29, at 281 (finding no difference between district court
judges appointed by Republican and Democratic Presidents in their treatment of civil rights cases);
Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, IntegratingAlternativeApproaches to the Study ofJudicial
Voting: Obscenity Casesin the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 963, 977-79 (1992)
(finding political party of appointing President not to be a significant determinant of federal
appellate judge behavior in obscenity cases).
54
See sources cited supranotes 51-52; Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay
ofPreferences, CaseFacts, Context andRules in the PoliticsofJudicialChoice, 59 J. POL. 1206,
1219-21 (1997); Tate, supranote 12, at 362-63.
55
See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 355-57 (reporting the "over 90%" figure for all
Presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan, except for Carter who was at 82%). Eisenhower appointed
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expect that a judge's political party affiliation and the affiliation of the appointing
President would be virtually interchangeable variables. In fact, however, one recent
study of appellate court judges found that a judge's political party affiliation was
significant while the party of the appointing President lacked comparable
explanatory power.56 Moreover, many studies that analyze party of the appointing
President examine judicial appointments of individual Presidents. 57 Over the past
50 years, some Presidents have placed greater emphasis than others on appointing
judges who would promote their favored social policies. 58 Further, each President
has accorded higher priority to some policies than others during his tenure. For these
and other reasons, the political saliency of a particular legal subject matter area may
59
vary considerably over the course of several decades.
A separate feature of the empirical work addressing political party influence is
that most studies have focused either on highly divisive or controversial cases60 or
else on published decisions, 61 which must meet some standard of policy or
three Democrats, Kennedy and Johnson a total of two Republicans, Nixon and Ford a total of four
Democrats, Carter four Republicans, and Reagan no Democrats to the courts of appeals. Carter
also appointed six judges with no party affiliation; his total of 10 is what brings him below 90%.
See idat 355.
56 See Songer & Davis, supra note 8, at 323-24; see also Tate, supranote 12, at 362-63
(finding political affiliation ofjudge more important than party of appointing President, though
each had explanatory value).
57
See, e.g., Carp et al., supranote 52; Gottschall, Reagan Appointments, supranote 52;
Gottschall, CarterAppointments, supranote 52.
58 See, e.g., Lyles, supranote 12, at 453-54, 464-65 (reporting that Johnson and Reagan
more regularly appointed judges with an eye toward promotion of their social policies); Carp et
al., supra note 52, at 301-02 (presenting four-part test to determine whether a President is
successful in securing an ideologically reflective judicial cohort, and arguing that President Bush
was able to use all four factors to create a highly conservative impact on the federal judiciary).
59 For instance, the abortion rights issue would not have figured at all in Kennedy, Johnson,
or even Nixon appointments to the courts of appeals, but it did figure prominently in the
appointments of Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. For discussion of the declining political popularity
of labor relations issues, see infra Part V.A. See also Lawrence Baum, Comparingthe Policy
PositionsofSupreme CourtJusticesfromDifferent Periods,42 W. POL. Q. 509, 512, 516 (1989)
(examining non-comparability of votes on civil liberties issues between Burger Court and period
from 1946 to 1969, and suggesting that more "conservative" votes in recent period may reflect in
part the need to decide closer, more difficult cases).
60 See, e.g., Brace & Hall, supranote 54, at 1208 (examining death penalty cases); George,
supra note 8, at 1669-70 (examining en banc decisions of a circuit court); Goldman, Voting
Behavior,supra note 12, at 375 (examining reversals and nonunanimous affirmances); Nagel,
supranote 49, at 843 (examining nonunanimous cases); Tate, supranote 12, at 355 (examining
nonunanimous Supreme Court decisions).
61 See, e.g., Carp et al., supranote 52, at 298 (examining published district court decisions);
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precedential value. 62 Inclusion of unpublished decisions may affect the importance
assigned to the political affiliation factor if, as is often asserted, these additional
cases are so routinely governed by precedent that there is less opportunity to inject
politically based policy preferences. 63 Examining the significance of political

affiliation across a database that includes all unpublished decisions will allow for
further analysis of this possible effect.

B. Applying the Social BackgroundApproach
Notwithstanding the range of criticisms and questions engendered by empirical
analysis ofjudicial behavior, many social scientists and legal academics continue
to explore social background models. This ongoing interest stems in part from a
recognition that neither a formal legal model nor a raw attitudinal model can
adequately explain or account for the complex and subtle evolution of judicial
decisions. Beyond the trial court stage, a mutual decision to litigate often signifies
that each side is armed with plausible arguments based on plain meaning, doctrine,
and precedent.6 4 Judicial resolution of such competing contentions seems to draw
upon influences that are distinct from purely legal principles.
Gryski & Main, supra note 29, at 529 (examining published state supreme court decisions);
Songer & Davis, supranote 8, at 321 (examining published appellate court decisions); see also
Lyles, supra note 12, at 447 (examining district court decisions that have precedential value).
62 See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERTA. CARP, POLITcs AND JUDGMENT]N FEDERAL DSTRICr
COURTS 16 (1996) (reporting that less than five percent of district court decisions are published,
and that such decisions "tend to be policyjudgments with greater political consequence than their
unpublished counterparts"); Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor
Defendants,34 HARV. C. R.- C.L. L. REv. 99,104 (1999) (reporting recommendation by Judicial
Conference of the United States that circuit courts should publish only decisions that have obvious
precedential value).
63
See Ashenfelter et al., supranote 29, at 258-60, 281; see generally Daniel R. Pinello,
Linking Partyto Ideology in American Courts:A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 237-38
(1999) (concluding that judicial behavior scholars may be overemphasizing the significance of
party identification when their statistical models omit the vast majority of appellate court output);
Wald, supranote 27, at 246 (suggesting that unpublished decisions, which are "usually short and
uncontroversial," are less likely to reflect partisan judicial decisionmaking). But cf ROWLAND &
CARP, supranote 62, at 21, 121-35 (finding that party identification is linked tojudicial behavior
for unpublished judgments as well as published decisions).
64
See Edwards supra note 7, at 390-91 (estimating that in half the cases presented to his
appellate court, each party advances at least one colorable legal argument for its side); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism,LegalRealism, andthe InterpretationofStatutes andthe Constitution,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 190-91 (1986) (maintaining that in appellate court litigation,
unclear cases-with textual uncertainty and credible contextual arguments for both sidesoutnumber the clear cases).
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If the legal model paints an incomplete picture, the ideological or attitudinal
model appears too blunt. Assuming arguendo that judges have policy preferences
and allow their preferences to affect their judicial behavior, it is extremely unlikely
that these preferences will be equally intense among different judges or across
different subject matter areas for the same judge. 65 It also is doubtful that these
preferences will produce "liberal" or "conservative" results that can be reliably
compared across an extended time period in which other factors do not remain
constant. 66 Rather than focusing primarily on a compacted category of ideology,
social background models presume that a range of personal and professional
experiences may influence judicial behavior in specific time periods and with
67
respect to particular subject matter areas.
Continued interest in the social background approach also reflects a pragmatic
desire to build a better mousetrap, to design a study that can integrate biographical
factors more effectively with both doctrinal and ideological considerations. One
way to address this practical challenge is to add depth and nuance to the substantive
legal area being analyzed. A more refined classification of issues within each case
should foster greater precision when attempting to link specific judicial attributes
to decisional outcomes. A further response involves limiting the analyzed cases to
a relatively confined time frame and measuring results in a manner that is less
subjective and changeable than whether the decision is "liberal" or "conservative."
65

See BAuM, supranote 8, at 16-19 (identifying a range of professional, policy, and personal
goals that affect judges' behavior on an individual basis); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JuDIcIALPROcEss 167-77 (1921) (discussing effects on decisionmaking of ajudge's complex

set of predilections, prejudices, emotions, habits, and convictions); Tate, supra note 12, at 355
(criticizing as too rough the reliance on general predictors of judicial attitudes); see generally

Jerome Frank, What CourtsDo in Fact,26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653-55 (1932).
66

See Baum, supra note 59, at 512, 516 (discussing problems ofnoncomparability based on

evolving complexity of civil liberties issues); Sisk et al., supranote 29, at 1393-94 (discussing
problems ofnoncomparability associated xvith longitudinal studies ofjudicial behavior on criminal
law issues); see generallyPeter J. VonKoppen & Jan Ten Kate, IndividualDifferencesin Judicial
Behavior: PersonalCharacteristicsandPrivateLaw Decisionmaling,18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 225,
226-27 (1984) (describing difficulty of ensuring comparability among different cases heard by
different judges); John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, FundamentalsofJurisprudence:An
Ethnography ofJudicialDecision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REv. 467, 472-73

(1988) (same).
67 Judges as well as academics have recognized the explanatory potential of this more refined

social background approach. See Edwards, supranote 24, at 1351 (suggesting that age, past job
experience, years on the bench, and other demographic and socioeconomic factors may help
explain judicial outcomes); Wald, supranote 27, at 252 & n.65 (contending that as the federal
judiciary becomes more diverse, factors such as race, religion, age, and socioeconomic background
"will prove to have stronger influences on decisionmaking and thus become better indicators of
voting behavior").
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Establishing a narrower longitudinal database and an objective assessment of results
may help minimize problems of comparability that are inherent when analyzing
cases that emerge from individual fact patterns and are decided by judges at
different stages of their distinct life experiences.
As explained further in Part II, our study seeks to apply social background
factors in a manner that is at once appropriately cautious and suitably elaborate. By
coding Board and judicial outcomes for each substantive labor law issue within a
case, we are able to compare judicial behavior across categories that may be both
doctrinal and ideological. This in turn enables us to assess how different judicial
attributes relate to particular types of unlawful conduct under the NLRA. Moreover,
by abjuring the use of "liberal" or "conservative" when identifying outcomes, we
avoid the many difficult judgment calls that would arise in the labor law area, such
as whether employees who charge their union with violating its duty of fair
representation are pursuing a liberal result, or whether a bargaining order remedy
that temporarily compromises employee free choice is a conservative outcome.
The coding design adopted in this study allows us to explore a wide range of
hypotheses. Some involve traditionally debated questions, such as whether ajudge's
race, religion, gender, age, or partisan political affiliation are related to her pattern
of voting on ostensibly doctrinal matters. Others relate to the special character of the
NLRA as an ideologically charged statute. Do judges react differently to Board
determinations that favor an employer as opposed to a union? Do judicial responses
diverge when the employer's misconduct infringes upon individual employee rights
as opposed to interfering with bargaining-related action initiated by the union? Are
judges who represented corporate or business clients before joining the bench more
likely to favor employer positions in the courts? Finally, the study's design allows
us to ask questions that relate to the NLRA as representative of a generation of
aging New Deal-era statutes. Are judges appointed by earlier Presidents from both
political parties significantly more prone to support union positions in the courts
than more recent appointees? If so, to what extent does this variation reflect a
change in the political saliency of NLRA issues? Do judges who represented
management in NLRA matters come to the bench with a special appreciation for the
statute and its goals? Could such a perspective lead these judges to respond
distinctively to labor law issues in general, or to certain types of issues?
I. METHOD
A. The Data Set ofLaborLaw Issues
Our study is based on all 1,224 appellate cases reviewing unfair labor practice
(ULP) claims issued by the federal courts of appeals between October 28, 1986, and
November 2, 1993. The seven year period is recent enough to reflect both the
current composition of the appellate bench and contemporaneous judicial attitudes

HeinOnline -- 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1694 1999

1999]

JUDICIALHOSTILITY

1695

toward the National Labor Relations Act.68 In addition, a period of this length
insures that the population of decisions is not unduly influenced by events or
disputes that arose with special intensity in a particular year.
We were able to identify the full universe of ULP decisions rendered during
this period because the National Labor Relations Board is a party to every ULP
appeal and the Appellate Division in the Board's Office of General Counsel
compiles monthly lists of those closed appeals. 69 Board personnel generously
provided these lists for research purposes.
Almost one quarter (22.9%) of the 1,224 appellate decisions reversed,
remanded, or modified a Board order;, we analyzed all 280 of these "reversals"
using a detailed issue coding approach. 70 Of the remaining 944 cases that wholly
enforced or affirmed a Board order ("affirmances"), we analyzed a stratified random
sample of 275 cases.7 l We then weighted these sampled affinnances to reflect their
presence in the full population. 72 Unless otherwise specified, all of our analyses
68

When Brudney began this project in 1993, it was the most recent period for which data
were available; because of its comprehensiveness and detail, the database required several years
to build.
69 By contrast, centrally compiled records are not available for cases arising under federal
statutes that authorize litigation by private parties, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
70 The ULP issue codes are set forth in Appendix A. Law student research assistants coded
each appellate decision based on a close reading ofthe opinion supplemented by review ofBoard
opinions when necessary. Brudney reviewed all coding and suggested revisions on approximately
10-15% of the issue codes. He met regularly with the research assistants to resolve any differences
and to discuss whether new codes should be added. Data collection proceeded first on the 280
reversals and then on the 275 affirmances described infra. Brudney also rechecked all coding
decisions at the completion of data collection. Thus, while no coding scheme that relies on analytic
judgments can be error-proof, various steps were taken to ensure quality control. See generally
James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: CollectiveBargainingProtectionsandthe StatutoryAging
Process,74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 965-88 (1996) (describing data-gathering process for determining
case outcomes and issue-specific results within cases).
71
Afiirmances were chosen using simple random sampling within each fiscal year (October
I to September 30). There were eight separate periods from which samples were randomly chosen;
the eighth group included affirmed or enforced cases between October 1and November 2, 1993.
Allocations of the total sample size of 275 to each year were proportional to the number of
affirmed or enforced cases in that year. This stratified approach to sampling substantially reduces
the chance that a disproportionate number of cases were chosen from a narrow time period that
would not adequately reflect the entire seven year context.
72 Because we analyzed about 30% of the affirmances, each affirmance in our database
represents about 3.4 affirmances in the full population. Assigning each sampled affirmance a
weight close to 3.4 permits analyses modeled on the full population, but without giving reversals
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incorporate this weighting.
Our study is especially rigorous in focusing on decided issues, rather than cases
as a whole. The 1,224 decisions we analyzed include more than 2,000 issues on
which the appellate courts either affirmed or reversed results reached by the Board.
Because each appellate court decision on an issue reflects participation by a threejudge panel, 73 our data set includes over 6,500 judicial participations on NLRA
issues. Each '[judicial participation" consists of a single judge's vote on a particular
issue in a case appealed from the Board.
In this Article, we address the three major categories of ULP issues arising
under the NLRA: claims that an employer has committed an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a);74 allegations that a union has committed an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b);75 and disputes under section 10(c) over the nature and scope of
relief against employers found liable for section 8(a) violations. 76 We omitted from
our analyses about 450 judicial participations involving procedural, jurisdictional,
or constitutional issues. Although these issues arose in ULP cases, they involved
77
doctrinal rules distinct from the substantive labor matters we analyze here.
We eliminated just two other types ofjudicial participations from our analyses.
First, we omitted votes from three summarily affired cases for which we could not
identify the participating judges.78 Second, we eliminated 572 votes by district court

an undue role. To achieve greater precision, we calculated weights by year.
73 We coded one en banc panel decision during this seven year period. The case, however,

involved only procedural issues and was omitted from our analyses for that reason.
7429 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994). In a small number of cases, unions or employees charge
employer misconduct under section 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1994). Although we coded those
claims separately, allowing the possibility of separate exploration, we grouped them with section
8(a) claims for the analyses in this Article.
7529 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994). A small number of claims against unions were filed under
section 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1994). We combined the latter claims with the
analogous, and much more numerous, section 8(b) claims for the analyses in this Article. Cf supra
note 74 (discussing similar grouping of section 8(a) and section 8(f) claims against employers).
76 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
77 Similarly,

we omitted a handful of section 10(c) issues involving the scope and content of

relief against a union, as well as a small number of issues on which employees prevailed against
both an employer and a union. Each of these de minimis issue categories would have required a
classification at odds with the major categories described above.
78 About 85% of the reversals and 45% of the affinnances in our data set were published. See
infra note 126 and accompanying text. We located some unpublished decisions on-line and
obtained the others through the generosity of Board attomeys. Two reversals and 34 affirmances
in our database generated no recoverable opinions. For these cases, Brudney identified issues by
reviewing the initial Board decision; attorney briefs on appeal (kept on file at the Board library in
Washington, D.C.); and, for the reversals, the Board decision on remand. For the two reversals and
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judges sitting by designation on circuit court panels.7 9 These judges do not regularly
perform appellate review, and they are likely to have had very little exposure to
review of NLRB determinations. 80 Although we plan to compare district and
appellate court judges in a later phase of this project, our current analyses focus on
differences among courts of appeals judges.81 With these omissions, our database
consists of 5,463 votes by appellate judges on unfair labor practice claims arising
under the NLRA.
Within this universe of all substantive NLRA issues, we also identified two
subgroups that have been the focus of most other judicial behavior studies. The first
consists of all issues in cases that the courts of appeals authorized for publication in
the FederalReporter.These published cases, a rough proxy for what the circuits
themselves consider important, included just over one-half ofthe 5,463 votes in our
database. The second subgroup comprises all votes on issues reversed by the
appellate courts, plus votes on affirmed issues that have more than one panel
opinion, either a dissent or a separate concurrence. These divisive issues cover one82
fifth of all judicial participations.
Our database is unprecedented in its scope, encompassing all appellate
31 ofthe 34 summary affirmances, we were able to identify the participating judges as well.
79
See 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994) (authorizing chief circuit court judge to assign district court
judges within circuit to participate on appellate court panels "whenever the business of that court

so requires").
80

See generally Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, DilutingJustice on Appeal? An
Examination of the Use ofDistrict Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States
Courts ofAppeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRm 351, 379-81 (1995) (discussing concern that district
court judges have less expertise regarding appellate practice than circuit court judges). Because
NLRB determinations are appealed directly to the courts of appeals, district court judges have little
occasion to become familiar with substantive law issues under the NLRA.
81 We repeated the multivariate analyses described in Part III infra for our full population of
judges, adding a control variable designating the district court judges. We had to omit some
background factors (such as religion) from these test equations because those values were missing
for the district judges. See infra Appendix A. Still, the test equations included nine background
variables as well as all of our control variables. District judge status was not significant in any of
our analyses.
Our data set included some participations by appellate judges on senior status. We included
these participations in the current analyses because those judges, like their active colleagues, are
familiar with appellate practice and have had exposure to the NLRA.
82 As we explain below, there are shortcomings to analyses conducted on both of these
subgroups. See infra text in paragraph that follows note 130. We include them because they allow
us to highlight decisionmaking processes in the most controversial cases and because previous
scholars have focused on categories like these. Indeed, one of the unique strengths of our database
is that we are able to analyze votes both within all decided cases and within more controversial
vote categories-as well as to illustrate some shortcomings of the latter analyses.
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decisions during a seven year time period, all issues within those cases, and
subgroups of important or controversial opinions. There are, however, some
limitations to the data set worth noting. Most obviously, we could not analyze the
large number ofULP charges that are disposed of before reaching the Board or that
do not generate an appeal. 83 This limitation does not fundamentally affect our study
because we seek to explain the behavior of appellate judges in NLRA cases, not to
track the success or failure of all NLRA claims.84 Still, strategic decisions by
litigants affect the mix of cases presented to the appellate courts.85 That mix, in turn,
may affect the decisions judges make. We cannot predict the reaction ofjudges to
a hypothetical universe of all ULP claims; we can only describe the reaction of
judges to the cases actually reaching them.
Further, decisions by judges during the seven years we studied probably differ
from those by judges during other decades. The larger economic environment may
substantially affect both the number of ULP charges filed and the Board's
disposition of those issues. Board members in different administrations may feel
varying pressures to respond to congressional oversight or to maintain the approval
of Presidents who hold the power of reappointment. 86 The appellate courts and
Board, finally, engage in an ongoing dialogue while interpreting the NLRA. A high
affirmance rate on particular issues during one period may conceal an earlier period
83

The early dispositions occur through dismissal or withdrawal at a preliminary stage,
informal settlement prior to trial, or formal resolution before the case is tried or appealed to the
Board. See William N. Cooke et al., The DeterminantsofNLRB Decision-MakingRevisited,48
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 237,238 (1995) (stating that the Board decided only about 2.5% of all
ULP cases closed in fiscal year 1990); 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 157 (1990) (showing that out of more
than 32,000 unfair labor practice cases closed in 1990 fiscal year, fewer than 1,100 reached stage
of a Board order); 54 NLRB ANN. REP. 211 (1989) (showing numbers for 1989 fiscal year. Nearly
30,000 cases closed; fewer than 1,100 reached stage of Board order).
84
Cf Revesz, supra note 8, at 1723-24 (arguing that settlement does not cause selection bias
when the "central purpose of [a] work is not to determine the probability that a challenger will
prevail ... [but] to determine, from the universe of litigated cases, whether differences in votes
across judges can be explained by ideological factors.") (emphasis omitted).
85
See Brudney, supra note 70, at 973-76 (arguing that employers or unions may often
appeal from the Board's liability determinations in order to extend the litigation process in cases
they do not expect to win, and that routine affirmances in such cases may mask the full extent of
Board-court disagreements). Cf John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, JudicialPolitics,Death
PenaltyAppeals, and CaseSelection: An EmpiricalStudy, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 465, 468-69, 492503 (1999) (illustrating that an analysis of one database showed that appellate courts were more
likely to overturn death sentences in states in which prosecutors aggressively sought the death
penalty at trial).
86 See generally Terry M. Moe, Controland Feedbackin Economic Regulation: The Case
ofthe NLRB, 79 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1094, 1094 (1985) (describing pattern ofmutually adaptive
adjustment among Board members, their staff, and the constituents that litigate before the agency).
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ofjudicial hostility; the Board may have abandoned interpretive efforts supporting
unions only after repeated judicial expressions of skepticism or repudiation. 87 For
all of these reasons, we do not describe a static pattern ofjudicial decisions. Instead,
88
we explore one segment of a continuous, evolving design.
B. Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable in all analyses is whether a judge voted for the union
on a specific issue in a given case. In coding this variable, we distinguished
carefully among subsections of the statute. If the Board ruled that an employer had
committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(a), then ajudicial vote to affirm
constituted a vote for the union. Conversely, if the Board rejected section 8(a)
liability against an employer, a vote to reverse qualified as a pro-union vote.
Similarly, ifthe Board held a union liable for an unfair labor practice under section
87 See,ag., Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 284,288-89 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (affirming Board decision that employer's wage proposal did not constitute bad faith
bargaining under section 8(a)(5), and observing that the Board, after numerous reversals, "now
seems to have accepted the courts' repeated teaching that an employer's bargaining position is not
itself bad faith but only evidence of bad faith, so that a finding of bad faith bargaining must be
bolstered by additional evidence"). Only once in the seven year period we studied was the Board
reversed on a bad faith bargaining issue. Further, in approximately one-half of the cases where the
Board was affirmed on this issue, it held in favor of the employer-that frequency of pro-employer
judgments was higher than for any other issue under section 8(a). Accordingly, it would seem that
Board-court harmony on the bad faith bargaining issue signifies judicial triumph over an earlier
Board position supportive of the union, rather than mere judicial deference to the agency.
88
The affirmance rate during the period we studied was relatively high, but still fits
comfortably into the general pattem of fluctuating success enjoyed by the Board over the past 35
years. Data taken from the Board's Annual Reports indicate that from 1960-1992, the percentage
of Board orders enforced in full was 66.9%. The rate of success varied widely: It was below 60%
in the 1960s, rose to 72% in the early 1970s, declined slightly to 65% in the early 1980s, and was
above 75% from 1985-1992. The highest success rate was achieved during the period under study
here; this was also a period relatively less affected by partisan divisions in terms of Presidential
appointments to the Board versus the courts. See 25 NLRB ANN. REP., tbl.19 (1960) through 57
NLRB ANN. REP., tbl.19 (1992). Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed all 11 Board members
who served from January 1985 to December 1992; Reagan made nine appointments while Bush
appointed two new members and made two reappointments. See listing of Board members at 273
NLRB iii (1984-1985) through 309 NLRB iii (1992). Those Presidents also helped shape the
appellate bench: Over 50% of the judicial votes in our study were cast by Reagan or Bush
appointees. Still, the overall preponderance of Republican votes on substantive issues (see infra
Table I, reporting two-thirds of votes being cast by Republican appointees), which reflects that
Republicans controlled the White House for most of the 30 year period preceding 1992, has
allowed for the development of partisan-related differences between results sought by unions and
outcomes handed down by the appellate courts.
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8(b), a judicial vote to reverse constituted a vote for the union; if the Board rejected
union liability, then a vote to affirm qualified as an endorsement of the union's
position. Finally, if the Board granted the relief requested under section 10(c)
against an employer, a vote to affirm constituted a vote for the union. If the Board
denied the relief, a vote to reverse qualified as a vote for the union.
When coding the dependent variable, we also accounted for concurring and
dissenting opinions. We coded a dissenting vote on a particular issue as a vote to do
the opposite of what the majority had decided. We counted concurring votes as
votes to follow the majority, although we also noted the fact of these concurrences
to identify issues as divisive for purposes of analysis. 89 The dependent variable for
each judicial participation, in sum, represents an individual judge's vote for or
against the union on a single issue in a particular case.
C. Independent Variables:JudicialBackgroundFactors
Our independent variables reflect more than a dozen demographic, educational,
and professional characteristics of each judge.90 We obtained basic demographic
and educational information from standard biographies addressing the federal
judiciary,9 1 supplemented by biographical files available at the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) library in Washington, D.C.,92 and questionnaires submitted to the
Senate Judiciary Committee by nominees as part of their confirmation process.93
89

Of the reversed cases, 19% included one or more separate opinions: These consisted of 13

concurrences, 26 dissents, and 21 opinions styled as concurrence-and-dissent. Of the analyzed
affirmed cases, 5% involved one or more separate opinions, consisting of five concurrences, eight
dissents, and four opinions styled as concurrence-and-dissent.
90 Our basic coding scheme for these variables appears in Appendix A. Although we used
this scheme to generate some 60 variables, our current analyses focus on the variables described
in text. Some omitted variables were combined to produce included variables; others were omitted
because they proved of lesser interest, encompassed too many missing values, or produced
collinearity problems.
91

See generallyALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Christine Housen ed. 1997); 9 THE

AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Jeanie J. Clapp ed. 1997); 3 FEDERAL JUDICIARY

ALMANAC (W. Stuart Domette and Robert R. Cross eds. 1987).
92 The FJC library has biographical files on every federal appellate court judge who has
served since the Constitution. FJC personnel generously fumish access to these files for academic
research purposes. Most judges in our data set who were appointed before 1982 filled out a
detailed biographical form devised by the FJC. Judges reported on their professional experience
and family background in greater depth than is available from the standard biographies referred
to supra in note 91. This detailed self-reporting by judges became much less frequent by the mid1980s.
93

Beginning in 1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee required each nominee to the federal
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For more extensive information on pre-judicial professional experience, we relied
on the FJC files and the Judiciary Committee questionnaires, augmented by
information from Martindale-Hubbell directories and a variety of searches run on
Lexis and Westlaw.94 Through these sources, as well as some additional reviews
directed at particular background factors, 95 we were able to obtain complete
information on almost all demographic, educational, and professional background
factors. 96
appellate bench to complete a questionnaire addressing professional experience as well as personal
background. From 1987 to 1992, these completed questionnaires were included in the
Committee's official hearing record for all judges. Prior to 1987, they were not part of an official
public record but copies of various judges' completed questionnaires are retained by the National
Archives, the Department of Justice, individual political science scholars, and public interest
groups that monitor the confirmation process. We were able to obtain questionnaires on all judges
in our data set through these sources. Questionnaires obtained from the Department of Justice
through a Freedom of Information Act request were redacted or incomplete in some respects. We
are grateful for the cooperation and generosity of Elliot Slotnick at The Ohio State University,
Sheldon Goldman at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), Gary Zuk at Auburn University,
Nan Aron at the Alliance for Justice, and numerous personnel at the National Archives and the
Department of Justice.
94 Judges who completed the FJC biographical form listed all firms they had worked for, as
well as the types of practice in which they had engaged (e.g., tax, labor, general litigation). Judges
who completed the Judiciary Committee questionnaire listed past employers, reported the general
character of their practice, identified typical clients, and described ten important litigated cases in
which they had been personally involved. Some judges provided information through both
sources; virtually every judge completed one of the two forms. To round out information obtained
from these sources, especially with respect to ajudge's NLRA or workplace law experience and
corporate law background, we examined Martindale-Hubbell volumes (which are available back
to the 1930s) and several databases available in Lexis or Westlaw.
95 For minority judges' professional and personal background, we examined a number of
specialized sources. See GERALDINE SEGAL, BLACKS INThE LAW: PHILADELPA AND TBENATON
(1983); WHO's WHO AMONG BLACK AMERICANS (7th ed. 1992-1993); JUDICIAL ADMIN. Div.,
ABA, DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES INTHE UNrrED STATES (1994). For religious background
ofludges who had not self-identified through a source listed in notes 91-93 supra,we relied on
various editions of Who's Who in America and Judges of the United States, and on a
comprehensive electronic database addressed tojudicial background of appellate courtjudges. See
Gary Zuk et al.,A Multi-UserData Base on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals CourtJudges, 18011994 [Computer file] First ICPSR version (1997).
96 After extensive research, we lacked information for only a small number ofjudges on three
variables: religious background (11 judges), college attended (3 judges), and experience
representing corporate or business clients (6 judges). We also were unable to obtain Astin
selectivity scores, see infranote 104 and accompanying text, for the colleges attended by 5 judges
in our study. Three judges, finally, belonged to religions (i.e., Morman or Bahai) that did not fit
comfortably into our major religious groupings of Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant. For the
multivariate analyses described below, we replaced the missing and undefined values on these
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The first independent variable in our analyses designates whether each judge
was appointed by a Republican or Democratic President. As in previous studies of
judicial attitudes, we rely upon this variable as a proxy for the judge's own political
inclinations. 97 We also coded the year that each judge was appointed to the bench.
This variable allowed us to determine whether judges appointed earlier in the
century (regardless of political party) differed from more recent appointees.
We coded four basic demographic variables: age, gender, religion, and race.
Age, a continuous variable, reflects the age of each judge at the time a vote was
rendered. 98 A dichotomous variable indicates each judge's gender. Another
dichotomous variable signals whether a judge was Catholic or Jewish, comparing
those judges to the predominant category ofProtestant judges. 99
During the years we studied, the appellate bench included only a small number
of Asian or Latino judges. 100 Creating distinct variables for each of these small
categories would have been misleading. Preliminary analyses, however, showed that
the Asian and Latino judges in our population voted in similar patterns, both before
and after controlling for other variables, and that these patterns differed significantly
from both African American and White judges. 10 1 We thus created two
three variables with the mean for that variable and created dummy variables denoting judges with
those missing values. None ofthe three dummies representing missing values were significant so
we omitted those dummies from the analyses and retained the substituted means for missing
values.
97
See supranotes 49-63 and accompanying text.
98
Thus,ajudge who was 50 years old in 1986 was given that age for votes rendered in 1986,
the age of 51 for votes rendered the following year, etc. Coding the variable in this manner allowed
us to track precisely any relationships between age and votes to favor or disfavor unions.
99
Preliminary analyses showed that Catholic and Jewish judges voted similarly (and
differently from Protestant judges) once we controlled for other variables. Because these
coefficients behaved so similarly in multivariate analyses, we combined them into a single
Catholic/Jewish category to streamline the number of independent variables. Grouping these
religions also reflects the relative outsider status of Catholics and Jews compared to the
majoritarian Protestants.
100 We recorded votes by only 2 Asian judges and 5 Latinos. No Latina women contributed
votes to our database. Nor were there any votes by Native Americans or Pacific Islanders.
10 1
White judges voted in favor of the union 76% of the time, while African American judges
cast pro-union votes 82% of the time. Latino judges favored the union in just 54% of their
participations, while Asian judges favored the union in 47% of their votes. Preliminary
multivariate analyses, using dummy variables for Asian, African American, and Latino judges,
showed significant negative coefficients for the Asian and Latino categories and significant
positive coefficients for the African American category.
Recent scholarship has stressed the importance of recognizing differences among racial
minority groups, rather than grouping them in a single "minority" category. See, e.g., Barbara F.
Reskin & Irene Padavic, Sex, Race, and Ethnic Inequality in United States Workplaces, in
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dichotomous variables denoting race: One for African American judges and one for
the combined category of Asian and Latino judges. 102 White judges constitute the
10 3
reference category for both groups.
Two variables designate each judge's educational background. The first,
college selectivity, reports the selectivity score calculated by educational sociologist
Alexander Astin for the judge's undergraduate institution. ° 4 The second variable
HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 343-74 (Janet Saltzman Chafetz ed. 1999); Barbara

F. Reskin & Camille Z. Charles, Now You See "Em,Now You Don't:Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
in Labor Market Research, in LATINAs AND AFRICAN AMERiCAN WOMEN AT WORK 380-407
(Irene Browne ed. 1999). Rather than making a priori decisions about racial differences, we
examined our data to make appropriate racial groupings. Other research, however, supports our
finding that Latino/a and Asian workers differ from both White and African American workers in
their experience with-and perhaps attitudes toward-unions. See, e.g., Gregory DeFreitas,
UnionizationAmong RacialandEthnicMinorities,46 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 284,298-300
(1993) (discussing differences in unionization among White, African American, Latino/a, and
Asian workers); Ronnie Silverblatt & Robert J. Amann, Race, Ethnicity, Union Attitudes, and
Voting Predilections, 30 INDUS. REL. 271, 277 (1991) (reporting that, in a study of southern
Florida workers, African American workers expressed more favorable attitudes than Whites
toward unions, while Latino workers expressed the least favorable attitudes). But see DeFreitas,
supra,at 293 (citing some evidence that both African American and Latino/a workers hold more
favorable attitudes toward unions than do Whites).
102
There were 13 African American judges contributing a total of 348 votes to our database;
this number was sufficient to create a distinct variable for those judges. Because our database
included votes by only one nonwhite female judge (an African American), we could not create
interaction terms between our race and gender variables to examine possible sex/race differences.
103 Even with the combined category of Asian and Latino judges, one should exercise
caution in interpreting those coefficients. These judges contributed relatively few votes (125) to
the database and may constitute the smallest distinct group of votes examined here.
104 See ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHO GOES WHERE TO COLLEGE? 57-83 (1965). Scholars
frequently rely upon the Astin scale to measure college prestige. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Asian
Americansin the LegalAcademy: An EmpiricalandNarrativeProfile,3 ASIAN L.. 7, 23 (1996);
Lowell L. Hargens & Warren 0. Hagstrom, Scientific Consensus andAcademicStatus Attainment
Patterns,55 SOc. EDUC. 183, 185 (1982); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race,
and Credentials:The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law FacultyHiring,97 COLUM. L. REV.
199, 222 n.75 (1997).
Astin estimated selectivity based on multiple factors assessed in 1962; he divided the number
of highly able students who wanted to enroll at each institution by the number of freshmen
admitted to the school. The colleges our appellate judges attended had Astin scores ranging from
a low of 37 to a high of 78.
While a ranking system based on a narrow band of years raises some concern, the early 1960s
is an especially meaningful point in time for our judicial population. Of the 223 judges in our
study, over half graduated from college between 1943 and 1962 while only 29 graduated after
1962. Moreover, academic reputation changes slowly over time. See, e.g., Kathryn T. Theus,
Academic Reputations: The ProcessofFormaton andDecay, 19 PuB. REL. REv. 277, 283 (1993)
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indicates whether the judge graduated from one of fifteen elite law schools. 105
We also included seven variables reporting the professional experience of each
judge before appointment to the court of appeals. One variable identifies whether
a judge ever held elected office, a second indicates whether the judge served in a
high-level (i.e., policy-related) nonelective government position, and a third denotes
prior judicial experience. All three of these variables include both state and federal
positions. 10 6 A fourth variable in this series denotes whether a judge had substantial
experience as a law professor prior to appointment107 We coded judges as positive
for any of these variables that applied; they are not mutually exclusive.
With respect to private practice experience, we created three variables
distinguishing distinct varieties of corporate, labor, and workplace law experience.
One variable designates judges who had any experience representing management
in NLRA matters.10 8 A second denotes judges who had experience on workplace-

(discussing how prior reputation, and the "myths" surrounding an institution, shape the public's
perception of what the institution can achieve).
105
The 15 schools in the elite group have first-rate reputations developed over an extended
time period prior to 1980: Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Comell, Duke, Michigan,
NYU, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Texas, UCLA, and Virginia. See The CarterReport
on the Leading Schools ofEducation, Law, and Business, CHANGE, Feb. 1977, at 44,46 (based
on faculty reputation and educational attractiveness). One could dicker over the precise schools
selected for any list of the top 15, see, e.g., Diana Fossum, Law Professors:A Profile of the
TeachingBranch ofthe Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501,507 (1980) (identifying top
schools based on which schools had produced the most law professors and substituting
Georgetown, Iowa, and Wisconsin for Cornell, Duke, and UCLA in the above list), but the
differences would not affect our analyses. Indeed, almost half of the judges who graduated from
schools in our "elite" category obtained their degrees from Harvard or Yale, schools that surely
would make any listing of elite law schools.
The Cartter rankings compiled during the mid seventies reflect law school reputation when
the vast majority of our judges attended law school. The rankings also offer an appropriate index
for judges graduating during an earlier period; law school reputation, like the reputation of
undergraduate colleges, changes slowly over time. See Richard Schmalbeck, The Durabilityof
Law School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568, 572 (1998) (finding that reputations of elite law
schools have been remarkably stable over past 25 years).
106 The elected offices and nonelective policy positions include only those in the executive
or legislative branches; elected and appointed judicial positions are included with the variable for
judicial experience.
107
We identified such experience on the basis of judicial biographies, supplemented by
reference to the annual AALS Directory of Law Teachers from 1923 to 1992. Judges with
substantial law teaching experience include 31 judges who were employed full-time as law
professors for any period before joining the appellate bench, as well as 18 judges who served for
at least three years as adjunct professors at a law school before becoming appellate judges.
108 Thirty-four judges had this experience. They included 24judges whose NLRA experience
was solely on behalf of management, 9 who also had experience representing the government or
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related matters other than those arising under the NLRA, as well as judges with
NLRA experience not involving management. 09 The third marks judges who
represented corporations or business clients but did not have either NLRA or other
workplace law experience. These three variables are mutually exclusive; the
reference category for all three is judges with no corporate, NLRA management, or
workplace law experience.
Finally, our independent variables include two interaction terms essential to
interpret the other variables. We identified these interactions through extensive
exploration of the database as well as theoretical considerations. First, we
discovered an interaction between gender and political party. As we explain further
below, female judges tend to favor unions more often than male judges do, and
Democratic appointees tend to register pro-union votes more often than their
Republican colleagues. Democratic women, however, do not differ significantly
from Democratic men on this score, while the difference between Republican
women and Republican men is substantial. Including a female/Democrat interaction
term allowed us to explicate more fully this relationship between gender and
political party.
unions on NLRA matters, and 1who also had substantial law professor experience. These judges
contributed 752 votes to our database, about 14% of all votes. We chose management experience

as the criterion for our primary NLRA variable because judges with that background constituted
more than two-thirds (69%) of all judges with any NLRA experience. We were also particularly
interested in identifying the reaction of judges with this potentially partisan background to the
Board decisions in our database, which overwhelmingly favored unions.
Although management experience provides the unifying theme for this category, we also
performed some supplemental analyses in which we separated judges with exclusively
management experience from those with a mixture of management and other (union, government,
and/or academic) experience related to the NLRA. See infranotes 212-15 and accompanying text
109 Judges with these other workplace experiences contributed 1,537 votes, or about 28% of
the total, to our database. More than three-quarters (78%) of these votes came from judges with
no NLRA experience. The latter judges had handled federal workplace laws other than the NLRA
(such as equal employment opportunity, safety and health, or employee benefits) or state laws
addressing comparable matters (and including public employee labor relations). Smaller
percentages of the votes in this "other workplace law" category came from judges with experience
representing unions under the NLRA (15%); government experience related to the NLRA (3%),
or academic experience teaching NLRA matters (5%). None of the judges in this category had any
experience representing management under the NLRA; votes from any judges who combined
management experience with other types of workplace law are included in our "nra management"
variable.
Although we grouped judges with these somewhat diverse experiences together for our
primary analyses, we separated them in some supplemental analyses. We report below on the
effects of pure union, pure government, or pure academic experience in NLRA matters. See infra
notes 150, 158, 161, 162, 165 & 179. We also probedthe effects ofpure workplace (no NLRA)
experience. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, we identified an important interaction between judges with NLRA
management experience and the NLRB's disposition of an issue (a control variable
discussed below). In most analyses, judges with NLRA management experience did
not differ significantly from other judges when they reviewed Board decisions
favoring the union; all judges were very likely to favor the union under these
circumstances. When the Board voted in favor of an employer, however, judges
with NLRA management experience were significantly more likely than their
colleagues to reverse the Board and vote for the union. Once again, an interaction
term helped us illuminate this relationship.1 10
D. Control Variables:Board Outcomes, Statutory Sections, and Circuits
As discussed above, we propose a "social background" model of judicial
behavior falling between the raw attitudinalism embraced by some political
scientists and the legal process perspective preferred by many legal academics.
Consistent with this view, we recognize that the characteristics of individual judges
will not completely predict judicial votes on NLRA (or other) matters.
We could not control directly for doctrine in our analyses, but we included
several variables signaling the doctrinal and litigation context in which each judge
rendered decisions. Most notably, we controlled for the Board's outcome on each
issue in our database. Paralleling our dependent variable, we recorded this variable
as either "for" or "against" the union."1I This variable allowed us to control for
110

We did not attempt to explore panel effects in these analyses. Although we recognize the

potential importance of panel effects (see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text), and we
intend to examine the ways in which panel members may have influenced one another in later
work, it is essential first to explore individual judges' votes. Panel effects are quite complex; ifthey
exist, they may operate along party, gender, professional experience, or other lines. Understanding
the first-order effects of these variables, therefore, is fundamental before attempting to build a
model that includes panel effects.
Omission of panel influences is unlikely to affect the results presented here. We analyzed
almost 5,500 votes cast on more than 1,100 panels. In a database this large, panel effects are likely
to approach random distribution. A particular Democratic judge, for example, would have sat with
various combinations of Democrats and Republicans over time; men likewise would have sat on
all male and mixed gender panels. Exploration of panel effects might reveal that some of the
associations we detected were particularly likely to emerge in certain contexts. It is possible, for
example, that Democrats were most likely to cast pro-union votes when another Democrat was on
the panel or that men were more likely to support the union when a woman sat on the panel. The
significant first-order effects we identify, however, would be unlikely to disappear. It still would
be true that Democrats were significantly more likely than Republicans to support the union and
that Republican women were more likely than Republican men to vote in that direction.
111
Pro-union Board outcomes were determinations of "liability" on issues under section 8(a);
determinations of"no liability" on issues arising under section 8(b), and deterninations of "relief
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perhaps the most important doctrinal influence on ajudge's vote: Deference to the
112
administrative agency.
Second, we distinguished claims arising under five different sections of the
NLRA.1 3 These statutory section controls allowed us to isolate important
differences among varying types of NLRA claims and to control for some doctrinal
differences among the categories.
The largest of our issue categories, and the one we use as our reference category
for multivariate analyses, includes claims arising under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
of the Act. Section 8(a)(1) claims allege employer interference with employee
organizing campaigns or attempts to secure a fair representation election, generally
through threats, interrogations, or the conferral of improper benefits. Section 8(a)(3)
claims allege employer discrimination against union members or supporters, usually
arising out ofterminations, layoffs, or failures to recall or rehire. Claims under these
two sections focus primarily on the right of workers to organize under the NLRA
in order to achieve union representation, and they typically involve employer
actions directed against individual employees.
Our next largest issue category includes claims arising under section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. These claims allege an employer's failure to bargain in good faith with a
recognized union.114 They thus invoke the Act's protection of the collective
bargaining process, and they almost always implicate employer conduct directed
15
against the union as an entity.'
granted" with respect to issues under section 10(c). Pro-employer outcomes were the opposite in
each instance. While individual employee interests were identical to union interests with respect

to section 8(a) and 10(c) issues, employee interests and union interests often diverged when a
section 8(b) issue was involved. The union might be charged with unlawful conduct by individual
employees under section 8(b)(1); in those instances, we considered employee and employer
interests to be aligned against the union.
112 The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints by unions, employers, or
individual employees alleging conduct in violation of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994).
Board decisions are subject to direct review by the federal courts of appeals. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1994).
113

Our coding scheme distinguished a far larger number of subcategories, but we grouped

issues under their major statutory headings for these analyses. For further discussion of the
categories described here, see Brudney, supranote 70, at 980-88.

114 The section 8(aX5) claims include some "technical" violations of the section in which the
employer sought to challenge the Board's certification of the union based on either the scope of
the bargaining unit or alleged union misconduct during the election campaign. Because the
Board's certification of election results under section 9(c) is not a final order, employers typically
test the validity of a certification by refusing to bargain with the union. This produces a violation
of section 8(a)(5) that is appealable to the courts. See Brudney, supranote 70, at 981 &n.125.
115
Examples of such bargaining-related employer misconduct include the refusal to provide
relevant information requested by the union during negotiations, the refusal to bargain on certain
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A third issue category consists of a very small group of other section 8(a)
claims brought against employers, including claims of employer domination of
labor organizations and alleged retaliation for filing a charge with the Labor Board.
The fourth category combines all claims maintained against unions under section
8(b) of the statute. Our final issue category includes all questions of relief against
employers litigated under section 10(c).
In addition to these controls for Board outcome and statutory sections, we
created variables denoting each circuit. The circuit variables controlled for possible
differences in the nature of controversies arising within each circuit; in litigation
strategies (including forum shopping) that might affect the caseload reaching each
court;11 6 and in the overall ideology of the court on which each judge served 1 7 In
multivariate analyses, we used the Sixth Circuit as our reference category for these
118
circuit variables.
Our final control variable reports the year in which each vote was rendered.
Although we examined votes occurring over a compact, seven year period, this
variable allowed us to control for any judicial trends for or against union positions
within that period.
E. Analyses
Our analyses proceed in three stages. First, we explore judicial votes across the
full database of all issues decided in all cases. After reporting means for our
dependent variable, each of the independent variables, and all of the control
variables in this full database, we estimate a logistic regression equation with
judicial votes for (or against) the union as our dependent variable. 1 9 This
"mandatory" subjects such as wages and benefits, and the unilateral modification of employment

terms and conditions while a collective bargaining agreement is in force.
116

Parties appealing a final order from the NLRB may seek review in the circuit where the
unfair labor practice allegedly occurred, in a circuit where the aggrieved party resides or transacts
business, or in the D.C. Circuit. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994).
117
Circuit ideology may reflect an aggregation ofjudicial characteristics in a particular circuit

as well as the ways in which different doctrines or precedents are applied to specific factual
situations and any differences in legal precedents among the circuits.
118 We chose the Sixth Circuit as our reference category because bivariate analyses identified
that court as the median or middle court on both Board outcomes (for/against the union) reaching
the court and decisions (for/against the union) rendered by the judges. The Sixth Circuit also
supplied more votes in our "all case" category than any other circuit.
119

Logistic regression is the appropriate multivariate technique for our analyses because our

dependent variable (a vote for or against the union) is dichotomous. Instead of positing a direct
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the logistic regression method

models the probability of an event-how likely the event is to occur. Thus, in our analysis we
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multivariate analysis allows us to assess the relationship between each independent
variable (such as political party) and the dependent variable (a vote for the union),
while controlling simultaneously for other variables in the equation. Because of
heteroscedasticity in the database, we use the Huber/White correction to obtain
robust estimates of standard error.120 Using these robust standard errors, we report
whether coefficients for each independent variable are significant or approach
12 1
significance.
The sign of each significant coefficient in the regression equation indicates the
direction of that variable's effect. A variable with a significant positive coefficient
enhances the probability that a judge will vote for the union, while a variable with
a significant negative coefficient signals that ajudge with that characteristic is more
likely to vote against the union. The magnitude of each coefficient, however, is
difficult to interpret because of the logistic form of our regression equation; unlike
ordinary least squares regression, the coefficients in our logistic regression equation
do not represent the impact of a one-unit change in the independent variable on the
dependent variable.
To aid interpretation of the coefficients, we conclude the first stage of our

investigate judicial attributes that may impact the probability that a judge will vote for or against
the union position. See JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREsTD. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT,
AND PROBIT MODELS 9-35 (1984); GREENE, supra note 25, at 873-76. For further discussion of
multivariate techniques generally, see JANET BuTrOLPH JOHNSON & RICHARD A. JOSLYN,

POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 389-401 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining multiple regression
analyses); R.MARK SIRKiN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 446-67 (1995) (same). We
used STATA version six software for all of our multivariate analyses.
120
See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 61-63 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining
heteroscedasticity); STATACORP, STATA USER'S GUIDE: RELEASE 6.0, at 256-60 (1999)
(explaining the Huber/White correction to obtain robust standard errors).
121 We follow the common social science convention of designating results with a p-value
of .05 or less as "significant." See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 161 (2d rev. ed.
1979); IVY LEE & MINAKO MAYKOVICH, STATISTICS: A TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY
281-82 (1995); DAVID MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTIROVERSIES 507 (4th ed. 1997).

A result that is significant at the .05 level has no more than a 5% probability of occurring through
random error in sampling or coding.
We designate results with a p-value of.10 or less as "approaching significance." These results
have no more than a one-in-ten chance of stemming from random errors. Social scientists
sometimes treat such results as identifying relationships that are suggestive or at least that warrant
further exploration. See MOORE, supra, at 414-20; SIRKIN, supra note 119, at 195-96. This is
particularly true ifthe results form a consistent pattern with other results that approach or achieve
significance. Based on findings in previous studies, we arguably could have reported some ofthese
results as "significant" (i.e., reaching the conventional .05 level) under one-tailed tests of
significance. We adopted the conservative approach, however, of treating none of our hypotheses
as directional.
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analysis by calculating the marginal effect of each variable with a significant
regression coefficient. 122 These marginal effects illustrate the extent to which each
variable is associated with a change in the likelihood that ajudge will vote in favor
of the union. The marginal effects assume a baseline of a judge with the
predominant (modal) characteristic for each bivariate variable and the mean value
for each continuous variable. We refer to this baseline judge as a "profile judge"
and, using the marginal effects, compare judges with other characteristics to that
123
profile.
In the second stage of our analyses, we examine separately the voting patterns
under four ofthe statutory subsections used as controls in our main equation. 124 We
report means for all variables within each of these subcategories, comparing them
to means within the full universe of issues. We then estimate separate regression
equations for issues arising under each of the statutory subsections. The dependent
and independent variables in these equations are identical to the ones in our first
equation except that we do not control for the statutory subsections. These
individual analyses of the statutory subcategories allow us to explore differences in
the impact ofjudicial background factors when judges confront diverse sections of
122 In
addition

to calculating marginal effects for each of the judicial attribute variables that
approached or achieved significance, we compute those effects for illustrative control variables.
123 We calculate the marginal effects by first using our regression equation to compute the
probability that a "profile judge" (one holding the modal value for bivariate variables and the mean

value for continuous variables) would vote in favor ofthe union. We then enter that value, Z, into
the equation: Prob=l / (1 + e'). Prob is the probability that a profile judge would vote for the

union. This probability becomes the baseline for our marginal effects table.
We then calculate a series of values for Z and Prob, changing a single characteristic of the
profile judge for each calculation. For example, we first change the value for Democratic
appointment from its modal value (0=Republican) to the nonmodal value (l=Democrat) while
retaining the profile values for all other variables. For two continuous variables (college selectivity
and year of appointment), we altered the value from the mean to the high. For the third continuous
variable, age, we used a "high" of 76, which was the oldest age of ajudge fitting other aspects of
the profile. We report these probabilities in the marginal effects table, comparing them to the

baseline probability. While we refer to this procedure as calculating 'marginal effects," it actually
combines a number of procedures: Calculating predicted probabilities given a set of values for the
independent variables, and computing the marginal effects on the probability of an event (first
differences). See GREENE, supra note 25, at 876-79; GARY KING, UNIFYING POLMCAL
METHODOLOGY: THE LIKELIHOOD THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 107 (1994); TIM FUTING
LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBrr, AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAR

MODELS 10-21 (1994).
124 The four statutory categories we examine are sections 8(a)(1) and (3), 8(a)(5), 8(b), and

I0(c). The number of cases in the "other" miscellaneous category of section 8(a) claims was too
small to support independent analysis. We also calculate means and estimate a regression equation

for a combined category of all section 8(a) claims, reporting those results in Appendix B.
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the statute. 125
In the final stage of our analyses, we recombine all issues into a single equation
but we focus on the two subgroups of votes that might have been more disputed
than the full universe ofjudicial participations. The first of these subgroups consists
of all issues included in cases published in the FederalReporter. These cases
constitute decisions that thejudges themselves considered worthy of publication and
full precedential value. Issues from published cases constitute just over half (54%)
of all issues in our database. 126 As we explain further below, these results must be
interpreted with caution because varying circuit practices and other factors affect
publication rates. 127 Still, analyses of this subgroup allow us to determine whether
judicial attributes play a greater-or different-role in published decisions than in
unreported ones.
The second category of "controversial" issues we examine includes all judges'
votes on issues in which either the court of appeals reversed the NLRB or an
appellate judge wrote a separate opinion. This category, in other words, consists of
issues on which at least one judge disagreed publicly with either another judge or
the Board. 128 The fact of disagreement signals the possibility of a more sharply
contested issue. The issues falling in this "divisive" category constitute 20% ofthe
125

We did not consider selection bias a problem when estimating regression equations for
each of the statutory sections because judges do not choose the issues that appear before them. See
infra note 130. We do, however, interpret the equation results cautiously, recognizing that they

summarize behavior with respect to individual sections of the statute rather than the statute as a
whole.
126 Decisions reversing the Board were more likely to be published than affirmances. Of the

reversed cases included in our analyses, 85% appeared in the FederalReporter.Similarly, 84%
of the reversed issues appeared in cases published in the FederalReporter. Only 45% of the
analyzed affirmances were published; 48% of the affirmed issues in our database appeared in the
FederalReporter.
127 Each circuit has different publication practices; publication rates vary widely among the
circuits. See Colker, supra note 62, at 104-05 (identifying disparate circuit court practices); see
generally Shuldberg, supranote 13; Peter Siegelman & John J. Donahue II, Studying the Iceberg
from Its Tip: A ComparisonofPublishedand UnpublishedEmployment DiscriminationCases,

24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1133 (1990); Elizabeth M. Horton, Selective Publicationand theAuthority
of Precedentin the United States Courts ofAppeals, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1691 (1995). For this
reason, our circuit controls are especially important in the analysis ofreported opinions. Even these
controls, however, cannot correct entirely for the bias created by substantial circuit differences in
publication rates.
128 Issues appear in this category only if disagreement arose over that particular issue; we do
not include other issues from the same case if the court unanimously affirmed those issues. It is
appropriate to define this category by issue, even though we define the first controversial category
by case, because this category focuses on disagreement (which arises by issue) rather than
publication (which can occur only by case).
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issues in our full "all case" analysis. 12 9
For each of these categories of controversial votes, we report means for each
variable and compare those means to the full population means. We then estimate
regression equations for both the published case and divisive issue categories, again
130
comparing those results to the equation estimated for all issues in all cases.
Finally, we calculate marginal effects for variables producing significant
coefficients in the analysis of divisive issues. Once again, this technique allows us
to give greater meaning to the logistic regression coefficients.
We analyze these two categories of controverted issues to test the possibility
that social background factors play a different or larger role in contentious or
divided cases. We recognize, however, that neither category perfectly represents the
universe of contested issues. Some issues in published opinions are no more
controversial than those in unpublished decisions. Varying practices among the
circuits also mean that an opinion published in one circuit might escape publication
in a neighboring court. Similarly, panel composition may affect votes to reverse,
dissent or concur. A panel including two Republican appointees and one Democrat
might produce a sharp dissent from the Democrat, qualifying the disputed issue for
inclusion in our divisive category, while a panel of three Republicans would yield
a unanimous affirmance on the same issue, omitting it from the divisive analysis.
We discuss some of these caveats in greater detail below, while also illustrating
the utility of comparing these two categories of controversial votes to the fall
universe of judicial participations. Our database is especially rich because it allows
us to analyze both all issues and smaller subsets of contested votes. The analyses
129

The divisive category includes 746 votes on unanimously reversed issues; 142 votes on

reversed issues that generated a concurrence or dissent; and 218 votes from affirmed issues that
generated a concurrence or dissent.
130In analyses of both the published case and divisive issue categories, we must be
concerned with the possibility of selection bias. See generally Richard A. Berk, An Introduction
to Sample Selection Bias in SociologicalData,48 AM. Soc. REV. 386 (1983). For issues appearing
in published cases, we avoided the problem of selection bias by estimating the equation within the
full population and using a series of interaction terms to isolate effects for issues in published
cases. Table VII reports only the coefficients reflecting effects in published cases; results for the

full equation are available from the authors. Because this technique uses information from both
published and unpublished opinions, it avoids the distorting effect that censoring can have on the
calculation of standard error. Most social science studies are unable to adopt this approach because
information about the dependent variable is missing for censored cases. We were fortunate in
having an exceptionally complete database.

We were unable to adopt this approach for divisive issues, because the interaction terms
predicted too many outcomes completely. We estimate this equation solely for the subset of
divisive issues, aware that this technique carries some risk of selection bias. As discussed further
below, we interpret coefficients from this equation cautiously and in combination with results from
our other equations.
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that follow draw upon these distinctive strengths.
Ill. RESULTS
A. Analyses ofAll Issues in All Cases
Our full data set includes 5,463 issue-specific votes by appellate judges. Table
I reports the means for our dependent variable (a vote for the union), as well as for
all independent and control variables in this "all case/all issue" universe. As the
table reflects, 76% of the appellate votes favored the union.1 3 1 Democratic
appointees cast 34% of all votes, judges who had held elected office cast 22%,
women cast 11%, and judges with NLRA management experience cast 14%. On
average, issues were decided by judges who were sixty years old at the time of
decision and who were appointed in the early months of 1980.132
The righthand column of Table I, which lists means for control variables, shows
that 88% of the votes arose out of Board decisions for the union, 133 that 45% of the
issues arose under sections 8(a)(1) or (3) of the statute, and that Sixth Circuit judges
decided more issues than judges in any other circuit. The high preponderance of
section 8(a) issues, 81% of the total, reflects the fact that the NLRA's primary thrust
is to protect union organizing and collective bargaining activities from unlawful
interference by employers.

13 1 The

dependent variable, like most of the other variables in Table I, is a dichotomous
variable. For these variables, the "mean" is equivalent to the percentage of votes reflecting the
characteristic for which that variable is coded "1." We have named the variables to reflect those
codes so that the table means can be read directly as percentages.
132
For continuous variables, namely age, year of appointment, and college selectivity, the

means in Table I represent the mean or average value of the variable. These values are not
necessarily the same as the mean value for all judges appearing in the database, because judges
contributed varying numbers of votes. The means in Table I and similar tables, in other words, are
based on votes rather than judges.
133The Board's pro-union bottom line is not surprising given that it settles, dismisses, or
withdraws over 90% of all charges, see supranote 83, leaving only strong cases for adjudication,
and that the overwhelming majority of cases adjudicated involve the employer as respondent.
Employers, moreover, often litigate liability determinations to the courts of appeals in order to gain
strategic advantages (especially delay) even if their case is weak on the merits. See Bnmdney, supra

note 70, at 973-78.
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Table I: Means for All Variables
All Issues in All Cases (N=5,463)
Variable

Mean

Variable

Judicial Vote for Union

Control Variables

Judicial Characteristics

Board for Union

.88

Section 8(a)(1) & (3)

.45

Democratic Appointee

.34

Year Appointed

80.01

Section 8(a)(5)

.34

Age

60.25

Other Section 8(a)

.02

Female

.11

Section 8(b)

.08

Female/Dem. Interaction

.07

Section 10(c)

.11

African American

.06

D. C. Circuit

.14

Latino or Asian

.02

First Circuit

.01

Catholic or Jewish

.47

Second Circuit

.09

College Selectivity

61.36

Third Circuit

.10

Elite Law School

.57

Fourth Circuit

.06

Elected Office

.22

Fifth Circuit

.05

Nonelective Position

.73

Sixth Circuit

.19

Prior Judicial Experience

.57

Seventh Circuit

.10

Legal Academic

.27

Eighth Circuit

.05

Workplace Law Experience

.28

Ninth Circuit

.13

Corporate Law Experience

A8

Tenth Circuit

.03

NLRA Management Exp.

.14

Eleventh Circuit

.04

NLRA MgmtJBd. Interact.

.12

Year of Decision

89.83

Table II reports the results of our logistic regression equation for votes favoring
the union. Most of our control variables, notably, are significant in the equation.
Judges were significantly more likely to vote for the union when the Board had
reached the same result. They were less likely to favor the union when litigants
presented claims under sections 8(a)(5), 8(b), 10(c), or the miscellaneous section
8(a) category than when parties sought review of issues arising under sections
8(a)(1) and (3), our reference category (and the statute's basic protections for
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Table H: Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union
All Issues in All Cases (N-5,463)
C&
Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appointee
Year Appointed
Age
Female
Female/Dem. Interaction
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish
College Selectivity
Elite Law School
Elected Office
Nonelective Position
Prior Judicial Experience
Legal Academic
Workplace Law Experience
Corporate Law Experience
NLRA Management Experience
NLRA Mgmt.Board Interaction
Control Variables
Board for Union
Section 8(a)(5)
Other Section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
Constant
Pseudo R2
***p .01, ** p .05,

ent

Robust Std. Err.

Signif.
Signif.000
.065
.010
.005
.005
.713
.001
.323
.000
.807
.090
.205
.715
.477
.142
.163
.037
.009

.68 ***
-.02 *

-.02**
.90 ***
-1.14 ***
-.09
-1.08 ***
.12
-.02**
-.03
.21 *
-.16
-.04
.09
-.30
-.25
.80 **
-1.02 ***
3.06 ***
-.20 *
-1.44 ***
-1.40 **
-.92 *

.10
-.06
.60 ***
.80 ***
-.61 ***
-.88**
.25
-.41 *
.73 *
.62 *
-.01
-.01
I
1

.19
.11
.32
.23
.14
.20
.43
.22
.23
.22
.22
.20
.22
.20
.34
.33
.03
2.33

*p - .10
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.000
.064
.000
.000
.000
.608
.899
.006
.001
.005
.000
.214
.059
.000
.068
.978
.619
.059
.000
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M: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables
All Issues in All Cases
Probability of Vote
for Union

Marginal
Effect

Profile Judge

.80

Judicial Characteristics
Male Democratic Appointee
Most Recent Year Appointed
Older Age (76)
Female Republican Appointee
Female Democratic Appointee
Latino or Asian
Most Selective College
Elected Office
NLRA Mgmt Exp./Board for Employer
NLRA Mgmt. Exp./Board for Union

.89
.76
.74
.91
.86
.58
.74
.83
.35
.81

.09
-.04
-.06
.11
.06
-.22
-.06
.03
-.45
.01

Control Variables
Board for Employer
Section 8(a)(5)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
Fifth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

.16
.77
.50
.62
.63
.89

-.64
-.03
-.30
-.18
-.17
.09

organizing behavior).1 34 Judges on the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
were all more likely than judges on the Sixth Circuit to vote for the union, while
judges on the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits were more likely to reject the
union.135
Table mH, which reports the marginal effects for variables with significant
coefficients in Table II helps illustrate the magnitude of these control variable

134

As Table II reflects, the coefficients for section 8(b), 10(c), and miscellaneous 8(a) claims
are strongly significant, while the coefficient for section 8(a)(5) claims approaches significance.
135
The coefficients for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits approached significance, while those
for the other circuits noted in text were significant. The nonsignificant coefficients for the D.C.,
First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits indicate that judges on those circuits did not differ
significantly from Sixth Circuit judges in their votes.
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effects. 13 6 Table III begins by reporting that a "profile judge," one with the most
common values for each of our variables, had an 80% probability of voting for the
union. This profile judge was, inter alia, a white male Republican appointee sitting
on the Sixth Circuit and reviewing a section 8(a)(1) or (3) claim that the Board had
decided in the union's favor. 137 If the Board had voted for the employer, the
probability of this judge favoring the union dropped dramatically-to just 16%.
Similarly, if the profile judge considered a section 8(b) claim, rather than the more
prevalent section 8(a)(1) or (3) claim, the predicted probability of supporting the
union dropped to 50%.138 And, if the profile judge sat in the Fifth Circuit, rather
than our reference category of the Sixth, the predicted probability of supporting the
union would drop to 63%. Agency deference, substantive issue mix, and circuit
culture clearly matter in predicting judicial votes.
A number ofjudicial attributes, however, also make a significant difference in
predicting outcomes. As indicated in Table II, judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents were significantly more likely to support the union than were their
Republican colleagues. Older judges and judges who had graduated from more
139
selective colleges were significantly more likely to reject the union's claims.
Judges who had held elective office appeared more likely to support the union,
although this result merely approached significance. Conversely, judges appointed
in more recent years seemed more likely to reject the union; this result also
136

The table reports marginal effects for all judicial attribute variables that approached or
achieved significance, as well as for illustrative control variables.
137
Similarly, the profile judge was appointed in 1980, was about 60 years old at the time of
decision, was Protestant, attended a fairly selective college and an elite law school, had held a
nonelective government position as well as a previous judicial appointment, and had practiced
corporate law but without handling NLRA or workplace matters. We used corporate law as the
modal value for private practice experience because it was the most common form of that
experience. The profile judge, of course, is an arbitrary concept. We could construct any other

hypothetical profile (such as a female Republican appointee with workplace law experience) and
test the marginal effect of each variable against that profile. The baseline we adopt is a particularly
useful one for comparing the magnitude of coefficients in the regression equation because it comes
closest to reflecting the typical judge in our data set.
138
If the profile judge reviewed a section 8(b) claim on which the Board had ruled for the
employer-a more common pattern with section 8(b) claims-the probability of supporting the

union would fall even further, to just five percent. Note, however, that we obtained this probability
by recomputing the probability for a profile judge reviewing this type of case. The marginal effects
reflected in Table I cannot simply be combined, the probability for each pattern of characteristics
must be computed separately.
139 According to our equation, Asian and Latino judges were also more likely than their
White colleagues to reject the union. As noted above, however, we view this coefficient with
considerable caution because of the small number of Asian and Latino judges in the population.
See supranotes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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approached significance. 140
The trend toward increased opposition to union positions in recent appointees
holds for both Republican and Democratic judges. We repeated our regression
equation for the separate populations of Republican and Democratic appointees. The
coefficient for year appointed was negative in both equations, indicating that more
recent appointees were less likely to support the union. The result was significant
in the equation for Republican appointees (-.03, p=.041); in the smaller population
of Democratic appointees, it did not quite approach significance (-.04, p=. 145).141
We can illustrate this effect by calculating probabilities similar to the ones
reported in Table III. A male judge appointed in 1961, the first year of the Kennedy
Administration, had a predicted probability of supporting the union of 92%.142 For
a judge appointed the previous year, the last year of Eisenhower's Administration,
we calculated an 86% probability of supporting the union. Moving forward twenty
years, a male judge appointed in 1980 (one of President Carter's last appointments)
showed an 89% probability of supporting the union. A judge appointed the
following year by President Reagan displayed an 80% probability of supporting the
union. For both Democrats and Republicans, in other words, the probability of
supporting the union's legal position dropped by 3 to 6 percentage points when we
compared recent appointees to more senior ones.1 43 The probability of support
140 Age and year of appointment are negatively correlated; more recent appointees are
younger, on average, than are judges with longer tenure. The variables, however, were not too
highly correlated to include in the same equation. The significance of both coefficients is

particularly intriguing here. The pattern suggests that older judges, on average, were more likely
to reject the union, even when we controlled for their relatively early years of appointment. Judges
appointed more recently were also more likely to reject the union, even when we controlled for
their relatively young ages. Both advanced age and recent appointment seem to correspond with
anti-union votes.
141 Full results for this supplemental analysis are available from the authors.
142 The judges who contributed votes to our database were appointed by Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush. Thus, 1961 was the
earliest year for a Democratic appointment. We use male judges for these comparisons because
the most senior female judge in our database was not appointed until 1979. Other than year of
appointment and party of the appointing President, we use the profile characteristics for these
comparisons.
143 For Republicans, the effect would be even more extreme if we compared the earliest

possible year of appointment (1954) with the most recent year of appointment (1992). Our
equation predicts that a profile judge appointed in 1954 (by Republican Eisenhower) had an 88%

probability of supporting the union. A judge appointed in 1992 (by Republican Bush) had a 76%
probability of supporting the union-a twelve-point drop. These figures probably are accurate in
depicting the increased opposition toward unions of the 1980s. We focus on the more moderate
comparisons in text. however, because the Republican appointees spanned a much greater range
(1954-1992) than the Democrats (1961-1980).
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among recent Democratic appointments, in fact, is not much higher than that of
144
early Republican appointees.
At least for this population of all votes in all cases, however, the difference
between Democratic and Republican appointees does not seem to be either
increasing or decreasing over time. Recently appointed Democrats and recently
appointed Republicans both are less likely to support the union than their more
senior colleagues of the same party. The partisan gap, however, appears fairly
constant once one controls for year of appointment. 145
Tables II and I also reveal that gender makes a difference in NLRA casesbut only for Republican appointees. The coefficients in Table II for Democratic
appointees, women, and the interaction of those two terms are all significant Taken
together, the coefficients indicate that Democratic men and women both are more
likely than Republican men to vote in favor of the union, but that Democratic men
and women do not differ significantly among themselves. 146 Republican women,
on the other hand, are significantly more likely than Republican men to support the
union. The votes ofRepublican women, in fact, are at least as pro-union as those of
Democratic men or women.147
144 The latter two groups, however, still differ significantly in their likelihood of casting prounion votes. We repeated our regression equation for a population of votes restricted to early
Republican appointees (those named to the bench by Eisenhower, Nixon, or Ford) and recent
Democratic appointees (those named by Carter). We omitted from this equation variables (such
as female and African American) that would have correlated perfectly with one of the two
categories. In this pared equation, comparing early Republican appointees to recent Democratic
ones, the coefficient for Democratic appointment was still positive and significant (p=.021).
145 We tested this possibility by creating an interaction term for Democratic appointment and
year of appointment; the interaction was not significant We also created separate regression
equations for judges appointed before and after 1976. In both groups, Democratic appointees were
significantly more likely than their Republican peers to support the union's position and the
magnitude of this effect (as measured through marginal effects) was comparable.
146
The Female-Democratic interaction term allows us to compare Democratic men,
Democratic women, and Republican women to the reference category of Republican men. To
obtain the result for Democratic men, we look just at the coefficient for Democratic appointment.
That coefficient is significant and positive, indicating that men appointed by Democrats are more
likely to support the union than are men appointed by Republicans.
To obtain the result for women appointed by Democrats, we must look at the coefficients for
Democratic appointment, being female, and the interaction between the two. The first two of these
coefficients are significant and positive, while the final one is significant and negative. In fact, the
third coefficient almost exactly cancels out the second one. This leaves the first coefficient, which
is the one for being a Democratic appointee. Thus, the results for Democratic women are
comparable to those for Democratic men; their "femaleness" does not enhance any pro-union
tendencies already conveyed by their political leanings.
147 To obtain results for Republican women, we need to look only at the coefficient for being
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Table 1I1clarifies these results by showing the marginal effects for each of these
variables. Switching the profile judge from a Republican to a Democrat (but
retaining the profile judge's maleness) raises the predicted probability of voting for
the union from 80% to 89%, an increase of 9 percentage points. Switching the
profile judge from a male Republican to a female Democrat similarly raises the
predicted probability of a pro-union vote from 80% to 86%.148 And changing the
profile judge from a male Republican to a female Republican increases the
probability of voting for the union to 91%.
Tables II and III, finally, reveal that judges with NLRA management
experience were significantly more likely than their colleagues to vote for the
union-but only in cases in which the Board had issued a decision for the employer.
When the Board supported the union, most judges showed a high probability of
voting for the union as well. As Table Ill illustrates, a profile judge had an 80%
likelihood of supporting the union when the Board had reached a pro-union result.
That same judge, with NLRA management experience instead of nonworkplace
corporate experience, had an 81% probability of supporting the union, a
1 49
nonsignificant difference.
The gap grew, however, when we examined appeals from pro-employer
determinations. Judges with no NLRA management experience showed only a 16%
probability of supporting the union when the Board had voted for the employer. A
judge with most of the same profile characteristics, but NLRA management
experience, registered a 35% probability of supporting the union under these
circumstances. When holding other characteristics constant in our judicial profile,
in other words, a judge with NLRA management experience was more than twice
as likely as a judge without that experience to reverse a pro-employer Board
150
outcome and support the union.
female. Republican women are female, but they are not Democrats. Thus, we can ignore both the
coefficient for being a Democrat and for the interaction of that status with being female. The
coefficient for being female is significant and positive, showing that Republican women are
significantly more likely than Republican men to vote for the union.
148 This increase is lower than the rise for male Democrats, but the difference is not
significant. Male and female Democrats were similar in their proclivity to favor the union when
compared to male Republicans.
149
One can reach the same conclusion by interpreting the coefficients in Table I. When the
Board supported the union, ajudge with NLRA management experience would show the effects
of the NLRA, Board outcome, and NLRA/Board coefficients. The NLRA management coefficient
is significant and positive, while the NLRA/Board interaction is significant and negative. The two

coefficients also are of similar magnitude, canceling one another out. This leaves only the Board
outcome coefficient, indicating that judges with NLRA management experience-just like all

other judges-were significantly more likely to support the union when the Board had done so.
150 The same result is apparent from the coefficients reported in Table II. To consider the case
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B. Statutory Subsections
We turn now to examination ofthe role ofjudicial attributes in predicting prounion votes under four different sections of the statute: sections 8(a)(1) and (3),
section 8(a)(5), section 8(b), and section 10(c). In Appendix B, we provide analyses
for a fifth grouping of statutory issues, all votes cast under section 8(a).151
Table IV reproduces the means for all variables (except the statutory section
controls) in our full population and compares those means to means within each
statutory section subpopulation. The table also identifies notable variations in
frequency, indicating when the mean for a variable within one issue category
differed significantly from the mean for votes falling outside that category. As our
initial regression equation suggested, outcomes vary widely by statutory section.
Judicial votes on section 8(a)(5), section 8(b), and section 10(c) issues all are less

of a judge with NLRA management experience reviewing a pro-employer determination, one
looks only at the coefficient for NLRA management experience. This coefficient is significant and
positive, indicating that these judges were significantly more likely than their colleagues to reverse
the Board when the Board had voted for the union.
As Table 11 shows, judges with other types of labor or workplace law experience were neither
more nor less likely than their colleagues to support the union. When we broke this variable into
separate components, we found that the very small number of judges whose only NLRA
experience was in government (see note 109 supra)resembled their colleagues with management
experience. That is,judges with NLRA government experience were significantly more likely than
other judges to vote for the union when the Board had found for the employer. Judges whose only
NLRA experience was in the classroom, conversely, showed some tendency to reject union
positions-but this result only approached significance. Judges with exclusively union experience
and judges with non-NLRA workplace law experience did not differ significantly from their
colleagues in our analysis of all issues in all cases.
151 As Appendix B reveals, this grouping offers results similar to those we obtained in our
initial regression equation for all issues in all cases: (1) Democratic appointees and Republican
women were significantly more likely to favor the union after controlling for other factors. (2)
Older judges, Latino or Asian judges, and graduates of more selective colleges were less likely to
support the union's legal position. (3) Judges with NLRA management experience, finally, were
significantly more likely than their colleagues to vindicate the union when the Board had voted
for the employer.
The resemblance of these findings to our analysis of all issues in all cases is not surprising;
issues arising under section 8(a) account for 81% of the votes in our database.
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Table IV: Means by Statutory Sections in All Cases
Variable

All

Judicial Vote for Union

.76

.85***

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appointee
Year Appointed
Age
Female
Female/Dent Interact
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish
College Selectivity
Elite Law School
Elected Office
Nonelective Position
Prior Judicial Exp.
Legal Academic
Workplace Law Exp.
Corporate Law Exp.
NLRA Mgmt. Exp.
NLRA Mgmt/Bd. Int

.34
80.01
60.25
.11
.07
.06
.02
.47
61.36
.57
.22
.73
.57
.27
.28
.48
.14
.12

.35
79.96
60.29
.11
.07
.06
.01***
.43***
60.78**
.58
.23
.71*
.57
.27
.28
.48
.14
.14***

Control Variables
Board for Union
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
N
***p .01, **p.05, *p

.88
.14
.01
.09
.10
.06
.05
.19
.10
.05
.13
.03
.04
89.83
5,463
.10

8(a)(1)/(3)

8(a)(5)
.79**

.32
80.11
60.13
.10
.06
.06
.02
.47
61.90*
.55
.21
.75*
.57
.27
.26
.49
.13
.13

.97***
.92***
.13
.14
.01
.01
.10
.07
.11
.09
.06
.06
.05
.06
.23***
.15**
.08**
.15**
.05
.04
.07***
.13
.04
.04**
.05
.05**
89.85
89.91
2,451
1,872

8(b)

10(c)

.22***

.70***

.45***
.31
79.70
80.27
60.30
60.24
.12
.13
.09
.10
.05
.07
.10***
.01
.62***
.46
61.70
61.65
.60
.58
.16*
.21
.72
.73
.6***
.61
.30
.29
.31
.29
.39**
.52
.09**
.20**
.01**
.09

.16***
.94***
.15
.17
.02
.00
.05**
.10
.14
.10
.05
.04
.02***
.04
.06***
.26***
.02***
.08
.06
.05
.43***
.14
.00**
.02
.00"**
.00**
89.11*** 90.01
430
623
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likely to favor the union than are votes on section 8(a)(1) and (3) issues. 152 The
difference is most dramatic with respect to section 8(b) issues, which involve
allegations of misconduct by unions. Judges supported the union on just 22% of
these appealed issues, while they favored the union on 70% of section 10(c)
remedial issues, 79% of section 8(a)(5) bargaining issues, and 85% of section
8(a)(1) and (3) issues.
Differences of this magnitude in judicial outcomes reflect in large part the
posture of issues appealed to the courts. Table IV demonstrates that the Board's
result also differed substantially among the statutory sections. The Board favored
53
the union in only 16% of the section 8(b) issues appealed to the courts) Most of
the issues falling in that category, in other words, involved union appeals of Board
determinations adverse to them. Section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims, on the other hand,
displayed an exceptionally high proportion ofpro-union outcomes.l 4 Most of those
appeals were filed by disappointed employers.
Table IV also reveals that the mix of NLRA issues differs somewhat among the
circuits. The Ninth Circuit handled a disproportionate number of the section 8(b)
claims, deciding 43% of all issues falling in that category. The Sixth Circuit heard
unusually high percentages of section 8(a)(1) or (3) and section 10(c) claims,
deciding about one quarter of the issues filed in both of those categories. And the
Seventh Circuit's docket included a disproportionate percentage of section 8(a)(5)
claims.
These differences may reflect forum shopping by litigants, variations in
underlying behavior, or both. Unions may tend to appeal adverse section 8(b)
findings to the relatively liberal Ninth Circuit; alternatively, West Coast unions may
generate a disproportionate number of section 8(b) challenges. The high percentage
of section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims in the Sixth Circuit, together with the remedial
issues accompanying those claims, may reflect concentrated organizing in some or
152

In an earlier study based on the same database, we reported a significant difference in
reversal rates with respect to Board findings of employer liability under section 8(a)(5) and
sections 8(a)(1) and (3). See Brudney, supranote 70, at 981-82. In that study, we distinguished
among substantive violations found by the Board under 8(a)(5), technical violations of that section
(discussed supra at note 114), violations of 8(a)(1), and violations of 8(a)(3). The reversal rates
with respect to Board determinations of liability in the first two categories were, respectively,
15.9% and 15.6%, while reversal rates for determinations ofliability in the last two categories were
just 12.0% and 12.4%. See Brudney, supranote 70, at 981-82.
153 This figure, of course, does not reflect the full universe of Board findings on section 8(b)

issues; it reflects only issues appealed to the courts.
154 Once again, it would be hasty to conclude from the mean in Table IV that the Board
decides 97% of all 8(a)(1) and (3) claims for the union. The high percentage of pro-union
outcomes appearing on the appellate docket may stem partly from a greater propensity of

employers to appeal adverse decisions.
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all of the states within that circuit. Whatever the reasons for these differences, it is
important to note that they exist-and that they may have some impact on our
analyses ofjudicial attributes. As Table IV shows, the uneven distribution of issues
among the circuits affects the judicial attributes within each of those statutory
categories. The problem is especially acute for section 8(b) appeals, which were
concentrated so heavily in one circuit. Each of the other categories, however,
includes a disproportionate number ofjudges with at least one of the attributes under
study.
With these caveats in mind, we turn to Table V, which compares our regression
equation for each statutory category to the results from our regression for all issues
(Table H.).155 The table suggests that judicial attributes differ in their correlation
with outcomes depending upon the type of claim under review. 15 6 Democratic
appointees, for example, were significantly more likely to support the union in both
categories of section 8(a) claims, but political background did not correlate with a
judge's vote on section 8(b) or section 10(c) claims. Indeed, the coefficient for
Democratic appointment in the equation for section 10(c) was negative and
relatively large (p-.147). Political affiliation, therefore, appears to be a better
predictor for outcomes on substantive issues involving alleged employer
misconduct than for remedial issues or claims alleging misconduct by the union.

155

To conserve space, we report only regression coefficients, designating those that reached

or approached significance. Standard errors for all equations in Table V, as for the equation
reported in Table I, used the Huber/White correction for heteroscedasticity. See supranote 120 and
accompanying text. Robust standard errors and precise p-levels are available upon request.
For section 8(b) and 10(c) claims, which embraced smaller populations, we had to drop
several variables from the regression equation. These omitted variables either were collinear with
other variables or completely predicted the outcome. We mark these omitted variables with a "'
sign in Table V.
Most of the omitted variables were circuit variables, but we had to drop the NLRA/Board
interaction from the equation for section 10(c). Because of the small number of pro-employer
decisions from the Board in this category, the interaction term completely predicted outcomes.
That is, in each case in which the Board voted for the employer under section 10(c), judges with
NLRA management experience voted to reverse and offer relief to the union. We discuss this result
further innote 160 infra.
156 When comparing coefficients across the four equations, one must remember that the
populations vary in size. The number of 8(b) and 10(c) claims is much smaller than the number
of 8(a)(1) and (3) or 8(a)(5) claims. It is correspondingly more difficult for coefficients in the
former categories to achieve significance. In comparing coefficients, we thus consider the
coefficient's magnitude and sign, as well as its p-value.
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Table V: Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union
Regression Coefficients for Statutory Sections

All

8(a)(1)/(3)

8(a)(5)

8(b)

10(c)

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appt

YearAppointed
Age
Female

.68 ***

-.02*
-.02***
.90 ***

Female/Dem. Int.
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish

-1.14 ***
-.09
-1.08***
.12

College Selectivity

-.02 ***

Elite Law School

-.03

Elected Office

.21 *

1.03 ***

-.01
-.01
1.33 ***

-1.62 **
-.59
-.32
-.21
-.04 ***

.72 ***

-.02
-.03*

.48

-.62

-.03
.01

-.09
08
-.

.55

2.73 **

-.64

-.54
-.38
-1.32**
.14

-3.92 **
1.78*
-3.17**
1.78 ***

1.29
.82
.12
.40

-.02 *

.00

-.02

.28

-.55 ***

45

-A6

.34 *

-.13

.43
-.18
-A0
-.08
1.57
2.06**
.88

-.07
.12
.77
-.35
-. 19
-.04

Nonelective Posit
Prior Judicial Exp.
Legal Academic
Wrkplc. Law Exp.
Corp. Law Exp.
NLRAMgmt Exp.

-.16
-.04
.09
-.30
-.25
.80**

-.14
-.08
-.09
-.54
-.49
1.55

-. 16
-.21
.12
-.29
-.27
1.55**

NLRA Mgmt./Bd.

-1.02 ***

-2.09

-1.60 **

-.51

.47

#

Interaction
Control Variables
Board for Union
D.C. Circuit

3.06 ***
.10

First Circuit

-.06

Second Circuit
Third Circuit

.60 ***
.80 ***

Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
Constant
Pseudo-R
N
***p

.01, ** p

.05, *p

-.61***
-.88***
.25
-.41*
.73***
.62 *
-.01
-.01
4.41 *
.25***
5,463

3.03 ***
.15

.60

3.17 ***
-.50

1.35

1.03 ***
.60

2.13 *
2.51 ***

-1.08***
-1.65***
.38
-.75**
.25
.87
-.07
-.03
5.72
.15
2,451

-.27
.14
.19
-.16
1.46 ***
.27
-.02
-.01
4.37
.25 **
1,872

3.23 *
2.07 ***

#

2.24***
.40

#

-1.34
1.22

-1.15 **
.38

1.58
-.56
#
#
.21
#
#
-.22
15.61
.36***
430

.73
-.94
-.72
-.38
1.99***
1.52
#
.07
6.11
.17***
623

.10, # variable omitted due to collinearity or perfect prediction
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The regression results for section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims are most similar to the
results for all issues in all cases, a pattern that reflects at least in part the dominance
of these claims in the full population. The coefficients for NLRA management
experience and its associated interaction, however, are not significant in the 8(a)(1)
and (3) equation. This difference may reflect the relative ease most judges feel when
reviewing section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims against employers. These allegations raise
the most common type of NLRA complaint: That an employer threatened, bribed,
interrogated, or discharged individual workers to impair an organizational campaign
or union election. These complaints also are analogous to claims of discrimination,
bribery, or intimidation arising in other areas of public law. 157 Experience
interpreting the NLRA may matter less when reviewing section 8(a)(1) and (3)
15 8
claims.
Section 8(a)(5) claims, on the other hand, raise issues more distinct from other
fields of appellate practice. These allegations focus on employer misconduct
directed at the union rather than at individual employees. They involve complaints
that the collective bargaining process is being undermined or subverted, including
charges that an employer refused to provide requested information, engaged in
surface bargaining, or improperly withdrew recognition of the bargaining unit. To
understand and assess these claims, judges must be comfortable both with the
protected nature of group action and with the complex dynamics generated by a
clash between two collective entities, the union and the employer. There also are
fewer analogues elsewhere in public law to claims that center on the paradigm of
group action.
With this background, it is noteworthy that the results for our section 8(a)(5)
equation differ substantially from those for the other equations. The coefficients in
Table V suggest that older judges and graduates of elite law schools were especially

157

See 26 AM. JuR. 2dElections §§ 374-85 (1996) (discussing the range ofpolitical election
misconduct analogous to section 8(a)(1) that is prohibited by federal or state law, including
electioneering, bribery, illegal advertising, and voter intimidation); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 239-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (addressing mixed motive discriminatory conduct
issue analogous to section 8(a)(3)); Mt. Healthy City Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,284-87
(1977) (same).
158 As in our analysis of all issues, the variable forjudges holding other types of NLRA or

workplace law experience did not achieve significance in our examination of section 8(a)(1) and
(3) votes. The judges within this category who obtained their NLRA experience solely within
government, however, were significantly more likely than other judges to support the unionregardless of the Board's outcome below. Judges whose only NLRA experience was academic,

conversely, showed some tendency to reject the union. As in our analysis of all issues, supra note
150, this coefficient approached significance. Separate variables for the larger numbers ofjudges
with union-side NLRA experience or non-NLRA experience were not significant in this equation.

HeinOnline -- 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1726 1999

19991

JUDICIALHOSTILITY

1727

hostile to unions asserting claims under section 8(a)(5). 159 Republican women
showed no significant hostility toward unions under section 8(a)(5), but their
absence of support is notable when contrasted with the backing they exhibited for
unions under sections 8(a)(1) and (3), as well as under section 8(b). Similarly, while
Democratic appointees (both male and female) were significantly more likely than
their Republican colleagues to support unions under section 8(a)(5), the difference
was not as strong as under sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
Conversely, judges with NLRA management experience displayed the largest
pro-union difference from their colleagues under section 8(a)(5). When the Board
rejected a union's 8(a)(5) bargaining claim, judges with NLRA management
experience were especially likely to reverse and protect the union's position. 16° This
pattern supports the hypothesis that section 8(a)(5) claims present particular
challenges to the bench. Judges who supported the union under other sections of the
statute appeared less likely to register that support under section 8(a)(5), while
judges with the most experience interpreting and litigating under the statute showed
161
a special propensity to protect union interests.
Votes premised on section 8(b), the statutory section protecting employers and
individuals from union misconduct, also displayed an interesting set of correlations
with judicial attributes. Democratic men and women did not differ from Republican
men on these claims, but Republican women were significantly more likely than the
other three groups to favor the union when claims were filed against it Catholic and
Jewish judges likewise were significantly more likely than their Protestant
counterparts to take the union's side under section 8(b), as were judges with
corporate practice experience. 162 African American judges also appeared more
159

Graduates of selective colleges tended to vote against unions in this context as well, but
that tendency was more consistent with their responses under other sections of the statute. The
coefficient for Latino and Asian judges also was negative and significant in this equation. The
small number of Latino and Asian judges in the population, however, counsels caution in
interpreting the result.
160 The coefficients for judges with NLRA management experience also were positive in the
equations for section 8(aXl) and (3), as well as for section 8(b), but they did not attain significance
in these equations. In the equation for section 10(c), we had to omit the NLRA/Board interaction
because it perfectly predicted outcome. Judges with NLRA experience, in other words, always
voted for the union when the Board rejected the union's claim under section 10(c). The effect thus
is consistent with the positive (and sometimes significant) coefficients in the other equations. Only
a small number of claims, however, fit this pattern under section 10(c).
161 Our variable for other workplace law experience did not attain significance in our analysis
of section 8(a)(5) claims. Nor did any ofthe components ofthat variable (i.e., judges with union,
government, or academic NLRA experience, as well as judges with non-NLRA workplace law
experience) attain significance.

162 When we subdivided our other workplace law experience variable, we discovered that
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likely to support unions under section 8(b), although this effect merely approached
163
significance.
In the section 10(c) category, year of appointment, age, and experience as a
legal academic all played especially strong roles in predicting outcomes. Both recent
appointees and older judges were especially likely to vote against broad remedies
favoring unions. 164 Experience as a legal academic, conversely, showed a strong
positive correlation with votes for the union. This effect, notably, did not appear in
any of the other statutory categories or in our analysis of all issues in all cases.
Former academics may be especially open to granting more expansive relief; or they
may be more sophisticated in thinking about broad remedial measures. 165
The votes for the four statutory sections thus showed substantial variation.
Judicial attributes help predict outcomes under all four sections, but the effects are
not uniform. Instead, the impact of social background factors appears highly
16 6
contextual, with factors assuming importance for some issues but not others.
C. ControversialVotes
We turn, finally, to two sets ofjudicial participations that may contain a higher
percentage of controverted votes than the groups analyzed earlier: Votes on all
issues in cases published in the FederalReporter ("published cases") and all votes
on issues that provoked some disagreement among judges or between the court and
judges with union, but not management, NLRA experience also were significantly more likely to
support the union under section 8(b). Additional subgroups within this workplace law experience
variable did not produce significant coefficients.
163
Latino and Asian judges were more likely than their White or African American
colleagues to reject union claims under section 8(b), but we interpret this coefficient cautiously
because of the small number of these judges in the population.
164 Although these effects point in opposite directions, they are consistent. The coefficients
mean that older judges were significantly more likely than their younger colleagues to vote against
unions on remedial issues, even after controlling for factors (like an earlier year of appointment)
that might have made them more favorable to the relief. Recent appointees likewise disfavored
unions under section 10(c), even after controlling for factors (such as their relative youth) that
might have made them more sympathetic to remedial claims.
165 None of our variables for NLRA or workplace law experience, including subcategories
of the latter variable, produced significant coefficients in the analysis of section 10(c).
166 Some judicial attributes, on the other hand, never showed a significant association with
outcomes after controlling for other variables. Previous appointment to a nonelective govemment
position and prior judicial experience failed to generate significant coefficients in our analysis of
any of the statutory sections, as well as in the all-case analysis. Nor were these two variables
significant in the two analyses of controversial cases we report in the next section. The variable
for other workplace law experience was not significant in any of our equations, but its components
sometimes achieved significance.
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the Board ('divisive issues"). Table VI summarizes the means for all variables in
the published and divisive categories and compares those means to the means in the
full population of all votes (Table 1).
Table VI reveals that the published and divisive votes differ in important ways
from the full population of all votes.167 Although 76% of all votes supported the
union, just 68% of votes in published cases were pro-union, and only 26% of votes
in divisive cases endorsed the union. The mix of statutory sections in each
controversial category differs significantly from that in the full population-and the
two categories differ from one another as well. 168 The circuits also varied widely in
the percentage of votes they contributed to the full population and each of the
controversial subpopulations. 169 The circuit mix, in turn, affected the presence of
judicial attributes in both controversial categories, especially the published cases.
Given these differences, we must exercise caution when interpreting results
from the published case or divisive issue categories. The results accurately reflect
the votes included within those categories, and may help identify characteristics that
are especially important in predicting votes in controversial cases, but these results
do not necessarily generalize to all votes in all cases. Instead, at least some of the
results may be a function of which issues were selected into the categories for
analysis.

167 Once again, within each category we mark means that differed significantly from means
for votes falling outside that category.
168 Both published cases and divisive issues contain significantly fewer votes on section
8(a)(1) or (3) issues than appear in the full population. The published cases include a high
proportion of section 8(a)(5) and section 8(b) claims, while the divisive votes contain a high
percentage of section 10(c) issues and a lower percentage of section 8(a)(5) issues.
169
The D.C., Fifth, and Eighth Circuits contributed more votes to both controversial
categories than to the full population, while the Third and Ninth Circuits generated proportionally
fewer votes in the controversial categories. The First and Seventh Circuits contributed a
disproportionate number of votes in published cases, while the Second Circuit was less prominent
in that category. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits were underrepresented among divisive issues.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, finally, were underrepresented among published cases and
overrepresented among divisive issues.
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Table VI: Means for all Variables
Controversial Votes and All Votes
Variable

All

Published

Judicial Vote for Union

.76

.68 ***

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appointee
Year Appointed
Age
Female

.34
80.01
60.25
.11

.34
80.02
59.88 *
.11

.31 *
80.22
60.45
.10

.07
.06
.02
.47
61.36
.57
.22
.73
.57
.27
.28
.48
.14
.12

.09 ***
.06
.02
.49 *
62.23 *
.61 *
.20 *
.74
.50 *
.30 **
.29
.48
.13 *
.11 **

.08
.07
.02
.45
62.49
.59
.22
.72
.54
.26
.28
.50
.14
.11

.88
.45
.34
.02
.08
.11
.14
.01
.09
.10
.06
.05
.19
.10
.05
.13
.03
.04
89.83
5,463

.87 **
.38 ***
.38 ***
.02
.10***
.12
.19 ***
.02***
.07 *
.06 ***
.05 **
.06 *
.15 ***
.16 **
.07 *
.11 ***
.03
.04
89.81
2,938

Female/Democratic Interaction
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish
College Selectivity
Elite Law School
Elected Office
Nonelective Position
Prior Judicial Experience
Legal Academic
Workplace Law Experience
Corporate Law Experience
NLRA Management Experience
NLRA Mgmt/Board Interaction

Divisive
.26

Control Variables
Board for Union
Section 8(a)(1) or (3)
Section 8(a)(5)
Other Section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
N
***p

.01,

**p

.05,

*p

.88
.40 *
.30 **
.04 *
.08
.18
.17
.01
.08
.06 *
.08
.09 *
.23 *
.10
.07 *
.08 *
.02 *
.02 **
89.87
1,106

.10
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Table VII reports the results of our regression equations for supporting the
union within both the published case and divisive issue categories. For convenience,
we compare the regression coefficients in those equations with the coefficients from
the same equation applied to all issues in all cases (Table H).170
Appointees ofDemocratic Presidents were significantly more likely than their
Republican colleagues to support the union on issues arising in published cases.
Surprisingly, however, this result did not hold for the divisive category of issues.
That category contains a disproportionate number of section 10(c) remedial claims,
which our previous analysis shows provoked less partisan difference. In addition,
the category includes fewer Democratic appointees than does the full population of
votes. Supplemental analyses revealed that this partisan effect is concentrated
among more senior judges: The divisive category contains significantly fewer votes
by early Democratic appointees and correspondingly more votes by early
Republican appointees. 17 The category thus encompasses more votes by the most
pro-union Republicans and fewer votes by the most pro-union Democrats. 172 The
composition ofthe category thus accounts, at least in part, for the failure of political
party to show a significant association with outcome in this equation.
The coefficient for year of appointment was negative and approached
significance among published cases, just as in our analysis of all cases. Once again,
this trend toward appointment ofjudges with less union sympathy held for both
Republicans and Democrats. We repeated our regression for published cases within
the separate populations of Republican and Democratic appointees. The coefficient
for year of appointment was negative in both equations-achieving significance in
73
the first analysis and approaching significance in the second)
Year of appointment failed to reach significance in our analysis of divisive
issues, although the coefficient had the same sign and magnitude as in the analyses
of all cases and published cases. The year of decision, however, was negative and
significant in our divisive category, providing a different type of evidence that
judicial attitudes in recent years may be moving away from pro-union

170

As with Table V, we omit standard errors and p-values; IIlI results are available from the

authors. As with all other regression equations, we used the Huber/White correction to estimate
robust standard errors. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
171 Early Democratic appointees (prior to 1976) contributed 5.14% of the votes in the
divisive issue category, but 8.33% of the votes on other issues (p=.004). Early Republican
appointees (again, prior to 1976) cast 16.19% of the divisive votes, but 13.53% of other votes
(p=.09 1). We used this same dividing line when analyzing partisan effects among all issues in all
cases. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.

173 For Republican appointees, p=.034; for Democratic appointees, p=.071.
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Table VII: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Supporting the Union
Controversial Votes and All Votes
All

Published

Divisive

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appointee

Year Appointed
Age
Female

.68 ***

.49 **

-.02*
-.02***
.90***

-.02*
-.
01
1.15 ***

-. 10

-.02
-.
00
2.75***

Female/Democratic Interaction

-1.14 *

-.99 **

Afican American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish

-.09
-1.08***
.12

.14
-.36
.18

2.19
#
1.22***

College Selectivity
Elite Law School
Elected Office

-.02 ***
-.03
.21 *

-.02 **
.32 **

-.03 **
1.00 ***

Nonelective Position
Prior Judicial Experience
Legal Academic
Workplace Law Experience
Corporate Law Experience

-.16
-.04
.09
-.30
-.25

-.15
.01
-.00
.04
-.07

NLRA Management Experience
NLRA MgmtJBoard Interaction

Control Variables
Board for Union
Section 8(a)(5)
Other Section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
Constant
Pseudo R2
N
***p

.01, **p g.05 I *p

.80 **
-1.02 ***

.06

.93 **
-1.18 **

-2.33 *

.75 **

.25
-.28
.17
.51
.65
1.27 **

3.06 ***
2.34 ***
-4.39 ***
-.20 *
-.15
-.78
-1.44 *
-1.57
.72
-1AO*
-.88***
-.85
-.
92
-.81***
-.86***
.10
.16
-1.97
-.06
#
-1.85
.60
-.01
-.
99*
.80
-.12
-.76
-.
61
.13
-.63
-.
88
-.86***
-4.09***
.25
.86 ***
-.17
-.
41
.21
.25
.73
.88***
-2.14***
.62*
#
-1.09*
-.01
-.13
#
-.01
-.04
-.
15
4.41 *
6.05 **
18.63 ***
.25 *
.17 ***
.34
5,463
2,938
1,106
.10, # variable omitted due to collinearity or perfect prediction
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interpretations of the NLRA. 174
Gender was significant in both categories of controversial cases, but the effect
once again was limited to Republican women. In published cases, as in all cases,
Republican women matched Democratic men and women in their support for
unions, with all three categories differing significantly from Republican men. By
contrast, for divisive issues, Republican women were significantly more supportive
of the union than were Republican men, while Democratic women (like Democratic
men) did not differ significantly from Republican men.175 Table VIII illustrates this
pattern on divisive issues through predicted probabilities: A male Republican judge
(the profile judge) registered a 22% probability of supporting the union in this
divisive category. For Democratic men and women, the predicted probabilities were
21% and 28% respectively-both nonsignificant differences. For a Republican
woman, however, the probability of voting in the union's favor was an
overwhelming 82%.
African American judges, as well as Catholic or Jewish judges, were
significantly more likely to support the union in the divisive vote category, although
neither ofthese effects appeared in our analysis ofall cases or published cases. Like
the pattern for Republican women, the effect appears to stem from these judges'
176
votes in 8(b) cases.
Within both categories of controversial votes, judges who attended more
selective colleges were less likely than their colleagues to support the union. Indeed,
this result is one of the most consistent we identified-across categories of
substantive issues as well as controversial votes. Graduates of elite law schools,
conversely, were more likely to vote for the union in both published cases and
divisive issues. The latter results are somewhat surprising, given the significant
negative coefficient for graduates ofelite law schools in our regression equation for
section 8(a)(5) issues, as well as the failure ofthis coefficient to achieve significance
in our regression for all votes. 177 The novel results for elite law graduates may stem
174 Increased rejection of the union's position might also reflect previous victories by the

union combined with a tendency to press an ever more favorable position. That explanation seems
less likely in this context, however, given that all appointments to the NLRB were by Republican
Presidents during the years we studied. See supranote 88.
175 This effect is similar to the one we identified in our analysis of section 8(b) above. See
supratext following note 161.
176 We had to omit the variable for Latino and Asian judges from our analysis of divisive
issues because the variable completely predicted the outcome. The coefficient for these judges
failed to attain significance in our analysis of published cases. These two effects reinforce our
cautions about interpreting race effects for such a small category ofjudges.
177 Indeed, a bivariate analysis of all votes reveals no significant difference between

graduates of elite law schools and other judges. Graduates of elite law schools favored the union
in 75.51% of their votes; otherjudges supported the union in 76.71% of their votes (p=.488).
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Table VIII: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables
Divisive Issues
Probability of
Vote for Union

Marginal Effect

Profile Judge

.22

Judicial Characteristics
Male Democratic Appointee
Most Recent Year Appointed
Older Age (76)
Female Republican Appointee
Female Democratic Appointee
African American
Catholic or Jewish
Most Selective College
Non-Elite Law School
Elected Office
NLRA Management Experience

.21
.18
.23
.82
.28
.72
.49
.15
.10
.40
.35

-.01
-.04
.01
.60
.06
.50
.27
-.07
-.12
.18
.13

Control Variables
Board for Employer
Section 8(a)(5)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

.96
.12
.11
.11
.04
.00
.03

.74
-.10
-.11
-.11
-.18
-.22
-.19

from the way in which issues were selected for the controversial case categories,
rather than from a genuine pro-union bias among those graduates. 178 At the very
178 Although elite law graduates and other judges supported the union at a virtually identical
rate, see supra note 177, elite law graduates contributed a higher percentage of their pro-union
votes to both controversial case categories. The published cases include 52.09% of the pro-union
votes cast by elite law graduates, but only 42.23% of pro-union votes cast by graduates of other
law schools (p=.000). Similarly, the divisive issue category includes 8.17% of pro-union votes cast
by elite law graduates and just 5.29% of pro-union votes cast by other judges (p=.007).
These effects may occur because graduates of elite law schools sit on circuits that encourage
publication of a higher percentage of unanimous affirmances (which overwhelmingly support the
union in our database), because they sit on panels that decide to publish more of those affimiances,
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least, the results illustrate that the predictive power of judicial attributes varies
considerably depending on the subset of votes chosen for analysis.
Judges who had held elected office were significantly more likely to support the
union on divisive issues. For a profile judge, experience as an elected official almost
doubled the probability of supporting the union, from 22% to 40%. This effect is
similar to one we obtained in our analysis of all cases, as well as in our separate
analysis of section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims.
In published cases, judges with NLRA management experience displayed the
same tendency we noted in our analysis ofall issues in all cases: They did not differ
significantly from their colleagues when the Board had voted for the union, but they
were significantly more likely than their colleagues to support the union when the
Board had decided for the employer.
In the divisive issue category, the impact of NLRA management experience
was even stronger. In this subgroup, the interaction between NLRA experience and
Board outcome was insignificant and we omitted it from the equation. As Table VII
shows, the coefficient for NLRA management experience was significant and
positive under these circumstances. On divisive issues, in other words, judges with
NLRA management experience were significantly more likely than other judges to
support the union, regardless of the Board's outcome. As Table VIII illustrates,
when the Board had decided in the union's favor (the profile case), NLRA
management experience raised the probability of a pro-union vote from 22% to
35%. Similarly, when the Board had decided in the employer's favor, NLRA
management experience raised the likelihood of a pro-union judicial vote from 96%
to 98%.179

because they participate in more reversals and split decisions, or because of some other
unidentified mechanism. Whatever the underlying cause, the significance of the positive

coefficient for elite law graduates in both regressions for controversial cases may reflect
overinclusion of these judges' pro-union votes rather than a true tendency to favor the union once
we controlled for other factors.
179 The last probability, which combines two different deviations from the profile, does not
appear in Table VIII; we calculated it separately. This probability, like the profile probability
attached to a pro-employer Board decision, is so high because of the way we defined divisive
issues. The category includes only issues on which ajudge either disagreed with the Board or with
another judge. When the Board supported the employer, almost all judicial votes in the divisive

category were for the union.
Judges with other types of labor or workplace law experience were not significantly more
likely to support the union on divisive issues, either when those experiences were combined in a
single category (reflected in Table VII) or when they were separated. Results for published issues
were similar, except that judges -with experience representing unions in NLRA matters were
significantly more likely than their colleagues to support the union in these cases.
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D. ComparingControversialand NoncontroversialCases
Our database is distinctive in allowing examination of all decided cases as well
as subsets of more controversial issues. Comparing these analyses yields three
important lessons beyond the specifics reported above.
First, contrasting results for the full database with those for the subsets of
controversial issues reveals the dangers of relying exclusively on one type of
analysis. If we had analyzed only published cases or divisive votes, we would have
underplayed the impact of some variables (such as political party) while overstating
the effect of others (such as race or graduation from an elite law school). On the
other hand, if we had limited our analysis to all votes in all cases, we might have
missed some significant associations. A combination of both analyses, together with
examination of individual statutory sections, offers the best avenue for exploring the
relationship between judicial attributes and outcomes.
Second, our multifaceted analysis confirms thatjudicial attributes play a larger
role in controversial cases than in less disputed ones. In our regression equation for
divisive issues, the 17 variables reflecting judicial attributes explained between
7.88% and 9.77% of the variance in outcomes. 180 Those variables, moreover,
18 1
accounted for about one-quarter of the total variance explained by our equation.
In the regression analysis for all cases, on the other hand, the same judicial attributes
explained no more than 2.55% of the variance in outcome and only one-tenth ofthe
explained variance. 182 Judicial attributes thus were considerably more successful in
180 The pseudo R2 statistic, reported at the bottom of each of our regression equations,
denotes the percentage of variance in the outcome explained by the variables in the equation.
Social scientists recognize a variety of problems with this statistic, and it should not be used to
assess "goodness of fit" in any absolute sense. See KING, supranote 123, at 24 n.7. The pseudo

R2statistic can, however, be used to compare models with the same dependent and independent

variables. In that context, it can illustrate the relative amount of variance explained by the same
variables in different equations. See ALDRICH & NELSON, supranote 119, at 55-59; GUJARATI,
supranote 120, at 561; MARJA J. NORUSIS, SPSS PROFESSIONAL STATISTICS 7.5, at 47-49 (1997).
To assess the contribution of the judicial attribute variables, we entered those variables into
the equation both before and after our control variables, checking the pseudo R2at each stage.
When we entered the attribute variables into the equation first, the attributes explained 9.77% of
the variance in votes for the union. When we entered the attribute variables after the control
variables, the attributes explained 7.88% of that variance.
181 As Table VII reports, our full regression equation for divisive issues explained 34% of
the variance in those outcomes.
182
When we entered the judicial attribute variables into this equation first, they explained
2.55% of the variance. When we introduced those variables after the control variables, the attribute
variables explained 2A8% of the variance. As Table I reflects, the full equation explained 25% of
the variance in judicial votes.
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predicting outcomes on divisive issues than on nondivisive issues. 183
Finally, however, our analyses reveal that judicial attributes do play some role
even across the full spectrum ofdecided cases. Personal or professional experiences
may exert greater influence in the controversial cases, those cases pushing the
frontiers of precedent The associations between judicial background and outcome,
however, do not disappear when one examines all appellate decisions. More than
half a dozen personal attributes-including political party, gender, year of
appointment age, college selectivity, experience in elected office, and NLRA
management experience-show a modest but significant association with pro-union
votes. Our research is unique in documenting these relationships even in a caseload
that includes a large number of unanimous, and apparently noncontroversial,
affirmances.
IV. DiscussioN
The results set forth above point in a number of different directions and invite
a range of possible explanations. We have chosen to focus on certain key elements
of our reported data. In addition to summarizing these key elements, we set forth
various hypotheses to help explain our results, relate our findings to other studies
ofjudicial behavior, and identify follow-up research that might further develop the
explanatory accounts we have advanced.
A. The DecliningPoliticalSaliency of Union Issues
Political party ofthe appointing President was highly significant in most of our
analyses. Our research is consistent with previous findings that Democratic
appointees are more likely, on average, to support union claims than their
Republican counterparts. 184 The association between political party and outcome
was particularly robust in our analysis of all issues in all cases (Table H).185 Political
183

The predictive power ofjudicial attributes in published cases fell in between the role of

those attributes among all cases and their role on divisive issues. When we entered judicial
attributes first into the equation for published cases, they explained 2.49% of the variance in
published votes. Similarly, when the attribute variables entered the equation after controls, they
explained 2A8% of the variance. Given that the full equation explained 17% of the variance in
published outcomes, judicial attributes accounted for one-seventh of the overall explained variance
in the published case setting.
184 See, e.g., Goldman, Voting Behavior, supra note 12; Goldman, Voting Behavior
Revisited, supranote 49; Gottschall, Reagan Appointments, supranote 52; Songer and Davis,
supranote 8; see also Carp et al., supranote 52 (discussing study of Bush appointees to district
courts and appellate courts).
185 This robust relationship also holds for the core substantive issues involving employer
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party matters, even across a universe that includes unpublished decisions and
1 86
unanimous affirmances.
Political party was not monolithic, however; it did not predict votes under all
circumstances. The variable showed no significant association with outcomes for
issues involving union misconduct or remedial matters (Table V), nor was it
significant in our regression for divisive issues (Table VMI). 187 Future research in
labor law as well as in other fields should continue to distinguish the particular
issues for which political party predicts outcome from those in which it shows no
significant association with judicial results.
At the same time, we uncovered considerable evidence that the political
saliency of union issues is declining on a bipartisan basis. More recent appointees
from both parties were more likely to reject the union's legal position than judges
appointed in an earlier era. This relationship emerged in several analyses of all
judges (Tables II, V, VII) as well as in separate regressions for Republican and
Democratic appointees. A male judge appointed by President Eisenhower had a
14% probability of rejecting the union in our regression for all issues in all cases.
A Republican appointed by President Reagan had a 20% probability of voting that
way, meaning the appointee was nearly 50% more likely to reject the union's legal
position. Similarly, a Kennedy appointee had only an 8% probability of voting
against the union. 188
For a Carter appointee, that probability increased by more than

one-third to

I11%.

The sharp bipartisan drop in judicial support for union legal positions may well
be a by-product of both the declining popularity of unions and the diminished
political visibility of the NLRA as a statute. For several decades up until the early
1970s, union-management relations in the private sector commanded the public's
interest required politicians' attention, and gave rise to high profile legal disputes.
Since the mid-1970s, however, there has been a notable decline in the Supreme
Court's attention to NLRA cases. 189 During this same period, private sector union
misconduct under section 8(a) (Table V).
186 Indeed, political party matters when we analyze unpublished cases alone. We reran our
regression equation for all issues in unpublished cases and found that party of the appointing
President was as robustly significant in that equation as in our equation for all cases (p=.001). Even
in unpublished cases, Democratic appointees are significantly more likely to support the union
than Republican appointees.
187 As noted above, the latter effect may be linked to the high percentage of section 10(c)
remedial claims, and correspondingly low percentage of section 8(a) claims, in the divisive
category.
188

See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. We reported above probabilities that
each judge would support the union's legal position. In this discussion, we invert theprobabilities
to focus on the likelihood that each judge would reject the union position.
189
See Brudney, supra note 70, at 960-65 (discussing the sharp decline in the number of
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density has fallen precipitously, 190 and the general public's perception of unions as
beneficial institutions also has dramatically declined. 191 Moreover, as other public
policy issues have risen to the forefront of public, political, and judicial debate,
NLRA law has been relegated to the margins of today's ideological equation.
Presidents, Senators, party organizations, and interest groups that are involved in the
judicial appointments process tend to focus on other aspects of federal jurisdiction
such as civil rights, criminal law, or 'Judicial activism." 192 Given the public's
skeptical view of unions and the low saliency ofNLRA issues, it is not surprising
that both Democratic and Republican appointees have become less favorably
disposed toward union legal positions in this area of the law.193
Supreme Court full opinions on NLRA issues, in the Court's "grant rate" on NLRA certiorari
petitions, and in NLRA petitions as a percentage of all paid certiorari petitions).
190 The proportion of the private nonagricultural workforce represented by unions was as
high as 35% in the 1950s, but fell to 20% by 1980 andto 11.2% in 1993. See CoMMtssiON ONTHE
FUrURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS FACTFINDING REPORT 24 (1994); Samuel
Estreicher, LaborLaw Reform in a WorldofCompetitiveProductMarkets,69 CH.-KENT L. REv.
3, 9-10 &n.23 (1993).
191
Gallup Poll results indicate that the general public's confidence in organized labor has
declined steadily since 1977. See Leslie McAneny & David W. Moore, American Confidence in
Public InstitutionsRises, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, May 1995, at 11, 11-13 (reporting that the
percentage of public expressing "great deal of confidence" or "quite a lot of confidence" in labor
unions has declined from 39% in 1977, to 30% in 1984, and to 26% in 1995); Frank Newport,
Confidence in Institutions: Small Business and the Military Generate Most Confidence in
Americans, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug. 1997, at 21, 24 (reporting public's confidence in
organized labor has further eroded to 23% by 1997).
192
Confirmation hearings in the 1980s and early 1990s featured frequent reference to these
subject areas. See, e.g., ConfirmationHearingson Appointments to the FederalJudiciaryBefore
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 5-6, 11-16 (1991) (setting forth senatorial
questions and responses from 11th Circuit nominee Joel F. Durbina, Sept 11, 1990); id at 624-27
(presenting senatorial questions and responses from 8th Circuit nominee James B. Loken, Oct. 5,
1990); Confirmation ofAppointments to the FederalJudiciaryand the DepartmentofJustice
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,100th Cong. 160-72 (1989) (setting forth senatorial
questions and responses from D.C. Circuit nominee David B. Sentelle, Apr. 1, 1987); id at 422-33
(presenting senatorial questions and responses from 7th Circuit nominee Michael S. Kanne, Apr.
28, 1987).
193
As a general matter, appellate court judges may be selected in a less predictably
ideological manner than Supreme Court Justices. Home state Senators from both parties exercise
considerable influence, either by promoting or opposing individual nominees or by relying on the
"blue slip" veto procedure operated by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See GOLDMAN, supranote
27, at 131-34, 173, 209-11 (discussing importance of home state Senator role); id. at 11-12
(describing blue slip veto procedure, whereby home state Senators from either party could
effectively kill a nominee's chances by marking "objection" on the blue slip sent to them by
counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also CHARLESH. SHELDON& LINDA S. MAULE,
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A particularly dramatic illustration of the declining political saliency of labor

relations law emerges from our analysis of divisive issues. When we limited this
analysis to votes on divisive issues by Carter, Reagan, and Bush appointees, we
found that Carter appointees were significantly less likely to favor the union than

their colleagues appointed by Reagan or Bush (p=.023). The result may stem partly
from the issues selected into this category for analysis; it does not hold for our
analysis of all cases, in which Carter appointees were significantly more likely than
Reagan or Bush appointees to support the union (p=.007). The fact that the effect
could occur at all, however, suggests that partisan differences on at least some labor
law issues may be declining. 194 The unusual partisan alignment on NLRA issues

may also suggest that positions on these issues were relatively unimportant in the
Carter, Reagan, and Bush appointment processes.
Even without these surprising results from the divisive analysis, the bipartisan
movement away from pro-union legal positions is clear. It seems that Democratic
appointees may have shifted, on average, from strong sympathy for union positions
CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 184-85 (1997); KviN

L. LYLES, THE GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COuRTS IN THE POLITICAL PRocESs 58-59
(1997) (describing origins and history of the blue slip procedure). Because such senatorial
influence often stems from a personal friendship, professional association, or other nonpolicy
relationship with a nominee or potential nominee, it may temper the ideological nature of appellate
judge appointments. Home state senator influence began to wane after 1978, but it remains
important. See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 263 (discussing modification of blue slip veto by
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Kennedy in 1979); LYLES, supra,at 59 (contending that
blue slip "remains a potential and valuable tool" to enhance Senators' negotiating position on
judicial nominees).
Since the mid-1970s, circuit court appointments have been increasingly affected by
presidentially established nominating commissions and advisory committees. See GOLDMAN,
supranote 27, at 238 (discussing Carter's creation of United States Circuit Judge Nominating
Commission in 1977); id. at 260, 264 (discussing Carter Administration's emphasis on merit
selection and downplay of political party considerations); id at 292,300,358 (discussing Reagan's
creation of Federal Judicial Committee chaired by White House counsel). While these
commissions and committees emphasized technical qualifications, diversity of backgrounds, and
scholarly perspective, ideology came to play a more prominent role in appellate judge
appointments, especially during the 1980s. See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 296-319 (discussing
importance of policy and ideology in the Reagan Administration selection of appellate judges);
LYLES, supra, at 136-42 (same). See also ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 62, at 36-37 (reporting
increase in partisan voting differences among district court judges with respect to civil rights and
civil liberties issues during early and mid-1980s). Labor relations evidently was not one of the
ideological litmus test issues with respect to selection of this more recent generation of appointees.
194 Full results from these supplemental analyses are available from the authors. Other
research may point in the same direction. See ROWLAND & CARP, supranote 62, at 40, 44-45
(reporting on lack of partisan voting differences among district court judges in 1980s vith respect
to labor law cases pitting union member against union or Secretary of Labor against employer).
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toward greater neutrality or indifference, while Republican appointees have moved
in the aggregate from cautious acceptance toward skepticism or resistance. The
combined impact of these two directional results has meant substantially less
support for union legal positions among more recent appointees from both parties.
B. The NLRA as an Aging SpecializedStatute
The one variable related to professional background that was robustly and
consistently significant in our equations was experience as a management-side
attorney in NLRA matters. 195 These results are especially striking. The thirty-four
appellate court judges who represented management in NLRA eases before joining
the bench were significantly more likely to support union legal positions in the
courts of appeals than their counterparts, almost all of whom were judges with no
NLRA experience of any kind.196 In our analyses of all issues in all cases, of section
8(a)(5) claims in those cases, and of published cases, the effects emerged when the
Board had ruled in favor of the employer; judges with NLRA management
experience were significantly more likely than their colleagues to reverse the
Board's determination and support the union. On divisive issues, judges with NLRA
management experience were significantly more likely to support the union
regardless of the Board's position. 197 As our marginal effect calculations reveal, a
history working for management on NLRA matters more than doubled the
probability that ajudge would reverse a pro-employer determination in our analysis
of all issues (Table IM)and increased the odds of a pro-union affirmance by almost
two-thirds in the analysis of divisive issues (Table VIII).
195 SeesupraTables II,V, VII (reporting NLRA management-side

experience as significant
for all issues in all cases, for section 8(aX5) issues in those cases, for all issues in published cases,
and for all divisive issues).
196 As

explained above, see supra note 109 and accompanying text, judges with NLRA
management-side experience cast 14% of the votes in our database. Judges with other types of
workplace law experience contributed another 28% of the votes. A small fraction of the latter
group had acquired NLRA experience in a non-management setting. Overall, judges with pure
union, government, or academic experience on NLRA matters cast only 6%of the votes in our
database.
197 Our remaining three analyses also suggested substantial pro-union support from judges
with NLRA management experience. In the section 8(a)(1) and (3) equation, as well as in the

section 8(b) equation, the coefficients for NLRA management experience pointed in the same
direction as in our other analyses, but did not achieve significance. In our analysis of 10(c)
remedial claims, the NLRA and Board interaction perfectly predicted outcome so we had to omit
the variable from the equation. Although the number of votes was quite small,judges with NLRA
experience always voted for the union when the Board rejected the union's claim under this
section. See supranote 160.
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The significance of this "NLRA management" variable stands out even more
sharply when contrasted with our findings on two other variables that measure
private practice experience. The variable designating judges with other types of
workplace law experience did not achieve significance in any of our equations.
When we broke this variable into subcategories, the component denoting judges
with pure workplace (non-NLRA) experience again was not significant in any
equation. 198 Similarly, judges who represented corporations or business clients
without handling any labor or workplace matters registered no significant pro-union
support in most of our equations (Tables II, VII). 199 Experience representing
employers on NLRA matters inclined judges to support union claims in a way that
experience in other areas of workplace law or on behalf ofbusiness clients in other
areas of law did not. 2°
A possible explanation for the noteworthy effects of NLRA management
experience stems from the distinctive nature of the NLRA itself. This New Deal era
statute rests on two legal paradigms that have become anomalous in our
contemporary legal culture. The first involves the primacy accorded to group action.
198

Indeed, when we varied our equations to use NLRA management experience as the
reference category for professional experience, we found that judges with experience handling
non-NLRA workplace matters were significantly more likely than judges with NLRA management
experience to reject union claims in analyses of all issues and divisive issues. The coefficient
approached significance (p=.091) in our analysis of all issues and reached significance (p-.039)
in the analysis of divisive issues. Full results ofthese supplemental analyses are available from the
authors. Using NLRA management as the reference category in these analyses meant that we could
compare the effects of NLRA management experience directly with the effects of several other
types ofpractice experience. In our main equations (reported in Tables I-VIII) we compare NLRA
management experience, other workplace experience, and pure corporate experience to a reference
category ofjudges who lacked any of these practice histories. See text following notes 108-109
supra.
199 When we varied our equations to use NLRA management experience as the reference
category, see supranote 198, these judges with pure corporate experience were more likely than
judges with NLRA management experience to reject union claims on divisive issues. The
coefficient for pure corporate experience approached significance (p=.075) in this equation.
200 Interestingly, judges with pure corporate experience were more likely than their
colleagues to support the union on section 8(b) claims (Table V). When we repeated this equation
with NLRA management experience as the reference category, moreover, we confirmed that
judges with pure corporate experience were significantly more likely than their NLRA
management colleagues to support the union on that subset of issues. Despite their overall support
for collective bargaining and unions, judges with NLRA management experience may have found
section 8(b) claims (in which the union is the alleged wrongdoer) less sympathetic. Judges with
general corporate law experience, conversely, may have been more inclined to support the union
when it appeared as a defendant organization, particularly because many section 8(b) claims are
brought by individual employees.
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The Act's emphasis on protecting collective bargaining and other concerted mutual
aid activity by workers entails a subordination of traditional individualistic
perspectives. Statutory recognition of collectively bargained terms and conditions
of employment means that individuals give up their freedom to negotiate their own
job conditions.20 1 The enforceability of such recognition means-again departing
from traditional contract law-that employers are required to bargain in good faith
202
with a collectively constituted entity rather than with individual employees.
While the creation of collectively defined rights and responsibilities was part of a
larger federal policy that extended to other aspects of the economy as part of the
New Deal, 20 3 this policy perspective has all but disappeared in recent decades.
Starting in 1963, Congress's approach to regulating the workplace has made
individual rights and choices preeminent, not subordinate. 20 4 In the ensuing four
decades, statutory support for collective determination of working conditions has
become a minor undercurrent amidst the rising tide of federal laws that offer rights
and protections to employees on an individual and individually enforceable basis.

201 See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,337-39 (1944); see generallyBrudney, supra

note 70, at 950-52 (discussing legislative history support for majority rule as the best protection
for individual rights); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to IndividualLiberties:Post-War
LaborLaw, Liberalism,and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-9
(1999) (discussing industrial pluralists' belief in workers' exercise of power through groups, atthe
expense of individual rights).
202
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5), 158(d) (1994); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678, 684-85 (1944) (finding violation of section 8(1) by employer that deals directly with
employees rather than with union as bargaining agent); Wings & Wheels, Inc., 139 NLRB 578,
581-82 (1962), enforced, 324 F.2d 495,496 (3d Cir. 1963) (finding violation of section 8(a)(5)
because employer dealt with employees in lieu of union).
203 See, e.g., National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933)
(embracing collective action by businesses to set prices and control production); Agricultural
Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10,48 Stat. 31 (1933); Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938)
(sanctioning collective action by farmers and agricultural processors; allowing the former to
receive a federal subsidy for crops not grown and allowing the latter to fix prices through
marketing agreements exempted from antitrust laws).
204
For laws establishing the individual's right to equal treatment in the workplace, see, for
example, Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38,77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994)); Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). For laws
establishing the individual's right to minimum standards in the workplace, see, for example,
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994); Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994); Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994); Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
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The second anomalous aspect of the NLRA is its furtherance of anticompetitive
and interventionist policy goals. By protecting unions in their effort to remove
20 5
wages from competition, the Act promotes the cartelization of labor markets.
This approach runs counter to basic norms of our legal system, norms that oppose
restraints on private competition and accept the efficiency of markets as a means of
maximizing consumer and public welfare. 20 6 Although there are sound reasons
favoring such an "inefficient" labor policy,20 7 those reasons resonated more in an
earlier era than they do today, when the sanctity of the market process presumes that
any regulatory intervention is suspect. 20 8 Industry-wide deregulation at home and
intense product competition abroad have sapped unions' ability to control, or in
some cases even substantially influence, wages or job security in the private

205

See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 353-56 (5th ed. 1998);

Estreicher, supranote 190, at 12-15.
206 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (prohibiting combinations in
restraint of trade); Robinson-Patmran Anti-Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692,49 Stat. 1526
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1994)) (prohibiting price discrimination in commerce);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1994) (mandating that financial institutions
disclose certain information to consumers so that inter alia the informed use of credit will
strengthen competition among financial institutions); see generallyPOSNER, supranote 205, at 35289 (contending that the common law is best understood as a system of doctrines for inducing
people to behave efficiently in their social and economic interactions). But cf.Kenneth G. DauSchmidt, A BargainingAnalysis ofAmerican Labor Law and the SearchforBargainingEquity
and IndustrialPeace,91 MICH. L. REV. 419,481-82,490 (1992) (contending that union gains
taken from a firm's monopoly profits should not reduce overall consumer welfare).
207 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABORAND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 72-78 (1990) (discussing the inherent imperfections of labor markets-

informational, psychological, and structural-that call for government intervention and regulation);
POSNER, supranote 205, at 353-54 (discussing "free-rider" problems that justify federal policy
favoring certain protections for union organizing and bargaining efforts).
20
8 A striking illustration is the Supreme Court's unwillingness in recent years to view the
free-rider rationale that underlies protection for collective bargaining as a basis for limiting
individual employees' freedom to refrain from associating with private sector unions or their
activities. See, eg., Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,451-53 (1984) (holding
that objecting bargaining unit members may not be charged for union expenditures to organize
additional employees or to litigate contract issues that do not directly affect bargaining unit
members); Pattemmakers' League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104-14 (1985)
(holding that union may not fine members who resign during strike in violation of union
constitution); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519-22 (1991) (in public
employment setting, holding that objecting bargaining unit members may not be charged for union
lobbying that improves terms and conditions of employment outside the collective bargaining
setting); seegenerally Schiller, supranote 201, at 64-69, 72 (discussing Supreme Court support
for individual employees' assertion of a "right to refrain" against their union).
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sector.209 As union power and visibility have declined, the anticompetitive thrust of
NLRA union protections has become harder to reconcile with the predominantly
procompetition aspirations of federal law.
Given the distinctive nature of basic policies and history underlying the NLRA,
the impact of management-side NLRA experience may signify that familiarity with
the Act breeds greater respect for its protective doctrinal scope-even if the
familiarity is developed while representing employer interests. Attorneys who
perform substantial work representing management before the Labor Board and the
2 10
courts come to understand the Act's practical realities and modest policy goals.
These attorneys may be better prepared to breathe life into NLRA purposes and
priorities as an interpretive matter once they are separated from a client-based
2 11
ideological perspective.
209

See Estreicher, supra note 190, at 13; Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,StartingOver:
Imagininga LaborLawfor Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 62-67 (1993).
2 10
It is particularly noteworthy that the pro-union effect of management-side experience was
significant for the subcategory of section 8(a)(5) claims (Table V). These claims, involving
bargaining-related misconduct by employers, embody what is most distinctive about NLRA
purposes. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to infer that judges familiar with the unusual nature
of policy objectives promoting the collective bargaining process are especially prepared to support
the union's position on such claims.
As explained above, the greater likelihood of support for union positions is linked to proemployer Board outcomes in our analyses of all issues in all cases and published cases (Tables II,
VII). This effect is due, in part, to the fact that most judges in those cases favored the union when
the Board had done so. The appearance of significant effects is more difficult when there is little
variation in outcome. In addition,judges with NLRA management experience may have perceived
a Board made up exclusively of Reagan and Bush appointees, see supra note 88, as especially
suspect when it ruled against the union; in such instances, the Act's purposes were more likely to
be shortchanged.
211
A slightly different version of this hypothesis might assert thatjudges with management
experience were "captured" by the Act based on their years of litigation before the Board. The
vibrancy of their own private practice depended to some extent on how energetically the Act was
enforced, and these attorneys may have developed a more expansive attitude toward the Act's
protections, an attitude they then carried forward as judges. This hypothesis assumes that
management attorneys who ascend to the bench view the Act and its enforcement as
fundamentally nonthreatening to unionized industry. See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 86-87 (1955) (suggesting that as a
regulatory scheme becomes more "mature," the agency functions less as a policeman and more
as an industrial manager); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1714 (1975) (discussing how agencies and regulated industries have
formed special relationships built on a desire to avoid conflicts and seek compromise); see
generally PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE INFEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981)
(exploring ways in which regulatory agencies act to protect the industries they regulate). The
"capture" hypothesis, however, is merely a variation of our "familiarity breeds respect" hypothesis.
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To explore this hypothesis further, we divided our NLRA management variable
into two subvariables: one representing judges whose only NLRA experience was
on behalf of employers and the other denoting judges who combined management
representation with NLRA work in other settings (including government jobs,
academia, and representation of unions). The variable representing judges with pure
management experience was not significant in any of our equations, although it
comprised about two-thirds of the votes from our original NLRA management
variable. The variable designating judges with a mixture of management and other
experiences was strongly significant in several equations, following precisely the
pattern of our original NLRA management variable. That is, judges with both
management and other NLRA experience were significantly more likely than their
colleagues to support the union on section 8(a)(5) claims, as well as in our analyses
of all issues and published issues, when the Board had ruled for the employer. On
divisive issues, these judges were significantly more likely than others to favor the
2 12
union regardless of the Board's outcome.
Put differently, judges who combined management-side practice with
additional experience applying the NLRA were most likely to support union
positions in the courts of appeals. 2 13 These judges, in fact, more consistently
supported union positions than did judges with a purely partisan history of
representing unions under the statute. 2 14 At the same time, judges whose only
NLRA experience derived from representing employers showed no identifiable
tendency to favor their former clients.2 15 Thus, breadth of experience predicted
212 Full results of these supplemental analyses are available from the authors. In general, the

coefficients for our "mixed NLRA experience" variable were larger and more significant than the
coefficients for the original NLRA management variable, although the latter variable included

twice as many votes.
213 Typically, these judges spent a considerable amount of time (5-20 years) with a private
firm in which an important part of their practice involved labor relations work. Their acquisition
of NLRA experience in government or academic settings generally occurred over a shorter time
period, either at the start of their career or after a number of years ofprivate practice. On average,
these judges also had more substantial NLRA practice experience than the judges in the "pure
management" group.
214 A variable designating judges with pure union-side experience was significant in our
analyses of section 8(b) claims and published cases (which contained a disproportionate number
of those claims). See supranotes 162, 179. The tendency ofjudges who had represented unions
to identify with the union in cases charging union misconduct is not surprising. It is more
surprising that these judges, unlike their colleagues with a mixture ofmanagement and other types
of NLRA experience, did not favor the union position for section 8(a)(5) claims, for claims on all
divisive issues, or for claims on all issues in all cases.
215 Indeed, the failure of this variable to attain significance in any of our equations, when
compared with the occasional significance of partisan union experience, could be characterized

HeinOnline -- 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1746 1999

1999]

JUDICIAL HOSTILITY

1747

union support among judges with a history of management-side practice, while
judges with pure management-side backgrounds transcended their "partisan" roots.
Our hypothesis that "familiarity breeds doctrinal respect" is not the only
possible explanation for these robustly significant findings. Attorneys who have
represented management on NLRA matters may become skeptical over time as to
the persuasiveness of their clients' legal positions. Employers sometimes pursue
appeals--or force the Board to seek enforcement against them-for strategic
reasons unrelated to the merits of the case.216 Employer attorneys who have litigated
enough such appeals may adopt a more jaundiced view toward them from the
neutral perspective of the bench. Suspicion of management's appellate litigation
strategies, however, would not explain why these judges were particularly likely to
support the union when the employer's position had prevailed below.2 17 Nor does
client skepticism explain why former union attorneys, who were also privy to
partisan litigation strategies, remained significantly more supportive than other
judges of some union claims.
Alternatively, judges with substantial management-side experience may have
become more skeptical of the Board's determinations. These judges, after all,
gained their management experience before that Board. The ones who proved most
active in supporting union positions also acquired NLRA experience in other
contexts, including with the Board's General Counsel. As repeat players in the
Board process, sometimes from a variety of perspectives, these judges had ample
opportunity to develop doubts about the Board's own invincibility. This explanation
fits particularly well with the willingness ofthese judges to overturn certain Board
decisions; in most contexts, judges with NLRA management experience differed
2 18
from their colleagues only when favoring the union required reversing the Board.
as an implicit form of "pro-union" sympathy. In this context, the failure to support positions taken
by one's former client can be interpreted as recognition that the Act's purposes favor unionization
and collective bargaining. That recognition, notably, was obtained even while representing clients
who tended to contest union efforts in these areas.
2 16
See Brudney, supra note 70,at 974-75 (discussing employers' interest in extending the
litigation process in cases they do not expect to win, in order to chill employee organizing efforts
or diminish the prospects for negotiation of first contracts).

217 Former management attorneys, of course, might remain dubious of employers' positions
before the Board, even when the Board endorsed those positions. This might be particularly true
during an era of Republican Board control.
218
Bivariate comparisons also reveal that all judges with NLRA management experience
were significantly more likely than their colleagues to overturn Board determinations for the
employer. Judges with management experience voted to reverse those determinations 27% of the
time; other judges cast 16% of their votes that way (p=.035). Judges with a mixture of
management and other types of NLRA experience manifested this tendency even more
dramatically. These judges voted to overturn pro-employer determinations 53% of the time,
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Even these skepticism hypotheses, however, are consistent with our theory that
familiarity with the specialized nature ofNLRA policy and practice contributes to
a sympathetic judicial perspective regarding the Act's basic protections. Skepticism,
after all, merely conveys doubt. Ajudge must still have a positive reason to embrace
the position offered by the union rather than the one offered by the employer or
Board. The robust association between NLRA management-side experience and
support for union legal positions strongly signals an educative effect from exposure
to the Act's historically grounded support for group action and anticompetitive
economic objectives. That educative power is apparent in its effects on judges with
exclusively management experience, who never exhibited a significant tendency to
favor legal positions offered by their former clients; in its concentrated force among
judges with the most extensive and diverse NLRA experience; and in the
willingness of these judges to overturn Board positions when necessary to further
the objectives they perceived in the Act. Management experience thus seems to
219
foster appreciation for labor law doctrine.
Such appreciation for the anomalous objectives of the NLRA bears some
resemblance to the expertise that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
applies to the resolution ofpatent controversies. Patent law, like the NLRA, rests on
a specialized statutory scheme and includes anticompetitive features that are not
widely embraced in the current legal climate. 20 Before Congress vested exclusive
jurisdiction to hear patent appeals in the Federal Circuit 1 some litigants perceived
compared to 15% of votes from otherjudges (p=.000). Our regression equations, with significant
coefficients for the Board/NLRA management interaction, demonstrate that this difference

persisted even after controlling for other factors.
219 Our variables, of course, can only measure extemal events like supporting the union's
legal position or reversing the Board. We cannot know what judges were thinking when they
pursued those ends. We believe, however, that doctrine does play a substantial role in shaping
legal outcomes. It seems reasonable to infer that the pro-union tendencies ofjudges with NLRA
management experience stem from their long exposure to the Act, its purposes, and its doctrinerather than from a more reflexive tendency to side with one's former adversaries.
220 In the intermediate run, patent protection aims to foster both innovation and competition.
In retum for a limited period of monopolistic use, patentees disclose the basis of their invention
to the public. That disclosure enables competitors to build upon the patentee's discovery, often
producing a competing and superior product even before the patent term has expired. See generally
ERNST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB IIU, LipSCOMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 1.8 (3d ed. 1984).

Similarly, unionization and collective bargaining can be said to strengthen, rather than impair, the
marketplace: A strong workforce is essential both for production and consumption. See generally
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? (1986). The immediate

claims of patentees and unions, however, often appear anticompetitive as they are presented before
the courts.

221 Creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was a central component of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended
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the regional courts of appeals as resisting patentees' interests and as helping to
shape public perceptions that the monopolistic aspects ofpatent law were harmful
to our competitive economic system. 222 A number of patent law scholars have
concluded that the new specialized court, staffed by judges with some expertise in
patent law, is interpreting the statutory scheme to increase the law's protection for
patentees. 223 There is no consensus as to whether the court's greater sensitivity to
inventors' interests is sound public policy.224 Specialized knowledge of Congress's
goals and priorities, however, seems to have facilitated interpretations more
sympathetic to these underlying legislative priorities-just as familiarity with the
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The provision governing the court's jurisdiction over patent
appeals appears in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338 (1994).
222
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A CaseStudy in SpecializedCourts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 &nn.37-38, 46 (1989) (citing congressional hearings and statements
from congressional supporters); Pauline Newman, The Sixth Abraham Pomerantz Lecture:
Commentary on the Paper by Professor Dreyfiss, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 53, 55-57 (1995)
(confirming that an important aspect of argument favoring Federal Circuit's creation was need to
protect patentees' interests more effectively than regional courts of appeals had done); see also
Lawrence Baum, JudicialSpecialization,LitigantInfluence, andSubstantivePolicy: The Court
ofCustoms andPatentAppeals, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 823, 842-45 (1977) [hereinafter Judicial
Specialization](concluding that between 1952 and 1975, standards of patentability became more
lenient in the CCPA than in generalist Article Hcourts). The major public justifications offered
by proponents of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit involved the need to eliminate
severe regional conflict by replacing forum shopping with a single appellate body that would
produce greater expertise as well as a uniform application of patent law. See Lawrence Baum,
Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74
JUDICATURE 217, 223 (1991); Dreyfuss, supra, at 6-7; Robert Desmond, Comment, Nothing
Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Federal Circuit,
Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the Standardof Obviousness Under the Patent
Law, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 455,460 (1993); see generally Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the
FederalCircuit:A PersonalAccount,41 AM. U. L. REV. 581 (1992).
223
See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law,43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329,
334 (1991); Desmond, supranote 222, at 473-83; Dreyfuss, supra note 222, at 16-20; Allan N.
Littman, Restoringthe Balance of OurPatentSystem, 37 IDEA 545,552-53 (1997). The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by merging the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals with the Court of Claims. Although judges on the latter court had no special expertise in
patent law, judges from the former tribunal resolved primarily patent controversies. Some of them
had also practiced patent law before joining the court. See Dreyfuss, supranote 222, at 5 n.29.
Once on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, of course, all judges had the opportunity to
delve deeply into patent law.
224 Compare Dreyfuss, supranote 222, at 25-30 (contending that Federal Circuit's propatent bias may be overstated but in any event is a healthy public policy change), with Desmond,
supra note 222, at 483-87 (contending that Federal Circuit's impositioi of its own policy
preferences, effectively superseding authority of Supreme Court and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, is an unhealthy development).
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goals of the NLRA, even when gained through management representation, seems
to enhance judges' understanding of the Act's policies to facilitate and protect
2 25
collective bargaining.

C. Education,Elected Office Experience,Religion, andRace
Status of undergraduate institution is among the most powerful explanatory
factors to emerge from our regression equations. Judges who attended more elite
colleges were significantly more likely to reject the union's position in almost all
of our analyses. 226 In our examination of all cases, judges who attended the most

selective colleges were 30% more likely to reject the union than were judges who
attended a college of average selectivity (Table fl).n7 The effect was similar for the
most divisive issues. On those claims, judges who had attended average colleges
had a 22% probability of supporting the union. For judges who had attended the
most elite colleges, the likelihood fell by almost one-third, to 15% (Table VIII).
Social science scholars have long recognized that college selectivity reflects
socioeconomic background: Students who attend the most elite colleges are raised,
on average, in more privileged economic circumstances than students who enroll
at less selective institutions. 22 8 This connection may have become somewhat more
225 The analogy between appointment to the Federal Circuit and possession of managementside NLRA experience is not, of course, on all fours. A key distinction is that judges appointed to
a specialized court are obligated to view their docket through a narrowing lens, in order to fulfill
the congressional policies set forth when the court was created. Moreover, in this instance, the
judges initially appointed to the Federal Circuit came primarily from the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, where they had already established precedents favorable to patent owners. See
Baum, JudicialSpecialization,supranote 222. We are not advocating creation of a specialized
NLRA appellate court; indeed, we recognize that there are pitfalls to such an approach. See itra
note 266 and accompanying text. We present the patent law analogy, however, to support our
hypothesis that appellate court appointees who come to the bench with a deeper understanding of
the purposes accompanying a complex and unusual statutory scheme may apply that scheme in
a more sympathetic manner than judges who lack such familiarity or experience.
226 The only exceptions were our analyses of section 8(b) and section 10(c) claims (Table V).
227
Table IHreports the probabilities that judges with selected characteristics would support
the union's legal position. For this comparison, we invert those probabilities to focus on the
likelihood that ajudge would reject the union's claims. The profile judge in Table III displayed a
20% probability of rejecting the union's position; a judge who had attended one of the most
selective colleges registered a 26% probability of reaching that result, an increase of about 30%.
228 See, e.g., James C. Hearn, Pathways to Attendance at the Elite Colleges, in iHE
HIGH
STATUS TRACK: STpiEs OF LrrE SCHOOLS AND STRATiFCATiON 121,130-33 (1990) [hereinafter

THE HIGH STATUS TRACK] (demonstrating link between attendance at elite colleges and high
family income as well as higher parental education levels); Paul William Kingston & Lionel S.
Lewis, UndergraduatesatElite Institutions: The Best, the Brightest,andthe Richest, in TI HIGH
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attenuated with the greater availability of student financial aid. 2 9 Nonetheless, it
remains true as a general matter-and was certainly true during the period when
most of the judges in our database were undergraduates.2 30 The pervasive negative
association between college selectivity and pro-union votes in our analyses most
likely reflects these socioeconomic differences. Judges who emerged from blue
collar settings, or from a milieu that included more frequent contact with unions,
may in the aggregate have been socialized to support the underdog or to be
sympathetically inclined toward unions' legal claims. Familiarity with unions and
sympathy for employees' status may be more prevalent among judges who grew up
23 1
as "outsiders" in socioeconomic terms.
The status of law school attended also predicted outcomes in some of our
analyses, but this variable pointed in two different directions. In our analysis of
section 8(a)(5) issues, graduates of elite law schools, like their colleagues from
selective colleges, were significantly more likely to oppose the union's legal
position. Conversely, in our analyses of published cases and divisive issues, elite
law graduates were significantly more likely to supportthe union's position.
The latter associations fit perceptions of elite law school faculties-and their

STATUS TRACK, supra, at 105, 106-13 (discussing persistence into 1980s of the connection

between high family income and attendance at highly selective private institutions); Raymond
Mulligan, Socio-EconomicBackground and CollegeEnrollment, 16 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 188, 188
(1951) (reviewing literature linking students' higher socioeconomic status to attendance at more
elite undergraduate institutions).
229

See ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA GOLDBERG, CRAFING A CLASS: COLLEGE

ADISSIONS AND FTNANCIAL AID, 1955-1994, 169-204 (1998) (discussing development ofneedbased federal and institution-specific aid programs from 1960s to 1990s, and observing that
beginning in 1970s, need-based programs shifted from enabling students to attend college to
giving them a choice among institutions with large cost differentials); id. at 205-27 (discussing
growth of merit aid programs in 1980s and 1990s, and observing that such programs often
supplement or complement aid to financially disadvantaged students); see also Richard Famum,
Prestigein the Ivy League: DemocratizationandDiscriminationat Penn and Columbia, 18901970, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK, supranote 228, at 75, 95-96 (discussing gradual movement
among Ivy League colleges toward a more heterogeneous or diverse student body after World War
I).
230
See supra note 104 (explaining that over half of the 223 appellate court judges in our
study graduated from college between 1943 and 1962, and only 29 graduated since 1962).
231 Professor Goldman in his study of court of appeals decisions between 1961 and 1964
found that college status did not significantly affect judicial behavior on labor law issues. See
Goldman, Voting Behavior, supra note 12, at 382. Goldman's study omitted all unanimous
affirmances, and his data set covered only a three-year period. See id at 375. Moreover, Goldman
does not indicate how he distinguished among elite and nonelite colleges; it does not appear that
he used the Astin scale. See id.
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graduates-as ideologically liberal and inclined to government regulation.2 2 We,
however, view the contrary coefficient in the 8(a)(5) analysis as more telling. As
explained above, the significant positive coefficient for elite law graduates in our
regression for published cases almost certainly stems from the propensity of these
judges to publish more routine pro-union affirmances than other judges do.2 33 The
positive result for divisive issues similarly may be an artifact of selection. Section
8(a)(5), on the other hand, is perhaps the most nuanced area of government
regulation included within the NLRA-and the anti-union tendencies of elite law
2 34
graduates are pronounced in this equation.
This negative association, like the more global links between college selectivity
and judicial votes, might reflect socioeconomic background. Law school status is
less emphatically related to socioeconomic class than is college status, but some
connection persists. 235 Alternatively, elite law schools may ground lawyers in an
individual rights perspective that is less compatible with empathy for collective
. 232 See Richard A. Posner, Legal ScholarshipToday, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1647, 1652 (1993)
(asserting that "[tihe faculties of the leading American law schools are now substantially to the left
of the judiciary... and of the public at large; and they are moderately to the left of the practicing
legal profession"); Sisk et al., supra note 29, at 1463 (describing elite law school faculties as
identified with liberal causes and attitudes); Joan Chalmers Williams, At the FusionofHorizons:
Incommensurabilityand the Public Interest,20 VT. L. REV. 625, 628-29 (1996) (describing Yale
Law School as an "epicenter of liberalisn" during the New Deal period, with many professors
holding important positions in Washington and the Dean promoting a new role for emerging
lawyers as "public counsel," defined in opposition to the business class).
233
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
234 Other studies of judicial behavior have generally found that law school status is not
significantly related to voting patterns by federal judges. See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supranote
29, at 265, 274-76, 281 (district court judges in civil rights and prisoner rights cases); Sisk et al.,
supranote 29, at 1464 (district court judges in cases challenging constitutionality of sentencing
guidelines); Tate, supranote 12, at 360-61 (Supreme Court Justices in civil rights and economics
cases). But cf Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple CorrelationofJudicialBackgrounds andDecisions, 2
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 267, 270 (1974) (finding that judges who attended low-tuition law
schools (as opposed to high-tuition schools) were more likely to favor prosecution over defense
in criminal cases).
235
See SEYMOUR WARKOv & JOSEPH ZELAN, LAWYERS INTHE MAKING 57-58 (1965)
(reporting from 1961 data that primary emphasis in law school admissions is on achievement
factors, though socioeconomic status appears to influence admission when talent is held constant);
Charles L. Cappell & Ronald M. Pipkin, The Inside Tracks:Status Distinctionsin Allocations to
EliteLaw Schools, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK, supranote 228, at 211,225 (reporting from 1975
data that "academic credentials are by far the most important factor" in shaping attendance at elite
law schools, but that high socioeconomic status also influences patterns of law school attendance);
LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTETIH CENTURY 20-44

(1995) (reporting from 1991 data that academic achievement remains primary component in law
school admissions, though socioeconomic status continues to play a role).
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bargaining claims under section 8(a)(5).236
Apart from educational background, judges who held elected office before
joining the federal bench were more likely to support union legal positions than their
counterparts who lacked this professional political experience. This result was
significant in our analysis of divisive issues (Table VII); it approached significance
in the analysis of all issues and for claims under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) (Tables I,
V).
The significance of this variable, like that of the education variables, may be
rooted in socioeconomic factors. Although elected officials come from a variety of
backgrounds, the electoral process exposes them to the issues and concerns of
working class voters. Judges who successfully appealed to a range of constituents
may have come to understand the concerns of those constituents and to appreciate
the economic or "lunch bucket" issues that animate union agendas.2 7 Alternatively,
perhaps these judges possessed such appreciation for other reasons and their
sensitivity was part of what prompted them to seek elected office in the first
instance. The significance of electoral experience in some of our equations,
especially the analysis of section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims, might also signal the strong
attachment veterans of elected office have to democratic institutions. Those beliefs
might incline these judges to identify with the democratic values embodied in union
organizing and representation efforts.
236Seesupratext following note 158 (explaining distinctive nature of section 8(aX5) claims).
Elite law schools have shifted their ideological perspectives over the past several decades, see
ELEANOR KERLOW, POIsONED IvY: HowEGOs, IDEOLOGY AND POWER PoLmIcs ALMOST RUINED

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1-9, 125 (1994) (describing Harvard Law School as constantly shifting
in its political orientation over past 50 years) and differ in important ways from one another, see
Ted Gest, SpecialReport; CoverStory; Best GraduateSchools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
29, 1991, at 77,77 (identifying Harvard and Stanford law schools as having "liberal leanings" and
University of Chicago law school as possessing "a conservative bent"). Still, elite faculties that
embrace liberal or egalitarian values on the left, as well as free market or libertarian values on the
right, may share an attachment to individual rather than collective rights.
237 Other studies ofjudicial behavior have identified a connection between elected office
experience and a propensity to vote with the majority. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, NeoInstitutionalismandDissentin State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POLITICs 54, 57-58 (1990) (finding
that higher levels of consensus are present on an elected court with respect to highly salient issues
of public policy); S. Sidney Ulmer, DissentBehavior and the SocialBackground ofSupreme
Court Justices,32 J. POLIcs 580,588,597 (1970) (finding that Justices with apolitical parent
were significantly more likely to vote with majority). Although Goldman in his earlier studies of
federal appellate judges did not find significant effects from background in electoral politics, the
variables he used differed from our "elected office experience." See Voting Behavior,supranote
12, at 382 (variable was having held appointed (non-judicial) or elective office prior to becoming
federal judge); Voting Behavior Revisited, supranote 49, at 499 (variable was experience as a
candidate for elected public office).
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Finally, our results include significance in a more limited context for the
demographic variables of religion and race.238 Catholic and Jewish judges were
significantly more likely than their colleagues to support the union both on section
8(b) claims and divisive issues (Tables V, VID). It seems plausible to infer that
Catholic or Jewish affiliation is a rough proxy for social class among the instant
population. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, Catholic and Jewish
families were more likely than their Protestant counterparts to be working class in
economic status and social perspective.2 39 A number of other studies of judicial
behavior have found such religious background to be a significant explanatory
240
variable with respect to particular areas of federal law.
Age was also significant for all issues in all cases and for two issue categories within all
cases. Older judges were more likely to rule against the union on bargaining-related claims under
section 8(a)(5), and also more likely to oppose the granting of broad relief under section 10(c). An
earlier study of appellate court judges found that older judges were more likely to favor
conservative (pro-employer) outcomes in labor cases and to rule conservatively in a number of
other regulatory areas. See Goldman, Voting BehaviorRevisited, supranote 49, at 499. Our results,
especially in the section 10(c) category, could be viewed as reinforcing the adage that with old age
comes a reluctance to deviate from the status quo. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,455 (1899) ("Judges commonly are elderly men, and are
more likely to hate at sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and which disturbs
repose of mind, than to fall in love with novelties."). But cf. Sisk et al., supranote 29, at 1460
(finding that age of district court judge had no effect on whether the judge declared federal
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional).
239
See ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FArH,
CULTURE, AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 90, 92, 108-11 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing tendency of
American Catholics and Jews in mid-twentieth century to adopt liberal social and political
238

perspective); KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION ANDPOLITICS INTHEUNITED STATES 66,89 (1987)

(discussing tendency of first and second generation Catholics and Jews tojoin New Deal coalition
between 1930s and 1960s, based to a large extent on their economic status).
240 See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLMCS
OF CHURCH AND STATE 206-20 (1976) (examining appellate and trial court decisions addressed

to separation of church and state, and finding that Jewish and Catholic judges differ significantly
in their approaches); Ulmer, supranote 25, at 624-28 (examining votes of 14 Supreme Court
Justices in criminal law decisions, and hypothesizing that religious affiliation was a proxy for
social class); Kenneth N. Vines, FederalDistrictJudgesand Race Relations Cases in the South,
26 J. POLrrICs 337, 353 (1964) (examining district court decisions on race relations, and finding
significant differences between Catholics and "orthodox Protestants").
While two studies involving federal appellate court judges from earlier periods did not find
religious background to be significant on labor law issues, those studies involved much smaller
numbers of labor law votes than are present in our database. See Goldman, VotingBehavior,supra
note 12, at 380-82 (examining labor law votes in unanimous reversals and nonunanimous
decisions over a 3 year period (July 1961 through June 1964) and finding no significant difference
between Catholic and Protestant judges); Goldman, Voting BehaviorRevisited,supranote 49, at
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Similarly, African American judges are significantly more likely than Whites
to support union legal positions on section 8(b) and divisive issues (Tables V, VII).
For much of this century, African American workers were not broadly welcomed
into the trade union movement 241 Since the late 1950s, however, many unions have
reached out to the African American workforce through organizing and collective
bargaining efforts as well as advocacy in Congress for stronger antidiscrimination
laws. 242 The development of this supportive relationship, and the fact that by the
1970s Black workers had joined unions in large numbers, 243 may explain why
African American status is a modestly significant variable in a pro-union direction.

498-99 (examining labor law votes over a 7 yearperiod (July 1964 through June 1971) but only
in nonunanimous opinions and finding no significant differences between Catholic and Protestant
judges). The fact that our unit of analysis was the issue rather than the case magnifies these
differences in size between the two data sets. Further, Goldman omitted Jewish judges from his
analysis because at that time their number on the appellate bench was too small to draw reliable
inferences. See Goldman, VotingBehavior, supranote 12, at 381 n.34.
Some studies have found that religious background does not significantly influence judicial
behavior in other areas of federal law. See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 29, at 270-71
(finding minimal influence for civil rights and prisoner rights cases in district courts); Gryski &
Main, supra note 29, at 535 (finding no significance for sex discrimination cases in state supreme
courts).

241 See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (invalidating collective
bargaining agreement that discriminated against Negro firemen); see generally WILLIAM B.
GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHIrE UNIONs: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15-22

(1977) (arguing that labor movement in 1960s had an ambivalent response to the reality of racial
discrimination in the workplace); IRViNG HOWE & B.J. WIDICK, THE UAW AND WALTER
REUTHER 207-34 (1949) (discussing UAW's struggles to address discriminatory attitudes among
White workers in the 1940s). But cf. JACK SANTINO, MILES OF SMILES, YEARS OF STRUGGLE:
STORIES OF BLACK PULLMAN PORTERS 33-68 (1989) (describing success of Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters and its ability to secure important protections for Black workers).
242 See, e.g., RAY MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 311-12 (1965)
(describing development of more egalitarian racial practices among many unions in the 1960s);
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 14, 82-83, 109, 144 (1985) (detailing key role played by AFL-CIO
and constituent unions in lobbying process leading up to enactment of Civil Rights Act).
243
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNrrED STATES 1986, at 424 (106th ed. 1985)
(reporting that in 1983,27.2% of Black wage and salary workers were union members, as opposed
to 19.3% of White workers); DeFreitas, supranote 101, at 292 (reporting that 29.4% of Black
workers aged 23-30 were covered by collective bargaining agreements in 1988, as opposed to
16.7% of White workers, and that higher percentage of coverage for young Black workers applies
to professional and technical jobs as well as clerical and blue collar occupations); Thomas A.
Kochan, How American Workers View Labor Unions, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1979, at
23, 26-27 (reporting that nonwhite workers appear to be willing to join unions as a matter of
course).
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D. The NLRA and the GenderEffect
Our database includes votes from twenty-one female judges, eleven appointed
by President Carter and ten named by Presidents Reagan or Bush. 244 The female
Democrats did not differ significantly in their voting patterns from male Democrats.
Democratic appointees, both male and female, were significantly more likely than
Republican appointees to support the union in many of our analyses. Political party,
not gender, best explained the votes of these female Democrats.
Among Republican appointees, however, a striking gender gap emerged. In five
of our seven analyses, Republican women were significantly more likely to support
the union than their male Republican colleagues. In three of the equations in which
gender was significant, including our analysis of all issues in all cases, Republican
women joined their Democratic colleagues in registering significant pro-union
support.245 In two other equations, including our analysis of divisive issues,
Republican women were significantly more likely to support the union than any of
their colleagues-including both male and female Democrats. 246
This gender difference between Republican men and women was one of the
largest effects we identified. Among all issues in all cases, a Republican man was
more than twice as likely as a Republican woman to reject the union's position
(Table M). For divisive issues, a male Republican was more than four times as
likely as a female Republican to rebuff the union's claim (Table VII). 247
of Democratic and Republican women was closely matched, the
Democratic women contributed more votes to our database. Carter appointees cast 386 of the 582
female votes on All Case issues (66%). Their relative participation was higher on divisive issues,
on which they cast 85 of the 108 female votes (79%).
245
See Tables II (all issues in all cases); V (section 8(a)(1) and (3) claims); VII (published
cases).
246
See Tables V (section 8(b) claims); VII (divisive issues). The divisive issues include only
23 votes cast by Republican women, and 85 by Democratic women, so this result should be
interpreted with caution. Still, the effect is noteworthy. Republican women also were more likely
to support the union than any of their colleagues on claims arising under section 8(b), but the
number of Republican and Democratic female votes in this analysis was even smaller than in our
examination of divisive issues.
In our analysis of section 8(a)(5) issues, Republican women resembled Republican men, with
both groups differing from Democrats. Democratic appointees, both male and female, were
significantly more likely to support the union on 8(a)(5) claims than were Republican judges of
either gender. Finally, neither gender nor political party was significant with respect to remedial
matters litigated under section 10(c).
247 Tables III and VIII report probabilities that judges with selected characteristics would
favor the union's legal position. These comparisons invert those probabilities to focus on the
likelihood of rejecting the union's claim.
244 Although the number
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We earlier identified two different theoretical approaches that have been
2 48
advanced to explain why a judge's gender might influence decisional outcomes
The argument for a distinctly female perspective on judging seems unpersuasive
when applied to our labor law data. None of our multivariate analyses revealed a
significant difference between women as a group and men as a group. Three
analyses found that Democratic men, Democratic women, and Republican women
differed significantly from Republican men; two discovered that Republican women
varied significantly from Democratic men, Democratic women, and Republican
men; and one revealed that Democrats (male and female) differed from Republicans
(male and female). None of our analyses, in short, uncovered a distinctive "female
voice."
Moreover, the analysis that might have been most likely to reveal a
communitarian female ethic, as posited in the "different voice" theory, displayed no
such effect. Section 8(a)(5) protects the exercise and effectiveness of collective
bargaining by the union, an entity asserting group rights on behalf of the community
of all represented employees.2 49 The section thus comes closest to recognizing and
protecting communitarian values. In this analysis, however, political party was
significant while gender was not. Republican women parted from Democratic
women, with whom they might have shared a communitarian support for collective
bargaining, and voted consistently with Republican men on these issues.
The other approach, that female judges' experiences as relative outsiders in the
legal profession may foster a tendency to support union legal positions, better fits
our data. This first generation of female judges carved out unusual professional
paths to the appellate bench, while facing special role conflicts and a hostile work
culture. Despite top academic honors, these women had difficulty finding legal
employment, received lower pay than men performing the same work, and had few
role models for overcoming these obstacles. 250 Assuming that women's values do
248

See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text (discussing psychologically based

"different voice" approach positing that women adopt less individualistic and more communitarian
moral positions, and sociologically based approach predicated on female judges' initial
experiences as relative outsiders in the legal profession).
249
By contrast, employer misconduct under section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) typically
involves attacks against the rights of individual employees to be free from interrogation, threats,
discrimination, and similar autonomy-related interference. See supra notes 113-15, 157-61and
accompanying text (discussing this important distinction).
250 See, ag., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progressin the LegalProfession
in the UnitedStates, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 15-16 (1997) (recalling that in 1963, the same year the
Equal Pay Act was passed, the Dean of Rutgers Law School "carefully explained about the state
university's limited resources, and then added it was only fair to pay me [more] modestly [than
men on the faculty], because my husband had a very goodjob"; the following year, she "borrowed
clothes from [her] ever supportive, one size larger mother-in-law" to conceal a pregnancy and
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not inherently differ from those of men, this generation of female judges may still
vote in distinctive ways on workplace fights issues that create a relatively clear
polarization between haves and have-nots.
This perspective also best explains why Republican women parted from their
male Republican colleagues and joined Democratic men and women to support
union outcomes. The generation of Republican women who came of age in the legal
profession between 1960 and 1990 may have a particularly sharp sense of outsider
status. During this period, Republican members of Congress and Republican
Presidents increasingly advocated positions adverse to the interests ofwomen in the
workforce and society at large.251 For these and other reasons, the Republican party
experienced a substantial gender gap with the voting public, especially after
1980.252 Women appointed by Republicans in the 1980s and early 1990s, therefore,
may perceive themselves as distinctly outside the mainstream of their own partyto a far greater extent than would be the case for their Democratic counterparts.
Perhaps this stronger sense of being outsiders contributed to their greater propensity
to identify with the employee protection policies and participatory values advocated
by unions.
insure renewal of her annual contract); Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's
Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. L. REV. 657, 673 (1996) (reporting that when she graduated from
Stanford Law School, the "best job offer I received in the private sector was as a legal secretary");
Deanell Reece Tacha, "W" Stories: Women in LeadershipPositionsin the Judiciary,97 W. VA.
L. REv. 683, 683-84 (1995) (noting her "anguish [in] ... trying to piece together [a] professional
and personal life without patterns to guide" her, and recounting that her father drove overnight to
her college dormitory to plead in person that she not apply to law school); see also supra note 47.
251 See, e.g., Carla M. da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Recent Development, Will the New
Republican Majority in Congress Wage OldBattles Against Women?, 5 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ.
501,517-20 (1995) (discussing Republican opposition to Family and Medical Leave Act in late
1980s and early 1990s, including two vetoes of a similar bill by President Bush); 134 CONG. REC.
4633-69 (1988) (reporting Senate debate and override of President Reagan's veto of Civil Rights
Restoration Act, which inter alia broadened antidiscimination protections for women in higher
education; majority of Senate Republicans voted to sustain President Reagan's veto).
252

See BARBARA C. BURRELL, A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGNING FOR

CONGREsS IN THE FEMINIST ERA 92-94, 146 (1994) (reporting that Republican party nearly

excluded women from candidacies for public office between 1976 and 1988, and that "[t]he
emphasis on the traditional family among the conservatives ... conflict[s] with their promotion
of women in political leadership positions"); O'Connor, supranote 250, at 669-70 (citing figures
demonstrating "the emergence of a sizeable political party gender gap in American politics");
Theodore H. White, New Powers,New Polities,N.Y. TIES, Feb. 5, 1984, § 6, at 22 (reporting
that exit polls from 1980 Presidential election indicated male voters favored Ronald Reagan by
56% to 36%, while female voters supported him by only 47% to 45%); STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
OFTHEUN= STATES 1996, at 269 (116th ed. 1996) (reporting that in 1988 and 1992 Presidential
elections, female voters were substantially more inclined than male voters to favor Democratic
candidate-50% v. 44% in 1988; 61% v. 55% in 1992).
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Our findings regarding Republican women are consistent with two recent
studies finding that female judges are significantly more likely than their male
colleagues to support employment discrimination claimants. 253 It is noteworthy that
one of these studies found the pro-plaintiff gender effect to be larger for Republican
female judges than for their Democratic counterparts. 254 The female Republican
judges in our database were significantly more likely than male Republicans to
support litigants alleging violations of individual employee rights under sections
8(a)(1) and (3); these are the NLRA claims that are most analogous to employment
discrimination complaints. Our results, however, go well beyond the findings of the
two previous studies. Support for union legal positions against employers often
involves disputes in which the equal treatment rights of female claimants, or indeed
individual employee rights of any kind, play no part. Moreover, the fact that
Republican women were also significantly more likely to support the union on
section 8(b) claims, which often are raised by individual employees and not
employers, suggests a willingness to favor union positions against allegations of
individual employee mistreatment. The Republican gender gap, in other words,
involved more than just an empathetic response to sex discrimination claims filed
by individual employees.
Democratic women, of course, also suffered career constraints and outsider
treatment, yet they did not differ significantly from Democratic men in their
treatment of union claims. It may be that both the experiences of professional
women in this generation and the beliefs that contribute to Democratic affiliation
create pro-union sympathies, but that the effects are not cumulative. Whatever the
mechanism, the finding serves as an important reminder that gender (like political
party) is not monolithic. Gender is one of many characteristics that, in combination
with other judicial life experiences, can have some relation to attitudes.
E. Some Caveats and a BroaderPerspective
We have attempted to explain why many different social background variables
may have been significantly associated with the likelihood that a judge would
support or reject the union's legal position in the court of appeals. It is important to
emphasize, however, that statistically significant correlation does not equate with
253

See Crowe, supranote 30 (reviewing sex discrimination decisions in courts of appeals
from 1981 to 1996); Davis et al., supranote 30, at 131 (reviewing employment discrimination
decisions in courts of appeals from 1979 to 1992).
254 See Crowe, supranote 30; see also Thomas, supra note 43, at 49, 51 (reporting that while

female legislators in California are generally more supportive of women's issues than their male
counterparts, the gender effect is relatively slight among Democratic legislators but quite strong
among Republican legislators).
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causation.2 55 With respect to judicial behavior, it would be misguided to assert that
a simple, direct relationship exists between social background and votes in
particular decisions or specific types of cases. Some life experiences, such as
running for office, may shape attitudes in ways that dispose a judge to support
arguments protecting employee efforts to secure representation. Yet the individuals
who chose to pursue elective office may already have held beliefs that favored such
arguments; those beliefs may have drawn them into the life experiences that later
correlated with pro-union votes. Some of the associations we detected might also
be proxies for quite different associations. Graduates of selective colleges may have
been more likely than other judges to have grown up in the suburbs; Republican
women may have been more likely than their colleagues to have led volunteer
organizations. Social background is complex, and no analysis can control for all of
tiose complexities.
In addition, all associations are averages, while judges vote as individuals. The
fact that Republican men, on average, are less likely than other judges to support the
union's legal position does not mean that all Republican men vote against the union
all of the time. Some Republican men favor the union's position more often than
Democrats or women do. Every judge, moreover, is a composite of all the
background variables in our database. For each individual, some characteristics
predict a sympathy for policies that promote collective bargaining while others
suggest an opposition to those policies. Analyses like ours identify composite
trends; they do not pigeonhole particular judges.
Finally, all of our variables together explained no more than one-third of the
variance in our "support union" dependent variable.256 That bottom line leaves
considerable scope for the operation of doctrine, precedent, and other more
traditional legal factors.2 57 Our model, using an especially large number of
255

See generally JOHNSON AND JOSLYN, supranote 119, at 56-57,376-77 (distinguishing
between causation and correlation); SIRKIN, supra note 119, at 21-22,436-38 (same); see also
Wald, supra note 27, at 238-39 (observing that while correlations often exist between ajudge's
votes on certain cases and the political party of her appointing President, personal experience as
ajudge has led her to doubt that such correlations are a secure basis for predicting her votes).
256
Our R 2 analogue was 25% for all issues in all cases, 17% for all issues in published cases,
and 34% for all divisive issues. See Tables II and VII supra. For statutory subsections, the R2
analogue displayed a wider range-from 15% for issues under section 8(a)(1) or (3) and 17% for
issues under § 10(c) to 25% for issues under section 8(a)(5) and 36% for issues under section 8(b).
See Table V supra. As we observed earlier, supranote 180, the R2 analogue, like other goodnessof-fit statistics, is only a relative measure; there is no justification for referring to a particular R2
analogue of 25% or 35% as "good" in some absolute sense. See KING, supranote 123, at 24 n.7.
257 Other factors, such as random error in sampling or coding, as well as personal attitudes
or background factors for which we could not control, would also account for some ofthe variance
in our dependent variable that is unexplained by our model.
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independent variables and controls, confirms the predominant role of those legal
factors in deciding most cases. Indeed, Board outcome, or deference to the
administrative agency, was the most powerful predictor in all of our equations,
25 8
explaining up to half of the variance accounted for in each equation.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our analysis has identified numerous personal,
political, and professional background factors that are significantly associated with
a judge's propensity to support or reject the union's legal position. Republican
women, Democratic men, and Democratic women are about 10% more likely than
Republican men to vote for the union, even when one considers the full range of
published and unpublished cases.259 Among all appeals from Board decisions
favoring the employer, judges with NLRA management experience are more than
twice as likely as other judges to adopt the union's position and reverse the
Board. 260 In the category of divisive issues, some of the marginal effects are even
larger, with Republican women about four times more likely than other judges to
adopt the union's position and judges with elected office experience almost twice
as likely to do so.261 These findings strongly suggest that social background factors
play a meaningful role in influencing judicial approaches to labor law issues.
Our explanations for that role hypothesize a connection between life
experiences and the formation of attitudes empathizing with the policies behind
collective bargaining. People, including those who become judges, are not bom
hostile to or supportive of unions. Instead, exposure to unions, to blue collar voters,
to chilly professional climates, or to other experiences may foster broader
258 In our analysis of all issues in all cases, Board outcome explained between 7.99% and
18.56% ofthe variance, depending on whether it was entered last or first in the equation, while the
remaining variables explained between 6.28% and 16.85% of the variance. See supranote 180
(explaining how the percentage of variance explained by a variable may depend upon when a
variable is entered in the equation). Among published issues, Board outcome explained between
5.15% and 9.81% of the variance, with all other variables contributing between 5.15% and 6.84%.
And among divisive issues, Board outcome explained between 14.63% and 16.98% of the
variance, with other variables explaining 16.70% to 19.05%.
Apart from the direct explanatory influence of our judicial attnibutes, see supranotes 180-83

and accompanying text, the controls for circuits explained between 2% and 6% of the variance in
our three primary equations. These variables almost certainly reflect the influence of some judicial
attributes, because the courts vary in the number ofjudges holding each of the characteristics we
examine. Thus, if a circuit produces pro-union results more often than other circuits, the result may
stem in part from a disproportionate number of judges holding characteristics (such as NLRA
management experience) associated wvith those outcomes. The circuit variables, however, also
reflect factors like case mix, local precedent, and circuit culture.
259 See supraTable MII.
260 See id.
261 See supra Table VIII.
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understanding for the objectives furthered through organization and collective
bargaining. In the judicial context, that understanding informs doctrinal
interpretation and policy elaboration; it does not trump those elements.
The robust association between NLRA management experience and pro-union
outcomes provides a particularly dramatic illustration of the way in which judicial
background may shape understanding of the claims litigated under a statute. Judges
with management-side experience were significantly more likely than other judges
to vote againsttheir former clients, especially when their NLRA experience was
diverse and especially when a pro-union vote required reversing the Board. The best
explanation for this effect is that extensive experience applying the NLRA gave
these judges a special appreciation for the statute's purposes and workings. In this
sense, the social background and traditional legal models ofjudicial decisionmaking
are linked, because familiarity with a statute's purposes (generated by personal
background) creates or enhances doctrinal understanding. 262
In terms of the broader intellectual debate between law and political science, we
have demonstrated that social background factors are valuable in helping to explain
judicial behavior. The language of statutory text and the principled application of
precedent to facts play a substantial part, but they do not constitute the whole story
in the federal courts of appeals. Individual judges' attitudes toward unions also
make a difference. At the same time, votes are not determined by a single prejudicial event or exposure. Rather, judicial policy preferences are an intricate
tapestry ofpersonal, educational, and professional experiences woven together over
the course of a lifetime. By constructing a model that is both careful and detailed,
we have identified some experiences as especially meaningful in shaping those
preferences.
CONCLUSION

Our findings illuminate the process of appellate decisionmaking under a major
federal statute, one that harks back to an entire generation of New Deal legislation.
From a scholarly perspective, our analyses suggest that intensive exploration of a
single subject matter can best crystallize the complex cross-currents of judicial
262 Ourresults

for section 8(a)(5) claims underscore this linkage. Section 8(a)(5) raises issues
that are most distinctive to collective bargaining and most foreign to the individual rights
orientation of contemporary legal culture. Under that section, judges with NLRA management
experience differed most sharply from their colleagues, showing an especially strong propensity

to reverse the Board and protect collective bargaining rights. Other judges (including graduates of
elite law schools, older judges, and even those, like Democratic appointees and Republican
women, who often favored union legal positions) showed less empathy for union arguments under
this section.
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behavior. Analysis of a data set that focuses on one field of substantive law, and on
subdivisions of case outcomes within that field, makes it easier to identify the
demographic, socioeconomic, and occupational experiences that appear to influence
judicial decisionmaking. Our unprecedented access to a full range of unpublished
opinions in this field also allowed us to explore effects in both controversial and
noncontroversial cases-as well as to show the pitfalls of confining analysis to any
one category.
As in any study of a single time period, our results may be affected if not
shaped by the broader historical context. Appellate court judges appointed between
1945 and 1965 acquired their life experiences in an era when public views regarding
unions' role in society, and the basic value of government regulation, were
considerably more favorable than they have been since the mid-1970s. Further
examination of judicial behavior interpreting the NLRA during earlier (and,
eventually, later) historical periods would allow for useful comparative assessment
of the role played by our various background factors.
From a practical standpoint our findings with regard to NLRA management
experience-suggesting that judges with extensive knowledge of the Act apply it
with greater sensitivity than other judges-could be invoked to promote the
establishment of a specialized labor court, analogous to the specialized tribunals
created in recent decades to enforce other federal statutory schemes.2 63 The need for
specialized knowledge, and the lack of uniformity across circuits, are among the
features most commonly associated with the creation of specialized courts.264 While

263 See Federal

Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to review and enforce
patent law); Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210 § 211 (b)(1),
85 Stat. 743, 749; Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 5, 87 Stat 627, 633;
Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, § 10(b), 91 Stat. 4,9 (creating Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals to review and enforce energy programs); Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951,

83 Stat. 730 (1969) (creating United States Tax Court to review and enforce aspects of revenue
laws); see generally Bruff,supranote 223, at 332-39.
264 See Daniel

J. Meador, A Challenge to JudicialArchitecture: Modifing the Regional
Design ofthe U.S. CourtsofAppeals, 56 U. C. L. REV. 603, 617-21 (1989) (identifying as key
criteria that justify creation ofanonregional appellate court forum the need for judges to develop

and maintain familiarity with a specialized area of law, and the corrosive effects ofnonuniform
regional decisions). Although our discussion does not focus on intercircuit variation, two or more
of the circuit variables were significant in all but one of our equations. Indeed, in the equation for
all issues in all cases, seven of the eleven circuit variables approached or reached significance. The

one equation that did not show significant circuit effects, our analysis of section 8(b) claims, was
the one in which 43% of all issues were concentrated in a single circuit, providing substantial
evidence of forum shopping.
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federal labor courts are well-entrenched in many European countries, 265 we do not
advocate the establishment of a specialized labor court based on our study. Apart
from the obvious need to collect additional detailed information, there are many
costs associated with specialization. 266 Any benefits gained from a specialized
court, moreover, may not be as substantial where a national adjudicative agency
already exists that in theory can provide much of the expertise and guidance
267
associated with specialized tribunals.
Our findings, however, do support the need for ongoing judicial training about
the distinctive purposes and policies of the NLRA-and, perhaps, about other
complex regulatory schemes. The Federal Judicial Center and several academic
institutions already offer extensive programs of continuing legal education to
judges.268 Those programs, like other professional education programs, may have
a natural tendency to focus on recent developments or new doctrines. Our results
suggest that it is equally important to revisit the fundamental principles of aging
statutes that remain an important component of the appellate docket.
As with other older federal laws, Congress for many decades has not altered the
basic structure of the NLRA. While this legislative inaction may not reflect
265 See, e.g., Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, The Settlement ofLabor Disputes in France,in LABOR
COURTSAND GRIEVANCE SMILEMENTiN WESrERN EUROPE 1, 15-40 (Benjamin Aaron ed. 1971)
(discussing French system of labor courts); Thilo Ramm, Labor Courtsand Grievance Settlement
in West Germany, in LABOR COURTS, supra at 81, 96-127 (discussing German labor court
system); Folke Schmidt, The Settlement ofEmployment Grievancesin Sweden, in LABOR COURTs,
supra, at 159, 198-226 (discussing Sweden's single labor court).
266 See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 223, at 331-32 (identifying costs of creating specialized
courts, including loss of the generalist perspective, diminished court prestige, and problems of bias
in appointments process and in application ofreview standard); Dreyfuss, supranote 222, at 2551 (discussing costs of specialization as demonstrated by initial Federal Circuit experience; citing
pro-patentee bias, problems ofjurisdictional definition, and difficulty of supervising lower courts).
267
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (describing Labor
Board as "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a
specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an
expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect"). Of course, the courts of
appeals have been criticized over the years for not conferring sufficient respect upon Board
judgments. See generally JULUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: ThE
BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 7-9 (1988) (discussing reasons why federal courts have
played a far greater role than was contemplated by NLRA drafters). Moreover, even the Supreme
Court in Universal Camera stated that in the wake of Taft-Hartley amendments modifying the
standard for judicial review, "courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness
and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have shown in the past." 340 U.S. at 488.
268
See Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 101, 81 Stat. 664, 664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(3)
(1994)) (authorizing Federal Judicial Center to "conduct programs of continuing education and
training for personnel of the judicial branch of the govemment, including... judges").
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widespread satisfaction with the Act, Congress's repeated refusals to approve
proposals for reform in either direction at least signal that there is no consensus to
alter the historic scheme. 269 In these circumstances, it is appropriate to deepen and
enrich judicial sensitivity to NLRA paradigms and policies, so that courts applying
this older statute are in a better position to implement faithfully Congress's stillprevailing norms.
In addition to this specific recommendation, our study supports the need for
further inquiry into the forces that shape judicial conduct We are in the midst of a
spirited debate between appellate court judges and scholars about the relevance of
a judge's political affiliation in predicting votes2 70 Such disagreements should not
obscure the importance of developing more sophisticated analyses of other judicial
background factors, and of exploring the possible relationships between those
factors and specific aspects of legal doctrine. Additional research is especially
timely as the federal bench becomes steadily more diverse in a number of
demographic and socioeconomic respects. In this regard, we share Judge Wald's
recently expressed belief that in the years ahead, social background factors will
assume an increasingly meaningful role as indicators ofjudicial voting behavior.27 1

269 See Brudney, supra note 70, at 943-44 (discussing unsuccessful campaigns for pro-union
reform between 1977 and 1994, and unsuccessful employer efforts at reform since 1995).
270
See Edwards, supra note 24 (criticizing Revesz, supranote 8, and Cross & Tiller, supra
note 22); Wald, supra note 27 (criticizing Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal
for ImprovingAmerican Justice,99 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1999)).
271 See Wald, supranote 27, at 252 n.65.
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Appendix A
Coding Schemes
1. Employer Liability: Specific Unfair Labor Practice Issue Codes
Under Section 8(a)
8al Misc
8alB
8alI
8alS
8alSU
8alT
8a2
8a3 Misc
8a3MM
8a4
8a5 Misc
8a5BF
8a5GFD
8a5I
8a5MS
8a5MT
9S
9U
8f

Catch-all for 8al violations not otherwise identified
Conferring or promising benefits during campaign
Interrogation
Employer solicitation policies
Surveillance
Threats
Domination or interference with labor organization
Catch-all for 8a3 violations not otherwise identified
Mixed-motive discrimination against union members or supporters
Retaliation for filing charge or testifying under Act
Catch-all for 8a5 violations not otherwise identified
Bad faith bargaining, including surface bargaining
Good faith doubt as to continued majority status
Refusal to provide information requested by union
Refusal to bargain on mandatory subjects
Unilateral mid-term modifications or other unilateral pre-impasse
changes
Technical 8a5 based on challenge to identity or scope of
bargaining unit
Technical 8a5 based on challenge to union/employees' conduct
during campaign
Pre-hire agreement

2. Union Liability: Specific Unfair Labor Practice Issue Codes Under
Section 8(b)
8bEr
8bEes

Union misconduct directed at employer, including violations of
§§ 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(l)(B), 8(b)(2), 8(b)(3), 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7)
Union misconduct directed at one or more individual employees,
including violations of §§ (b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2)
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3. Relief Against Employer: Specific Issue Codes Under Section
10(c)
Backpay awards against employer
Bargaining Orders
Catchall for § 10(c) relief not otherwise identified

10BP
10BO
locMisc

Most issues were readily identifiable based on the descriptive and analytic
discussion in the appellate court opinions. As a general matter, when the issue was
not sufficiently identifiable, it was placed in the "catch-all" category - e.g., an 8a5
ULP that did not plainly belong in one ofthe five more specific subgroups.
4. Appellate Court Judges Data Collection Form
Judge's Name
Judge's Circuit

(1 through 11 plus DC = 12)

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Year ofBirth
Race

(Last 2 digits of birth year)
(O-W; 1-B; 2-L; 3-A; 4-NA/PI; 5-Oth)
(0-M; l-F)

Gender

Religion

(0-Protestant; 1-Catholic; 2-Jewish; 3-Oth)

APPOINTMENT DATA

Year appointed
Appointing President

(Last 2 digits)
(0-GB; 1-RR; 2-GF; 3-RN; 4-IKE;
5-BC; 6-JC; 7-LBJ; 8-JFK; 9-FDRIHT)

Confirming Senate

(0-D; 1-R)

Active or senior: 10/28/86

(0-A; 1-S)

Active or senior: 11/2/93

(0-A; I-S)
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EDUCATIONAL-BACKGROUND
College attended

(C )de schools in alpha order)

Year of degree

(Last 2 digits)

Law School attended

(C ode schools in alpha order)

Year of degree

(Last 2 digits)

Law School Geographical Region

(Wr-West; MP-Mountain &
Pa ins; MW-Midwest; MAMi d-Atlantic; NE-Northeast;
SE-Southeast;
SC-South
Ceiatral; SW-Southwest)

PRE-APPOINTMENT PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Workplace law experience

(0-no; 1-yes)

Non-NLRA-related, state

(0--no; 1-some; 2-substantial)

Non-NLRA-related, federal

(0--no; 1-some; 2-substantial)

NLRA-related

(0--no; 1-some; 2-substantial)

Political experience

(0-no; 1-yes)

State elective

(0-no; 1-yes)

State legis hi-level

(0-no; 1-yes)

State exec hi-level

(0-no; 1-yes)

Fed elective

(0-no; 1-yes)

Fed legis hi-level

(0-no; 1-yes)

Fed exec hi-level

(0-no; 1-yes)
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(0-no; 1-adjunct; 2-full-time)
(List all applicable)

Legal academic experience

Law clerk experience

(0-no; 1-state; 2-Fed.D.Ct.;
3-Fed.Ct.App; 4-S.Ct.)
(List all applicable)

Judicial experience

(0-no; 1-st trial; 2-st app; 3-federal)
(List all applicable)
(Code number of years)
(Non-govt, non-public interest)

Private practice experience

MISCELLANEOUS DATA
(0-<250G; 1-<500G; 2-<lMil;
3-<3Mil; 4-<5Mil; 5->5Mil)

Net worth

(Code states in alpha order)

Residence when appointed
Sen. Judic. Comm. Questionnaire Used
Other Sources Used

(0-no; 1-yes)

(0-Almanac of Fed. Judie; 1-Am.Bench;
2-Fed.Judic.Alnanac; 3-Other)

5. District Court Judges Data Collection Form
Judge's Name
Judge's Circuit

(1 through 11 plus DC = 12)

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Year of Birth
Race

(Last 2 digits of birth year)
(0-W; 1-B; 2-L; 3-A; 4-NAIPI; 5-Oth)
(0-M; 1-F)

Gender
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APPOINTMENT DATA

Year appointed
Appointing Presi

(Last 2 digits)
(0-GB; 1-RR; 2-GF; 3-RN; 4-IKE;
5-BC; 6-JC; 7-LBJ; 8-JFK; 9-FDR/HIT)

Confinning Senate

(0-D; 1-R)

Active or senior: 10/28/86

(0-A; 1-S)

Active or senior: 11/2/93

(0-A; 1-S)

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
College attended
Year of degree
Law School attended
Year of degree

(Code schools in alpha order)
(Last 2 digits)
(Code schools in alpha order)
(Last 2 digits)

(W-West; MP-Mountain& Plains;
Law School Geographical Region
MW-Midwest; MA-Mid-Atlantic; NE-Northeast;
SE-Southeast; SC-South Central; SW-Southwest)
MISCELLANEOUS DATA

Sources Used

(0-Almanac of Fed. Judic; 1-Am.Bench;
2-Fed.Judic.Almanac; 3-Other)
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JUDICIAL HOSTILITY

Appendix B
Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union
All Section 8(a) Issues (N=4,409)
Coefficient

Robust Std. rr.

Significance

.18

.000

.01
.01

.387
.076

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic Appointee

.83 ***

Year Appointed
Age

-.01
-.02*

Female

Female/Democratic Interaction
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish
College Selectivity
Elite Law School
Elected Office
Nonelective Position
Prior Judicial Experience
Legal Academic
Workplace Law Experience
Corporate Law Experience
NLRA Management Experience
NLRA MgmtlBoard Interaction

.97 ***

.35

.006

-1.12 **
-.37
-.79 *
-.01
-.03 *
-.02
.13
-.13
-.13
.02
-.32
-.34
1.45 **
-1.81 ***

.45
.29
.43
.14
.01
.14
.14
.15
.14
.15
.24
.21
.61
.60

.013
.201
.065
.953
.000
.869
.357
A00
.322
.906
.186
.103
.017
.003

3.16 ***

.24

.000

.11
.34
.22
.54

.103
.000
.420
.387

Control Variables
Board for Union

Section 8(a)(5)
Other Section 8(a)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit

-.19
-1.57 *
-.18
.46

Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit

1.54 ***
1.24 ***
-.70 ***
-.88 ***

.30
.34
.23
.24

.000
.000
.002
.000

Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit

.33
-.34

.22
.25

.138
.168

.80 ***

.26

.002

.47
-.02
-.03
4.72 *
.18***

.32
.34
.03
2.74

.143
.942
.409
.084
.000

Ninth Circuit

Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of Decision
Constant
Pseudo R2
***p .01, **p.05, *p

.10
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